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In what follows I am going to provide the synopsis (dt.: “Inhaltliche Zusammenführung”) 
of my cumulative dissertation “Essays in Mutual Fund Research”.1 While all four essays 
of my dissertation are fully self-contained research articles within the strand of literature 
on mutual funds, information disclosure and regulation, this synopsis aims to provide an 
overarching understanding of the research area. In addition, the synopsis serves as an 
anchor to clarify interdependences of the papers and finally provide answers to the 
research questions addressed. 
In my doctoral thesis, I demonstrate i) how the demand and supply side respond 
to the (first time) availability of product information for mutual funds and ii) how actions 
and personal characteristics of portfolio managers impact investors and fund 
management. Essays (1) and (2) extend the scarce evidence on the utility of investor 
information disclosure by means of a comprehensive investigation into the disclosure 
practices of the mutual fund industry. Using product information with different degrees 
of salience and obligation, ranging from comprehensive mandatory pre-contractual 
product information to complementary fund characteristics only disclosed by selective 
players, the essays document the importance of thoroughly written and designed 
information. Specifically, on the demand side, I analyze i) whether retail investors can 
understand mutual fund product information and ii) if investors are able to benefit from 
novel disclosure initiatives. Moreover, on the supply side, I show if and to what extent 
mutual fund companies react to novel disclosure regulations. Essays (3) and (4) shift the 
focus towards the individuals in charge of managing retail investors’ money, i.e. the 
portfolio managers, analyzing the impact of incentive mechanisms and personality traits 
on fund management and investor behavior.  
The overarching contribution of my research is threefold. First, by addressing 
information salience and understandability, I shed light on retail investor limitations not 
explained by the classical efficient market framework assuming investors to be fully 
rational utility-maximizing decision-makers (e.g., Fama 1970). Thus, my research adds 
to the rich behavioral finance literature dealing with cognitive capacity and information 
                                                          
1 The synopsis of the doctoral thesis is required by the Doctorate Regulations of the business and economics department 
of the University of Marburg (“Promotionsordnung des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaften”) valid since June 8th, 





processing constraints (e.g., Kozup et al. 2012, Agnew and Szykman 2005). Second, by 
analyzing investor behavior from an objective point of view, I contribute to the 
understanding of determinants which affect flows of mutual fund investor (e.g., Sirri and 
Tufano 1998, Barber et al. 2005). Third, methodically my research adds to the 
quantification of qualitative data in the finance domain (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 
2016, 2019) by applying advanced textual analytics (essays (1), (3) and (4)), allowing to 
investigate large samples of written (verbal) information. 
How do policy makers help consumers make sound investment decisions?  
Regulations which require disclosure of information are among the most ubiquitous 
interventions in investor protection. The popularity of mandatory information disclosure 
follows standard economic theory which suggests that disclosure can help avoid instances 
of market failure in situations characterized by asymmetric information and a risk of 
misaligned incentives (e.g., Akerlof 1970, Ross 1973). However, although broadly 
advocated as an appropriate policy measure, there is a paucity of data supporting the 
efficiency of mandatory information disclosure. For example, individuals’ information 
processing abilities have been shown to be limited and, thus, the increasing extent of 
mandatory information likely leads to an ‘information overload’, where the marginal 
utility of information for the decision-maker becomes negative (e.g., Eppler and Mengis 
2004). 
In my dissertation, I focus on investor information disclosed by actively managed 
equity mutual funds, since holdings in this asset class represent the by far largest fraction 
of household investments: in 2017, worldwide retail assets under management by equity 
mutual funds totaled at $21.8 trillion with the large majority being actively managed 
(Investment Company Institute 2018). Moreover, disclosure requirements are pervasive 
for fund companies and the market is a prime candidate for unintended consequences of 
mandatory disclosure such as information overload: investors face a dizzying number of 
product options and each product carries a host of characteristics, which should be 
considered in order to make an informed decision. Especially when investing in an 
actively managed mutual fund which is tantamount to delegating the management of a 
securities portfolio. I investigate four types of investor information which regulatory 





First and foremost, investor should understand the fund’s key features. For this to 
be the case, mandatory product information has to be easy to understand for the average 
investor (essay 1). The introduction of Key Investor Information Documents (KIIDs) for 
mutual funds in the European Union is the regulator’s response to the quest for a more 
comprehensible description of the essential product features and we examine if these 
documents live up to their purpose. Following Loughran and McDonald (2014), we assess 
the comprehensibility and regulatory compliance of KIIDs and thereby extend the scarce 
academic evidence on the importance of product information documents (e.g., Habschick 
et al. 2012, Oehler et al. 2014, Walther 2015). We use a comprehensive sample of roughly 
38,000 product information documents for mutual funds pre and post the introduction of 
KIIDs to capture the regulations impact on fund information comprehensibility. We find 
that while mutual fund product information remains difficult to read requiring on average 
13 years of formal education from readers, textual readability significantly improved with 
the introduction of KIIDs. Furthermore, we show that the introduction of KIIDs translated 
into a ‘clearer’ writing style. By contrast, we detect that the relative usage of financial 
jargon increased in the new short form disclosure document. Moreover, the improvement 
on readability and the significant reduction in length seem to be achieved at the expense 
of an appealing font. Only half of the KIIDs comply with regulators’ guidelines on font 
type and size. Taken together, we document mixed results on the regulations’ 
effectiveness in creating clear and comprehensible pre-contractual information that 
enable retail investor to read and understand those documents. 
Second, unlike index funds, actively managed funds sell the potential to beat their 
benchmark (usually a market index) and investors who select this type of mutual fund are 
typically looking for an opportunity to outperform the market index. However, actively 
managed funds usually charge significantly higher fees than passive funds (e.g., 
Morningstar 2018). This cost difference may be justified by the fund manager’s effort to 
manage the portfolio in a way which creates an opportunity to generate excess returns. 
Thus, assessing the fees charged by an actively managed fund in light of the actual level 
of activeness is a worthwhile screening exercise for investors: prior literature documents 
substantial underperformance for funds with low levels of activeness (e.g., Petajisto 2013, 





companies employ Active Share (AS)2, a metric to capture the degree to which a fund 
deviates from its benchmark, for a variety of purposes3 and provide AS information to 
institutional investors, they did not disclose it to retail investors and were not required to 
do so by regulators. The lack of equal access to AS information can be regarded as an 
information asymmetry, which prevents retail investors from fully evaluating the 
potential value proposition of an actively managed equity fund.4 Consequently, the New 
York Attorney General (NYOAG) revealed dubious index-hugging practices and unequal 
access to AS information for several of the largest US mutual funds and subsequently 
imposed disclosure of AS on them (NYOAG 2018). We make use of this unique 
intervention and thereby extend the few existing studies on funds’ activeness (essay 2). 
In particular, we are the first to demonstrate if and how individual investors react to AS 
information once they (can) learn about it. We find that retail investors strongly respond 
to the NYOAG intervention, but not in the way intended by the regulators. We document 
a significant increase in investor flows into funds of fund companies affected by the 
intervention. The effect is most pronounced in the days after the intervention became 
public. However, rather than ‘rationally’ re-allocating assets away from ‘high fee/low 
activeness’ and into truly actively managed funds, investors are subject to a media 
attention bias. Fund companies that are prominently covered in the press following the 
disclosure intervention experience high net inflows, irrespective of the degree of AS. 
These findings are hard to square with the notion that retail investors have understood the 
concept behind AS and rationally traded on this newly available information. On the 
supply side, we do not observe a change in portfolio management habits following the 
intervention. Even for funds with the lowest AS levels—i.e. arguably those funds with 
the highest pressure to act in an attempt to legitimate ‘active’ fees—we do not observe 
any measurable effort to increase AS post-intervention. In sum, our evaluation of the 
NYOAG intervention documents a number of unintended consequences and reveals 
substantial limits to the effectiveness of this disclosure initiative. 
                                                          
2 Introduced by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). 
3 Fund companies commonly use AS statistics to track fund performance and fund risk as well as in the selection and 
evaluation of fund managers (cf. NYOAG 2018, p.10f). 
4 Note that, while constituting highly relevant information, AS does not reflect all of the information an investor may 
want to consider when making a mutual fund investment decision. Moreover, the usefulness of AS as a measure of 
activeness has been criticized by several fund companies (e.g., Vanguard 2012, AQR 2015, Fidelity 2017). Yet, we 
observe that all these companies have always provided their professional and institutional investors with AS statistics, 





Third, investors face ongoing uncertainty about the standard of care fund 
managers exercise when managing their savings and whether they act in their best 
interest. Following the rationale "(…) that a portfolio manager's ownership of a fund 
provides a direct indication of his or her alignment with the interests of shareholders in 
that fund" (SEC 2004, section II, part D), managers of US mutual funds are required to 
disclose the amount of their private investments in all funds they manage. However, 
information about the beneficial holdings of portfolio managers (their skin-in-the-game) 
is far from readily accessible for the average retail investor. Instead, managers’ private 
investments are disclosed in a supplementary fund information document that is only 
provided upon request and, at best, can be considered a secondary source for the average 
investor.5 Yet, interestingly, fund managers regularly use another medium to voluntarily 
disclose skin-in-the-game to their investors: the Letter to the Shareholder (LS).6 The LS 
is a non-mandatory–however commonly enclosed–component of the mutual fund's semi-
annual or annual report.7 It is typically authored by the fund management, addresses the 
fund shareholders directly and thus constitutes a key element in communication with their 
shareholders (e.g., Hillert et al. 2016, Chu and Kim 2019). Unlike prior studies (e.g., 
Khorana et al. 2007, Ma et al. 2019, Evans 2008, Ibert 2018), who find that funds with 
managerial ownership yield higher risk-adjusted returns, I exploit verbal signaling of the 
managers in the LS to analyze aggregate investor fund flows applying advanced textual 
analytics (essay 3). With this, I contribute to prior research on the effects of fund manager 
skin-in-the-game by observing how retail investors respond to their managers’ signaling 
activities. I find that signaling of skin-in-the-game in the LS triggers substantial net 
inflows from retail investors. The effect is most sizeable in the days after investors receive 
the LS and persistent throughout time. On the other side, I show that retail investors’ asset 
allocation is unaltered by the actual amount invested by fund managers –an information 
                                                          
5 The Statement of Additional Information (SAI) frequently counts more than 50 pages and details numerous regulatory 
aspects. Furthermore, the SEC defines the SAI on its webpage as "[conveying] information about an open- or closed-
end fund that is not necessarily needed by investors to make an informed investment decision, but that some investors 
find useful." (cf. SEC 2019 – Defined Terms). 
6 Examples of how skin-in-the-game is communicated are, e.g., “I remain a significant investor in the fund alongside 
you“ or “I am committed to invest a substantial part of my private wealth in the fund” and addressing fund investors as 
“fellow shareholders“. 
7 Note that LSs (contained in the SEC Form N-CSR and N-CSRS) need to be certified by the executive committee and 
are required by law to present a “fair and truthful picture“ of the general economic outlook as well as the fund’s future 
strategy, i.e. no untrue or misleading statement should be made in the letter. In a related study using LS data, Hillert et 





the average retail investors most probable is unable (or unwilling) to find. Finally, I 
document that signaling of fund managers in the LS affects only retail investors. 
Professional investors, on the other hand, regularly have access to licensed fund data 
providers and potentially can easily obtain valuable information on fund manager 
investments. 
Fourth and lastly, we explore the consequences of a well-researched personality 
trait –narcissism– on fund managers’ portfolio management. Unlike ‘hard facts’ of a fund, 
such as past performance, cost or investment style, investors do know little about their 
fund managers personality. Yet, looking into the literature on corporate managers (e.g., 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, Kumar and Goyal 2015, Aktas et al. 2016), personality 
traits might also affect the job of fund managers. Applying text-mining techniques on 
verbatim fund manager interviews retrieved from The Wall Street Transcript, we find that 
narcissism is even more severe among professional fund managers than in the corporate 
context. We show that narcissistic fund managers are significantly more likely to deviate 
from their advertised investment style. Moreover, we document that while the realized 
performance of narcissistic fund manager is virtually identical to their non-narcissistic 
counterparts, we find that they exhibit a worse risk-return profile. Furthermore, we 
identify that large funds, i.e. those associated with higher compensation and prestige in 
the business, are more often managed by narcissistic managers, which is in line with prior 
literature documenting ‘empire-building’ behavior of narcissists. Given our evidence 
pointing to a rather negative relation of narcissism on portfolio management, we would 
expect investors to refrain investing with a narcissistic manager. However, we find that 
this is not the case. Most probable, investors do not know about personal traits of their 
fund managers and consequently are unable to act upon this information. 
Taken together, the findings of my essays stress the importance of salient 
information disclosure in order for retail investors to arrive at a wise investment decision. 
The empirical evidence provided highlights certain shortcoming in current disclosure 
practices and regulations. Essay (1) indicates that summary product information 
accompanied by formatting and language guidelines are a first step in the right direction 
to ensure investors comprehensibility of product information for mutual funds. However, 
we still detect linguistic barriers that potentially prevent investors from reading and 





of a non-standardized information disclosure intervention. As can be inferred from 
investors’ (non-) response to the availability of information on funds’ activeness, we 
observe that local interventions that address information asymmetries and therefore 
should benefit retail investors decision making, proof almost inefficient when not 
requiring a standardized, comparable and well-thought through information layout. Essay 
(3) supports this notion in documenting a prevalent mismatch between information 
availability and information usage. Finally, essay (4) points on the importance of 
personality traits. For retail investors it might be important to know more about the 
character of their fund managers given the evidence that personality traits, such as 
narcissism, affect day-to-day portfolio management. In sum, decision relevant 
information for investors, from the explanation of funds’ investment style in the 
prospectus (essay 1), funds’ ‘true’ degree of activeness (essay 2), an indication of 
manager private wealth investment (essay 3) or hints on the managers personality (essay 
4), remains useless as long as the understandability, salience and transparency of 
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Nachfolgend findet sich die deutschsprachige Zusammenführung meiner kumulativen 
Dissertation zum Thema „Essays in Mutual Fund Research“.* Thematisch widmet sich 
jedes Essay hierbei einer eigenständigen und abgeschlossenen Fragestellung im 
Forschungsfeld Investmentfonds, Privatanleger und Regulierung. Übergreifend versucht 
die dargelegte Dissertation zu eruieren, welchen Einfluss die (verpflichtende) 
Bereitstellung von entscheidungsrelevanten Informationen auf den Anleger hat. Dabei 
untersuche ich i) ob Produktinformationen für den Privatanleger verständlich sind, ii) wie 
lokale Interventionen zur Bereitstellung von entscheidungsrelevanten Informationen auf 
Angebots- wie Nachfrageseite wirken sowie iii) welchen Einfluss strategisches 
„Signaling“ durch Fondsmanager auf Privatanleger hat. Ferner wird in einem 
angeschlossenen Essay untersucht, iv) wie sich Persönlichkeitsmerkmale von 
Fondsmanagern auf deren Anlageentscheidungen auswirken. Entgegen bestehender 
Literatur im Forschungsfeld, welche sich überwiegend auf die Untersuchung von 
Akteuren unter Laborbedingungen in kleinen Stichproben konzentriert, ist den Essays 
meiner kumulativen Dissertation gemein, die Anlegerreaktion im realen 
Kapitalmarktumfeld quantitativ zu messen. Zielsetzung ist somit ein besseres Verständnis 
der Auswirkungen von Informationsbereitstellung auf breiter Basis zu schaffen. Dies ist 
insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund a) eines zunehmenden Angebots von 
Finanzmarktprodukten sowie b) beschränkter Informationsaufnahme- und 
Verarbeitungskapazitäten auf Seiten der Anleger relevant. Sparer, die bisher über 
klassische Giro- und Sparkonten den Aufbau von Vermögen verfolgten, sehen sich im 
aktuellen Niedrigzinsumfeld gezwungen in alternative Anlageninstrumente 
umzuschichten. Offene Investmentfonds sind hierbei zunehmend das Instrument der 
Wahl. In den USA, wo im Vergleich zu Europa das Bewusstsein für das Risiko-Rendite 
Verhältnis seit Langem in der Anlagekultur der Sparer verankert ist, hält Stand 2018 
bereits jeder zweite Haushalt Anteile an einem Investmentfonds (ICI 2019). Parallel mit 
dem steigenden Investitionsvolumen durch Privatanleger steigt auch das Angebot. Ende 
2018 sind über 118.000 offene Investmentfonds weltweit zum Verkauf zugelassen (ICI 
2019). Von Seiten der Regulierer werden in diesem Zuge ausgedehnte 
                                                          
* Die Bestimmungen hierzu ergeben sich gemäß §8 (3) der Promotionsordnung des Fachbereichs Wirtschafts-





Veröffentlichungspflichten für die Angebotsseite etabliert, um den Anleger in die Lage 
zu versetzen sich vor der Investitionsentscheidung ein möglichst umfassendes Bild des 
Angebots zu machen. Allerdings trifft das zunehmende Angebot gepaart mit einer Fülle 
an bereitgestellten Informationen auf limitierte Informationsaufnahme- und 
Verarbeitungskapazitäten der Privatanleger. Dies führt nicht selten dazu, dass ein „Mehr 
an Information“ nicht zwangsläufig zu einer besseren Information des Anlegers führt. Die 
vorliegende Thesis analysiert daher verbindliche wie freiwillige Informations-
bereitstellung im Investmentfondskontext und ordnet deren Effektivität unter Einbezug 
der Investorenreaktion ein.  
Die Erkenntnisse der Dissertation legen nahe, dass gutgemeinte Regulierung zum 
Anlegerschutz häufig nicht die erhoffte Wirkung erzielen. Es scheint entscheidend, dass 
die Bereitstellung von Informationen den Anleger befähigen auf deren Basis einfach, 
vergleichbar und transparent abzuwägen. Neben der reinen Bereitstellung unterstreichen 
die Studien der Dissertation dabei, dass Format und Salienz von großer Bedeutung für 
den Anleger sind. Im Speziellen wird durch die Essays aufgezeigt, dass i) die Einführung 
kompakter Dokumente für die Zusammenfassung von Produktinformationen für 
Investmentfonds zwar deren Verständlichkeit verbessert hat, jedoch das generelle 
Sprachniveau weiterhin als schwierig einzustufen ist, ii) lokale Initiativen des 
Regulierers, welche die Angebotsseite zu mehr Transparenz hinsichtlich des 
Leistungsumfangs von Investmentfonds verpflichten, wirkungslos bleiben solange keine 
Standardisierung und Vergleichbarkeit geschaffen wird, iii) Informationen, die die 
Anreizsysteme von Fondsmanagern belegen, nur dann wahrgenommen werden können, 
wenn diese salient veröffentlich werden und schließlich iv) Charakterzüge des 
Fondsmanagers eine zentrale Rolle im Portfoliomanagement spielen und somit als 
wichtige Information für Anleger erachtet werden sollten. Allen Essays ist gemein, dass 
unter Verwendung von Textdaten qualitative Informationen in quantitative Merkmale 
übersetzt und so Teil des Untersuchungsgegenstandes werden. Nachfolgend finden sich 








Essay (1): Double Dutch finally fixed? A large-scale investigation into the 
readability of mandatory financial product information 
Mit der Einführung von zusammenfassenden Produktinformationsblättern (dt.: PIBs / en.: 
KIID) für Investmentfonds in 2012, unterstreicht die europäische Finanzregulierung die 
Wichtigkeit einfacher und verständlicher Sprache in der Beschreibung von 
Finanzprodukten. Zielsetzung ist es dem Privatanleger einen einfacheren und 
transparenteren Zugang zu Produktinformation für Investmentfonds zu verschaffen. Wir 
bewerten, ob durch die Einführung von PIBs sowie zugehörige Richtlinien zur 
Standardisierung und Vereinfachung der Sprache die Verständlichkeit von Informationen 
für Investmentfonds verbessert wurde. Mittels Methoden automatisierter Textanalyse 
untersuchen und bewerten wir hierbei erstmals quantitativ im Rahmen einer 
Vollerhebung alle in Deutschland zum Verkauf registrierten Investmentfonds. Wir stellen 
fest, dass Produktinformationen für Investmentfonds als „schwer lesbar“ einzustufen sind 
und vom Anleger ein hohes Maß an Bildung erfordern. Jedoch beobachten wir im 
Rahmen der Einführung von PIBs eine signifikante Verbesserung der 
Dokumentenverständlichkeit im Vergleich zu vorherigen Regulierungen. Dabei sind die 
sprachlichen Verbesserungen insbesondere durch einfachere Syntax und einen 
kohärenteren Schreibstil getrieben. Andererseits erkennen wir einen Anstieg in der 
Verwendung von branchenspezifischen Fachjargon sowie eine teilweise Missachtung 
von Designanforderungen. Diese Effekte erschweren insbesondere Privatanlegern mit 
geringer Branchenkenntnis die effiziente Aufnahme und Verarbeitung von 
Produktinformation im Rahmen des Entscheidungsprozesses. Wir diskutieren unsere 
Ergebnisse und schlagen mögliche Verbesserungen zur Offenlegung von 
Produktinformationen für Investmentfonds vor. 
Essay (2): Leveling the playing field? The effect of disclosing fund manager 
activeness to individual investors 
Seit April 2018 sind eine Reihe der größten US-Investmentfondsanbieter verpflichtet, 
Privatanlegern neben den Kosten mehr Informationen zur Leistung des Fonds 
offenzulegen. Im Speziellen erfordert die von der New Yorker Oberstaatsanwaltschaft 
eingeführte Intervention erstmals den Ausweis der ‘wahren Aktivität‘ des 





Privatanleger und die angebotsseitige Reaktion der Branche auf diese Intervention. Wir 
stellen fest, dass Anleger die neuen Informationen nicht rational in ihre Handelsstrategien 
übersetzen. Vielmehr beobachten wir, dass die Aufmerksamkeit der Privatanleger und 
folglich deren Investitionsverhalten im Zuge der Intervention durch die Medien (“Media 
Attention Bias“) beeinflusst wird: Fondsgesellschaften, welche von der Intervention 
betroffen sind, erfahren einen signifikanten Mittelzufluss, welcher im unmittelbaren 
Zusammenhang mit dem Medienecho zur Intervention steht. Darüber hinaus stellen wir 
fest, dass die Verpflichtung zur Veröffentlichung der wahren Fondsaktivität zu keinerlei 
Veränderungen auf der Angebotsseite führt. Selbst für als aktiv gemanagt beworbene 
Fonds, die allerdings einen hohen Grad an Überschneidung mit dem gewählten 
Benchmark Index aufweisen und somit einer passiven Anlagestrategie nahekommen, ist 
kein messbarer Effekt auf die Managementaktivität zu beobachten. Wir diskutieren 
unsere Ergebnisse und schlagen mögliche Alternativen zur Offenlegung der 
Fondsaktivität vor. 
Essay (3): skin-in-the-game: Investors’ reaction to fund managers’ strategic 
signaling of mutual fund ownership 
„skin-in-the-game“ (‘sitg’) – private Beteiligungen des Fondsmanagements am eigenen 
Fonds – ermöglichen es, Interessen von Fondsmanagern und Anlegern durch 
Risikopartizipation in Einklang zu bringen. Seit 2005 sind amerikanische Fondsmanager 
verpflichtet ihre Anteile an selbst verwalteten Fonds offenzulegen. Jedoch kann diese 
Information für Privatanleger als unzugänglich betrachtet werden, da sie weder 
standardisiert noch transparent ausgewiesen wird. Wir verwenden einen alternativen, für 
Privatanleger deutlich zugänglicheren Kommunikationskanal, über den Fondsmanager 
regelmäßig ‘sitg‘ signalisieren: Aktionärsbriefe im (halb-) jährlichen Fondsreporting. 
Aus diesen lässt sich (zumeist) zwar nicht das exakte Investment des Managers ableiten, 
sehr wohl enthalten diese aber (oftmals) eine verbale Indikation, ob durch das 
Fondsmanagement privat Anteile gehalten werden. Mit Hilfe von Textanalyse 
untersuchen wir eine große Stichprobe an Aktionärsbriefen von Investmentfonds (~ 
16.000 Beobachtungen) und zeigen erstmals, dass Privatanleger auf bewusstes 
„Signaling“ des Fondsmanagers reagieren. Wir finden signifikante Mittelzuflüsse durch 
Privatanleger im unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit der Veröffentlichung von 





nach schwacher Performance, im Bullenmarkt sowie bei Fonds, welche nur durch einen 
Manager verwaltet werden, ausgeprägt. Im Gegensatz dazu beobachten wir, dass 
Privatanleger nicht auf den tatsächlich vom Management investierten Betrag, der alleinig 
durch Sekundärquellen und spezialisierte Fondsdatenprovider ausgewiesen wird, 
reagieren. Unsere Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit Offenlegungspflichten 
entscheidungsrelevanter Information vor dem Hintergrund des tatsächlichen 
Anlegernutzens zu bewerten. Hierbei wird deutlich, dass neben dem Inhalt insbesondere 
das Format und die Salienz der Information entscheidend wirken. Wir diskutieren unsere 
Ergebnisse vor dem Hintergrund bestehender Regulierung. 
Essay (4): Fund manager narcissism 
Unter Verwendung wortgetreu transkribierter Interviews zeigen wir, dass „Narzissmus“ 
im besonderen Maße das Portfoliomanagement von Fondsmanagern beeinflusst. Wir 
finden, dass narzisstische Fondsmanager mit einer um 41% höheren Wahrscheinlichkeit 
von ihrem im Verkaufsprospekt beworbenen Anlagestil abweichen. Darüber hinaus 
weisen die von narzisstischen Fondsmanagern verwalteten Fonds ein deutlich höheres 
Anlagerisiko auf, welches sich nicht in höheren realisierten Renditen widerspiegelt. 
Jedoch beobachten wir, dass, unabhängig von der Wertentwicklung des Fonds, keinerlei 
Reaktion der Anlegerseite auf narzisstische Tendenzen des Fondsmanagers 
vorgenommen wird. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Anleger sich der 
investitionsrelevanten Konsequenzen dieses Persönlichkeitsmerkmals nicht bewusst sind.  
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1. Introduction  
“Don’t write up. Don’t write down. Write to.” 
–Robert Gunning, pioneer of textual readability analysis 
 
In this study, we investigate into the readability of mandatory product information 
addressed to retail investors. The regulatory goal behind imposing the disclosure of 
financial product information is to help investors arrive at informed decisions in situations 
which are likely characterized by a substantial information asymmetry between product 
providers and investors. To achieve this objective, financial regulation has traditionally 
mandated that an overwhelming quantity of information be provided to investors in order 
to support their financial decision making (e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014, Choi 
and Pritchard 2003). Clearly, however, mandatory disclosure may not serve its intended 
purpose if investors are not able to process the wealth of information they are provided 
with (e.g., Oehler et al. 2014, Chater et al. 2010, De Pascalis 2014). Prior research 
documents multiple instances of ‘information overload’ in retail finance, i.e. a situation 
in which too much information is provided to consumers and, as a result, reduces their 
ability to arrive at well-informed decisions (e.g., Eppler and Mengis 2004, Agnew and 
Szykman 2005, Oehler and Wendt 2017, Malhotra 1984). Indeed, Huhmann and 
Bhattacharyya (2005) show that investment companies regularly provide excessively 
detailed information which goes well beyond what is required by law and some even 
conjecture that mandatory information disclosure is abused to obfuscate investors rather 
than inform them (e.g., Warren 2008).1 
In light of the questionable merits of traditional financial product information 
disclosure, regulatory authorities have shifted their focus away from pure information 
provision.2 Recent disclosure requirements pay heed to long-standing evidence with 
respect to how humans process information as documented articulately in Kozup et 
al. (2008, p. 38): “[…] in order for […] information to have a positive impact on the 
consumer decision-making process, it must be easily accessible and presented in a clear 
and understandable format”. Specifically, the EU has mandated Key Investor 
                                                          
1 On a lighter note, Allan Sloan (2011), the former senior editor at Fortune magazine, provides a witty distinction of 
disclosure and transparency stating that “(…) disclosure is when you bury information in widely separated places in a 
400-word document filled with small type. Transparency is when you tell people what they need to know in simple 
terms in readable type on the cover of a document or within the first few pages. (…) Disclosure is a legal obligation. 
Transparency is an ethical obligation.” 
2 See section 2 for details on the regulatory background of mutual fund product information in the EU. 




Information Documents (KIIDs) for mutual funds in an effort to improve the readability 
of mutual fund product information. As of 2012, KIIDs have superseded Simplified 
Prospectuses (SPs) and are supposed to provide a comprehensible description of a fund’s 
essential product features. In this study, we examine if these documents live up to their 
purpose. At this, we focus on investor information disclosed by actively managed equity 
mutual funds, since holdings in this asset class represent by far the largest fraction of 
aggregate household investments: in the EU, for example, total assets under management 
in mutual funds have reached an all-time high of as much as 17.2 trillion EUR by the end 
of 2019, with the large majority being actively managed (EFAMA 2020).3 Moreover, 
information disclosure requirements are pervasive for fund companies and the market is 
a prime candidate for unintended consequences of mandatory disclosure such as 
information overload: investors face a dizzying number of product options—e.g., as much 
as 62,511 mutual funds were domiciled in the EU by 2019—and each product carries a 
host of decision-relevant characteristics. 
The introduction of KIIDs marks a paradigm shift in information disclosure in that 
these documents are legally required to be written in plain language.4 In order to specify 
this requirement, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) has issued 
the “CESR Guide to clear Language and Layout for the Key Investor Information 
Document” which provides fund companies with guidance and best practices on how to 
write in plain language (CESR 2010).5 Given that KIIDs are the blueprint for the 
upcoming Key Information Documents for Packaged Retail and Insurance-Based 
Investment Products (PRIIPs) which extend the concept of harmonized information 
provision to virtually all consumer finance products, a comprehensive evaluation of these 
documents is a matter of particular importance. 
                                                          
3 Mutual funds suitable for retail investors in the EU comprise Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) and Alternative Investment Funds (AIF). UCITS are organisms whose sole purpose is to invest 
funds raised from the public for collective account in accordance with the principle of risk diversification in securities 
and / or liquid financial assets. Shareholder of UCITS shares can request to withdraw their assets of these organisms at 
any time. Contrary, AIFs cover all funds that are do not qualify as UCITS funds. Typical examples for this asset class 
are hedge funds, private equity funds and real estate funds. 
4 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 583/2010 – Section II / Article 5: “A key investor information document shall be: 
a) presented and laid out in a way that is easy to read, using characters of readable size; b) clearly expressed and 
written in language that communicates in a way that facilitates the investor's understanding of the information being 
communicated, in particular where: (i) the language used is clear, succinct and comprehensible […].” 
5 Note that the CESR was superseded by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 




To assess the readability of KIIDs, we apply state-of-the-art textual analysis 
methods. To this end, we retrieve original full-length product information documents 
pertaining to a large-scale sample of 9,363 funds domiciled in eleven different countries 
and issued by 205 different mutual fund companies. For each of these documents, we 
compute an individual Flesh Reading Ease (FRE) score using a fully automated text 
mining routine which builds on the natural language toolkit (NLTK) package in Python. 
Our results suggest that key mutual fund investor information on average does not 
come in plain language. Compared to mandatory patient information leaflets or national 
newspapers, product information for mutual funds remains significantly more challenging 
to read and understand for the average retail investor. At the same time, however, several 
of our findings document that the introduction of KIIDs and the accompanying CESR’s 
guidelines have improved the comprehensibility of mutual fund product information. On 
average, KIIDs are significantly easier to read than the preceding SPs. While the use of 
jargon has not improved much, we find that the CESR guidelines regarding syntax and 
style indeed lead to enhanced readability of mandatory mutual fund product information. 
Additional metadata analysis reveals that only roughly half of the product information 
documents under review comply with CESR design requirements (i.e. font type and size). 
Finally, we find fund companies domiciled in countries whose official language is the 
same as the document language comply more accurately with the plain language 
regulations specified for KIIDs. This ties in with the notion that composing a plain text is 
particularly challenging if done in a foreign language. 
We make three contributions to prior research on KIIDs. First, we add to the 
ongoing debate about the usefulness of mandatory short-form-disclosure. In an early 
response to the finding that information representation matters for retail investors, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the SEC Plain English Rule6 in 
1998 which Loughran and McDonald (2014b) indeed found to be useful. In a related 
study, Godwin and Ramsey (2016) evaluate the effectiveness of short-form disclosures 
in five other economies and find that the Canadian fact sheet launched in 2007, which 
puts special emphasis on intelligibility, ranks highest in a student online experiment. By 
contrast, the Australian fact sheet which has remained largely unregulated in terms of 
                                                          
6 The SEC Plain English Rule, along with detailed user instructions and best practices on how to provide information 
clearly and concisely, is documented in a handbook (‘A Plain English Handbook - How to create clear SEC disclosure 
documents’).  




comprehensibility, comes in last. Moreover, they find that the complexity of language 
ranks as the most relevant determinant of investor attention to product information. 
Recently, Gilbert and Scott (2017) analyze investors’ perception of product information 
in New Zealand pre- and after the introduction of a short-form disclosure document and 
report mixed results with respect to its usefulness. While they observe an improvement 
in finance-related terminology, they find that general language has become more complex 
and harder to understand in the short-form disclosure. In earlier research, Kozup et al. 
(2008) show that summary data affects investor assessment of different mutual funds. By 
contrast, Beshears et al. (2011) find that summary prospectuses lead to a welfare gain in 
that they reduce the time being spent on an investment decision, but do not alter 
investment choices. 
Second, we analyze comprehensibility and legal compliance of KIIDs by applying 
objective and thus readily reproducible methods of advanced text mining. This 
methodology differs from approaches taken in most prior research in the field. Habschick 
et al. (2012) review a micro-sample of 160 short-form disclosures in Germany (among 
them 41 mutual fund KIIDs) and conclude that only roughly half of the fact sheets under 
review complied with the regulatory requirements on completeness of contents, 
intelligibility, and comparability. Oehler et al. (2014) ask students to compare the 
usefulness of real-world KIIDs with (mock-) fact sheets designed by the authors 
themselves and show a preference for the latter. In a related study, Walther (2015) 
conducts an online experiment in which 137 subjects make hypothetical investment 
decisions using KIIDs and fund prospectuses and rate their respective usefulness for the 
task. By contrast, our methodological approach allows for a significantly higher 
generalizability of results. Moreover, by focusing exclusively on KIIDs of mutual funds, 
i.e. the most important investment vehicle for retail investors in terms of asset volume, 
we ensure that our findings are not confounded by variation in intelligibility and 
regulatory compliance across different asset classes. 
Third, we demonstrate the applicability of readability formulas in the context of 
financial product information. In fact, the use of readability formulas in order to assess 
complexity in financial communication has been advocated by, e.g., former SEC 
chairman, Christopher Cox (SEC 2007). 




2. Mutual fund product information: regulatory background 
Mandatory disclosure of mutual fund product information in the EU dates back to the EU 
directive 85/611/EEC (UCITS I) effective as of 1985 which marked the first step towards 
a single European financial market. Specifically, investment companies were mandated 
to disclose a sales prospectus as well as (semi-)annual financial reports for all open-ended 
funds distributed to individual investors in the EU.7 However, because of inconsistent 
national law as to the marketing of mutual funds, the level of harmonization proved 
insufficient for the standard setter’s ultimate goal of establishing cross-border 
authorization and supervision. 
As of 2001, directive 2001/107/EC (UICITS III) required management companies 
to publish a Simplified Prospectus (SP)—intended to summarize the usually lengthy sales 
prospectus—and make this document available to their investors prior to the purchase of 
a mutual fund. However, the SP neither lived up to its purpose: “The Simplified 
Prospectus has failed as a consumer communication tool because the rules have led to 
long documents […], written in technical or legalistic language […] poorly structured 
and designed” (CESR 2010, p. 4). 
Hence, a new short-form document, the Key Investor Information document (KIID), has 
replaced the SP in all EU member states in a “[…] radical attempt […] to produce a 
document that is readily understandable by the average retail investor” (CESR 2010, 
p. 4). As of 2012, KIIDs have been a mandatory part of pre-contractual product 
information for retail mutual funds distributed in the EU.8 Again, KIIDs are supposed to 
provide investors with information on the key features of a UCITS in order to correctly 
assess scope and risks of the product. However, as a response to the shortcomings 
observed under the SP regime, KIIDs are limited to a maximum of two pages, have a 
predefined structure and content and, most importantly, should be easy to read and 
understand for an average retail investor.9 Specifically, EU Regulation 583/2010 requires 
                                                          
7 A prospectus must include the information necessary for investors to be able to make an informed judgement of the 
investment proposed to them. (EU directive 85/611/EEC – Article 28 (1)). 
8 The mandatory pre-contractual disclosure of a summary of a mutual fund’s key characteristics in a Key Investor 
Information Document is part of the UCITS IV directive, effective as of June 2012 (Directive 2009/65/EC). 
9 Specifically, EU Regulation 583/2010 mandates that KIIDs include the following information: product type and 
functionality, inherent risks, projected redemption and returns under different capital market scenarios, investment cost. 
Layout requirements include specifications as regards the sequence of contents as well as a simplified representation 
of risk, return, and cost of the product. As an exception to the general page limit, KIIDs pertaining to complex structured 
UCITS may consume up to three pages. 




KIIDs be “(…) written in language that communicates in a way that facilitates the 
investor’s understanding of the information being communicated.” (Section II, Article 5, 
1(b)). In order to provide fund companies with guidance on how to prepare KIIDs, the 
CESR (2010) has published guidelines on clear language and layout of the document. We 
list these guidelines in Table I-1 and examine whether they are adhered to in the 
subsequent sections of this study. Notably, highlighting the importance of plain language 
as well as standardized format and content marks a paradigm shift in the disclosure 
strategy of European regulatory authorities. 
 
Table I-1—CESR guidelines 
Variable CESR Guideline 
Readability “[The KIID] must appear important and easily readable.” (Part 3 – 
Designing a KIID) 
Sentence length “[…] aim to break up any that are over 25 words.” (Part 2 – Short 
sentences) 
Complex words (No specific guideline provided) 
Jargon “[Try] to avoid jargon altogether.” (Part 2 - Dealing with jargon) 
Writing style  
Passive style “A formal, passive and impersonal style can lead to redundant words 
and phrases as well as being unengaging to the reader.” (Part 2 – 




Typeface “Use a typeface that is easy to read, such as Arial (or similar sans 
serif) or Times New Roman” (Part 3 – Typeface) 
Type size “Aim for at least 11pt for serif fonts and 10pt for sans serif fonts” 
(Part 3 – Type size) 
Notes: This table summarizes the main CESR guidelines. Appendix I-1 provides detailed variable descriptions. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sampling and summary statistics 
We collect product information documents for all funds marketed to retail investors in 
Germany from FWW Fundservices GmbH, who maintain a unique database of product 
disclosure documents for financial products. To control for potential time effects, we 
retrieve four different documents from the database: two SPs (earliest and most recent 
version available) and two KIIDs (first and most recent version available) for each fund 
in our sample. We access all documents in November 2018. The earliest document (SP) 




in our sample was disclosed in 2004, whereas the most recent document (KIID) dates as 
of October 2018. For a given fund to be admitted to the sample, we require all four 
documents be available.10 Our final sample consists of 9,363 funds for which we obtain 
37,452 product information documents in PDF format. Sampled funds are domiciled in 
eleven different countries and issued by 205 different mutual fund companies and asset 
managers.  
To obtain textual characteristics from each document, we need to translate PDF 
files into machine-readable TXT files. We use the Python PDF2TXT module to extract 
plain text from the PDF files and supplement this module by a self-coded script, which 
enables us to obtain textual characteristics on various syntax measures (e.g., sentences, 
words, syllables) from the product information files in order to automate information 
processing. At this, we apply state-of-the-art textual analysis methods included in 
Pythons’ Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) and adopted to the investigation of text 
written in German. Finally, we merge the textual information with a host of fund 
characteristics we obtain from Morningstar Direct in order to explore differences with 
regards to the readability and format of product information depending on fund 
characteristics. Following the conventional procedure, we convert all variables at the 
share class level to fund-level aggregates weighted with their respective contribution to 
the fund’s total net assets (e.g., Doshi et al. 2015). 
 
Table I-2—Summary statistics - mutual funds 
   Mean SD Min Median Max 
Fund age (years) 12.45 6.40 6.00 12.00 84.00 
Fund size (in € mn.) 721.38 1,170.45 2.21 227.26 7,450.64 
Avg. annual gross return ’12-’18 (in %) 4.98 4.78 -24.43 4.43 35.84 
Avg. annual return std. dev. ’12-’18 (in %) 9.24 5.54 0.50 9.90 38.92 
Turnover ratio (in %) 70.93 110.92 -68.74 35.35 719.45 
Morningstar rating (1-5 stars) 3.03 1.02 1.00 3.00 5.00 
Ongoing charge (in %) 1.59 0.59 0.20 1.69 2.92 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of our sample of N=9,363 mutual funds. We provide a detailed description 
of the variables in Appendix I-1.  
 
                                                          
10 This limits the total of mutual funds covered in our sample from an initial 12,304 funds to a final 9,363 funds. 




Table I-2 reports summary statistics of our fund sample. The average fund has 
been run 12.5 years since inception, holds 721 million EUR in assets, yields an annual 
gross return of 4.98%, turns over 71% of its assets in a given year, features a three-star 
Morningstar rating and charges their investors 1.59% annually.11 
 
Table I-3—Summary statistics – SPs and KIIDs 
   Mean Sd Min  Median Max 
Panel A: Simplified Prospectus (earliest available version) 
Disclosure date   10/2007 694 days 02/2004 03/2007 10/2012 
# sentences   454 591 42 130 3,318 
# words   11,251 14,389 950 3,432 87,391 
Unique words (in %)   26.7 13.6 4.3 28.4 48.0 
Complex words (in %)   37.2 3.5 22.5 37.7 45.9 
Panel B: Simplified Prospectus (most recent version) 
Disclosure date   03/2011 288 days 06/2005 05/2011 12/2012 
# sentences   563 669 50 165 2,909 
# words   14,551 17,029 1.202 4.594 67.641 
Unique words (in %)   24.7 13.2 4.9 26.4 45.3 
Complex words (in %)   38.1 2.4 23.0 38.1 45.3 
Panel C: Key Investor Information Document (first version) 
Disclosure date   09/2012 120 days 05/2011 04/2012 10/2018 
# sentences   53 8 37 52 74 
# words   951 149 632 942 1,338 
Unique words (in %)   48.1 3.4 41.4 48.3 56.6 
Complex words (in %)   36.2 2.1 22.5 36.6 44.0 
Panel D: Newest Key Investor Information Document (latest version) 
Disclosure date   03/2018 190 days 04/2012 02/2018 10/2018 
# sentences   60 8 40 60 81 
# words   1,073 165 189 1,066 1,469 
Unique words (in %)   46.7 3.8 40.8 46.6 88.7 
Complex words (in %)   36.8 3.0 20.9 36.9 81.2 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of our sample of N=9,363 mandatory disclosure statements for mutual 
funds registered for sale in Germany. Panel A (B) reports text statistics for mutual funds’ Simplified Prospectus (SP) 
in the earliest (most recent) version available. Panel C (D) reports statistics for product information disclosure in the 
first (most recent) available Key Investor Information Documents (KIID) as of October 2018. Unique words represent 
the share of unique words (vocabulary) on total words. Complex words are defined as consisting of three or more 
syllables (Gunning 1952). We provide a detailed description of the variables in Appendix I-1. 
 
Table I-3 reports summary statistics on the sampled SPs and KIIDs. Our sample 
comprises SPs from 2004 to 2012 (Panels A and B), i.e. the entire period in which these 
documents were required, and KIIDs from their introduction in 2012 through to 2018 
                                                          
11 We use Morningstar’s ‘ongoing charge’ data point to proxy fund fees. Ongoing charge encompasses the fund’s 
(i) professional fees, (ii) management fees, (iii) audit fees, and (iv) custody fees and hence serves as an accurate proxy 
for the cost of fund ownership (Morningstar 2020). 




(Panels C and D), which marks the end of our observation period. While SPs feature an 
average number of roughly 500 sentences and 13,000 words, respectively (see mean 
values of Panel A and B), the short-form disclosure KIIDs, unsurprisingly, make do on 
only about 56 sentences (1000 words) on average (see mean values of Panel C and D)12. 
However, the share of unique words in a given document is almost twice as high for 
KIIDs as compared to SPs, suggesting that the page limit of KIIDs forced management 
companies to eliminate redundancies in their product information. Interestingly, we do 
not observe a measurable impact of the shift from SP to KIID with respect to the usage 
of complex words.13 
3.2. Measuring textual readability 
To assess the comprehensibility of a given fund’s product information documents, we 
apply well-established measures of textual readability. DuBay (2004) argues that 
traditional readability formulas are the best predictors of text difficulty as measured by 
comprehension tests.14 Moreover, he shows that readability formulas are highly positively 
correlated with the reader’s comprehension of a given text, which qualifies them as valid 
proxies for comprehensibility. The vast majority of extant research relies on two different 
survey methods to test the validity of readability formulas. Subjects are provided with 
text passages of different difficulty as measured by a given readability formula and either 
answer a questionnaire eliciting the extent to which they have understood the text or fill 
in words that are omitted from the text. Using the number of correct answers to the 
questionnaire or the number of correct words in the cloze test, validity is then measured 
as the correlation of subjects’ comprehension of the respective text with its readability 
score provided by the formula under review.15 Average sentence length and word 
                                                          
12 Reported numbers on sentences (words) refer to the document mean, i.e. an average SP in our sample contains 
approximately 13,000 words (11,251 (Panel A) + 14,551 (Panel B)) / 2 = 12,901. 
13 “Complex” words, i.e. words which are hard to read, consist of more than two syllables (Gunning 1952). 
14 Note that some authors argue that current readability formulas are poorly specified in financial applications. Instead, 
Loughran and McDonald (2014), for example, propose document file size to capture document readability. 
15 “[Readability formula] predictions correlate very well with the results of the actual readability measurements of 
expert judgments, comprehension tests, and the cloze procedures” - Kondru (p. 9, 2006). For example, Flesch (1948) 
finds a correlation of 0.71 between the FRE and text comprehension. Moreover, DuBay (2004) documents readability 
formulas to capture between 50 and 84 percent of variance in text difficulty. Note, however, that the adequacy of 
readability measures based on lexical characteristics as proxies for text comprehensibility is discussed controversially 
in the literature. While Best (2006) argues that “[they] measure much more than is directly contained in the formulas 
due to the many interactions between linguistic entities”, others question the validity of readability formulas (e.g., 
Hartley 2016, Connaster 1999, Duffy 1985, Manzo 1970). 




complexity vary greatly across different languages and readability measures are designed 
to capture the comprehensibility of a given text in a specific language. While there is a 
range of different readability measures available for the English language, only a handful 
of measures have been developed for the German language. In our main analyses, we use 
the German version of the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) as introduced by Amstad (1978), 
i.e. the most prominently applied German measure16, which is formalized as follows: 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑑 = 180 − 𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑑 − (58.5 ∗ 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑) (1) 
where readability measured by the FRE score pertaining to document d of fund i is a 
function of the average sentence length (ASL) and the average syllables per word (ASW). 
ASL denotes the average number of words in a sentence of document d and ASW counts 
the average number of syllables used in a given word of document d. 
We calculate the FRE for each document in our sample using a self-coded text 
analytics program which builds on Python’s natural language toolkit (NLTK) package. 
Specifically, we analyze the lexical characteristics of each processed text document by 
tokenizing sentences, counting the number of words in each sentence and, if applicable, 
deconstructing all words into their respective syllables. The FRE takes values between 0 
and 100, where a higher score indicates better readability. Amstad (1978) classifies FRE 
scores as follows: Texts scoring 60 to 70 (higher than 70) are referred to as easy (very 
easy) to read, average readability is defined by a score between 40 and 60, FRE scores 
below 40 indicate hard-to-read documents, and texts featuring scores below 30 rate as 
difficult, i.e. requiring at least university education in order to fully grasp their content.  
Moreover, we include a number of additional determinants of textual readability 
suggested in the CESR guidelines on the design of KIIDs but not captured via the FRE 
measure. Specifically, we analyze whether important style components (active voice, 
personal style and superfluous words), the use of jargon (financial terminology) and 
textual design (font type and font size) comply with the CESR guidelines summarized in 
Table I-1. To this end, we apply a bag-of-words technique (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 
                                                          
16 Alternative, less frequently applied readability measures designed for the German language include the Wiener 
Sachtext-Formel proposed by Bamberger and Vanecek (1984); the German version of the Simple Measure of 
Gobbledygook (gSMOG) following Bamberger and Vanecek (1984); the Kölner Verständlichkeitsindex following 
Jussen (1983) and the Lesbarkeitsindex from Björnsson (1968). 




2015) using several established dictionaries and conduct a metadata analysis of the PDF 
files under review.  
To investigate into the effectiveness of KIIDs and the accompanying CESR 
guidelines on plain language, we test for statistical significance of differences in 
readability and writing style measured for SPs and KIIDs, respectively. At this, we focus 
on changes between the most recent SP and the earliest, i.e. first-ever KIID for a given 
fund in our sample, since the date of the regulatory intervention can be pinned down to 
lie in the time period between the issuance of the two documents. Yet, to uncover potential 
time trends, we also include the earliest SP as well as the most recent KIID, i.e. analyze 
a total of four documents per fund. 
4. Results 
4.1. Has the introduction of KIIDs improved readability? 
Figure I-1 plots average FRE scores pertaining to the four documents under 
investigation. As can be inferred, all documents score below 30, indicating very low 
levels of readability. According to the Flesch interpretation scheme adapted by Amstad 
(1978), mutual fund product information provided in both SPs and KIIDs is very difficult 
to read for its addressees and requires at least university education. These values square 
well with the results reported in a study by Henselmann et al. (2009), which, to the best 
of our knowledge, has thus far been the only investigation into the readability of financial 
information in German language. For a micro-sample of 19 IPO prospectuses, they obtain 
FRE scores ranging from 20 to 35.  
 
  




Figure I-1—Readability measures 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the Flesch Reaading Ease (FRE) readability score as measured by their (German) Flesch-
Reading Ease (following Amstad 1978) for the four panels ([earliest/most recent] SP and [first/most recent] KIID) 
under investigation. 
 
To put these scores into perspective, we compare them with extant readability 
analyses of patient information leaflets, i.e. a related instance of mandatory information 
disclosure to consumers which has been researched quite extensively.17 Pires et al. (2015) 
survey a total of 22 studies on the readability of medicine package leaflets published 
between 2008 and 2013. Overall, those studies manifest a low level of readability of the 
package leaflets and the need to simplify the texts (e.g., Pinero-Lopez et al. 2011, Roskos 
et al. 2008, Weiss and Smith-Simone 2010). Product information is found to be too 
complex, with some package leaflets requiring university education.18 This is in stark 
contrast to the five years of education recommended by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Yet, featuring an average FRE score of 29, the comprehensibility 
                                                          
17 The European Commission’s guide “Guideline on the Readability of the Label and the package Leaflet of Medicinal 
Products for Human Use”, becoming effective as of June, 12th, 2009, dedicates its first chapter to the specification of 
levers to improve leaflet readability (“Chapter 1 Readability of the package leaflet and the labelling”). Among others, 
type size and font, layout, headings, syntax (e.g., short sentences) and style are mentioned as major levers to improve 
readability. (EC 2009) 
18 Note that Pires et al. (2015) perform a systematic review of readability studies relying on English, Portuguese, Italian, 
French, or Spanish drug leaflets, thus applying slightly different readability formulas than applicable to German.  




of mutual fund product information is well below that of German patient information 
leaflets, which feature average readability (FRE score of 47.6) reported by Merges and 
Fathi (2011). Hence, while dealing with an arguably equally complex topic, mandatory 
product information for drugs appears to be substantially more readable. Interestingly 
however, Pinero-Lopez et al. (2016) show that the readability of patient information 
leaflets has not improved ever since the EC introduced its guideline on the readability of 
package leaflets, a finding which is corroborated by Segura-Bedmar and Martinez (2017).  
Moreover, Kercher (2010) analyzes the readability of national newspapers in 
Germany around the federal elections in 2009. He finds that the news outlets under review 
vary greatly in readability (Bild Zeitung: 61.3; Süddeutsche Zeitung: 52.7; Spiegel: 54.0), 
however, none of them rates as hard-to-read. In a related study, Kercher and 
Brettschneider (2011) analyze the comprehensibility of speeches delivered by German 
politicians. E.g., the FRE score computed for the 2007 Christmas speech of former federal 
president Köhler was as high as 65 and thus qualified as easy to understand, while an 
online podcast issued by chancellor Merkel still featured a FRE score of 47, i.e. average 
readability. Thus, financial product information in Germany also seems to be significantly 
harder to understand than newspapers or political speeches. 
As can be inferred from Figure I-1, we document a statistically significant and 
economically relevant increase in readability along with the introduction of KIIDs in 
2012. The improvement is not only large in magnitude, but has also been persistent ever 
since SPs have been replaced by KIIDs. Specifically, the average FRE score increases by 
13.1 points, i.e. a relative improvement in readability of a given funds’ KIID of as much 
as 81% when compared to the FRE score of that funds’ most recent SP.19 
Figure I-2 plots the distribution of readability scores for the sampled SPs and 
KIIDs and implies moderate variation within the respective document types. While 
product information provided in SPs is very difficult to read in virtually all cases, at least 
some of the KIIDs are in the range of 30 and above, indicating hard-to-read, but not 
difficult, text. Taken together, these empirical results point to a significant improvement 
in comprehensibility of mandatory mutual fund product information, as proxied by the 
                                                          
19 Average FRE of earliest KIIDs: 29.2 and average FRE of most recent SPs: 16.1: 
29.2 – 16.1
16.1
 = 81.37% 




FRE score, in recent years. Yet, readability of financial product disclosures lags behind 
that of mandatory consumer disclosures in other domains. 
 
Figure I-2—Readability box plots 
 
Notes: This figure shows box plots of the product information documents readability as measured by their (German) 
Flesch Reading Ease (following Amstad 1978). We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix 
I-1. 
 
Better readability as measured by FRE may result from either (i) avoiding 
complex words and/or (ii) using shorter sentences.20,21 In addition to these two 
characteristics, several other factors have been shown to affect text difficulty (CESR 
2010) but do not enter the FRE formula. To account for a potential influence of these 
additional characteristics, we supplement our analysis by examining (iii) writing style, 
(iv) use of financial jargon, and (v) text design. 
4.2. Factors affecting readability 
4.2.1. Complex words 
Figure I-3 illustrates the share of complex words in the sampled texts (LHS) as well as 
their average word complexity captured by the number of syllables (RHS). We do not 
find a significant change in the usage of complex words: for both SPs and KIIDs, we 
obtain a share of complex words between 36 and 38 percent. Moreover, the decrease in 
                                                          
20 Complex words are defined as featuring more than three syllables in the CESR guidelines. 
21 The CESR guidelines call for avoiding sentences featuring more than 25 words. 




the average number of syllables per word from 2.35 in case of SPs down to 2.2 for the 
sampled KIIDs is economically small and only borderline significant, hence confirming 
the pattern.22 This evidence suggests that the vocabulary used to describe the key 
characteristics of a mutual fund has not changed much. 
4.2.2. Sentence structure 
Next, Figure I-4 plots the percentage of long sentences in the documents under review 
(LHS) as well as their average sentence length (LHS). We find that KIIDs have a 
significantly lower share of long sentences than SPs; in fact, the use of hard-to-understand 
syntax has almost halved ever since SPs have been replaced by KIIDs. Moreover, KIIDs 
contain an average 18 words per sentence while the average SP in our sample comes to 
as much as 25 words, i.e. features about 50% longer sentences. Note that our results on 
sentence length of KIIDs tie in with prior evidence in the medical domain. Investigating 
patient information leaflets, Fuchs et al. (2006) report an average sentence length of 15.7 
words, a number which is corroborated by Merges and Fathi (2011), who find an average 
sentence length of 15 to 17 words for the sampled leaflets. Despite the improvements in 
readability brought by the introduction of KIIDs, however, the average sentence in the 
mutual fund product information under review still features almost three times as many 
words as the average text passage in national German newspapers, i.e. making this 
information substantially more difficult to digest.23 
 
 
                                                          
22 To put our results pertaining to word complexity into perspective: Kercher (2010), in his study on the text structure 
of national newspapers in Germany, e.g., documents an average word length ranging from 1.83 syllables (Bild Zeitung) 
to 1.91 syllables (Süddeutsche Zeitung). 
23 Kercher (2010) documents an average sentence length of 5.6 words (Bild Zeitung) to 7.1 words (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung). 




Figure I-3—Complex words and syllables per word 
 
Notes: This figure shows the usage of complex words and the average syllables per word for the four product information documents under investigation. Complex words are defined as 
those word containing three or more syllables (e.g., Loughran and McDonald (2012)). Bar comparison lines describe the relative difference in complex words (avg. syllables per word) 
between the earliest and most recent document of a fund in our sample (outer comparison) as well as between the change in relevant product information document from SP to KIID (inner 








Figure I-4—Long sentences and average sentence length 
Notes: This figure shows the usage of long sentences and the average sentence length (measured in number of words) the four product information documents under investigation. Long 
sentences are defined as those sentences consisting of more than 25 words according to the section “Short Sentences” of the CESR’s guide to clear language and layout for the Key Investor 
Information document. Bar comparison lines describe the relative difference in long sentences (sentence length) for the change in relevant product information document type from SP to 
KIID. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix I-1. 




4.2.3. Writing style 
In our first supplementary analysis beyond the FRE-determinants, we analyze the writing 
style of the different documents in our sample. Writing style is relevant, since “[…] 
formal, passive and impersonal style [… can] be unengaging to the reader” (CESR 2010, 
p.7). Thus, we first infer the active tone of either document type by computing the number 
of verbs in passive form relative to the total number of sentences. Second, we construct a 
variable capturing the number of personal pronouns in a given text relative to the total 
number of words in order to approximate the personal style of the documents under 
review. Third and finally, we count the number of superfluous words as defined in the 
German version of the Technical Writers’ Companion.1 
Figure I-5 reports our results pertaining to the occurrence of the relevant style 
components in SPs and KIIDs, respectively. KIIDs are different from SPs in that they 
feature a more active tone, use a higher share of personal pronouns and a lower share of 
superfluous words than SPs. Note that these differences in writing style are highly 
statistically significant along all dimensions under review, i.e. suggesting that fund 
companies live up to the style requirements set down in the CESR guidelines. 
4.2.4. Financial jargon 
Moreover, the use of jargon, i.e. special words and phrases which are exclusively or 
primarily used by a particular group of people (Cambridge Dictionary 2020), 
compromises textual readability considerably. In fact, jargon is pervasive in the mutual 
fund industry and therefore—beyond word complexity and writing style—many text 
passages have been shown to be difficult to understand for retail investors simply because 
they are not fluent in ‘fund jargon’ (e.g., De Pascalis 2014). Consequently, the CESR 
guidelines call for management companies to avoid jargon whenever possible. 
In the vein of Loughran and McDonald (2015), we capture the extent to which 
mandatory mutual fund product information includes jargon by applying a dictionary 
approach referred to as the ‘bag-of-words method’. Specifically, we quantify the overlap 
of words used in the documents under review with two widespread glossaries, which aim 
at explaining financial jargon to German retail investors, i.e. the ING Börsenlexikon 
(2020) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) Börsenglossar (2020). To this end, 
                                                          
1 https://www.indoition.com/de/technical-writing-companion-de/de_schwarze_liste_fuellwoerter.html 




we define all entries in the two glossaries to represent financial jargon and count each 
word’s unique occurrence in the text under review as well as the total number of jargon 
words per document. We draw on the ING Börsenlexikon because ING is one of the 
largest retail banks in Germany. Likewise, we select the FAZ Börsenglossar because the 
FAZ is Germany’s third-largest national newspaper and features the most reputable 
business news (IVW 2020).  
Figure I-6 plots the corresponding results. Counterintuitively, we document a 
strong and significant increase in the percentage of financial jargon used in KIIDs as 
compared to SPs. This increase holds for both the total number of jargon words used, 
which is up by 25% (55%) when using the ING glossary (FAZ glossary) and the share of 
unique jargon words in a given document, which is up by 20% (22%). Moreover, when 
we compare the first KIIDs to the most recent ones, we observe that the use of jargon has 
further increased in recent years. The increase is robust to the financial glossary we 
employ and, of course, runs counter to the improvements in comprehensibility 
documented in sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. 
4.2.5. Text design 
Finally, the CESR guidelines pay special attention to certain design elements which make 
for a document that appeals to the reader and thus increase the likelihood of being read.2 
Hence, we investigate into whether or not the mandatory mutual fund product information 
documents heed the CESR advice as to font size and typeface. The CESR recommends 
easy-to-read fonts such as Arial or Times New Roman and a font size of at least 11 point 
for serif (e.g., Times New Roman) and 10 point for sans serif fonts (e.g., Arial).3 To 
readout the typeface and font size used in the sampled documents, we compute a text 
algorithm based on the Python module PDFMiner which enables us to automatically 
analyze the PDF metadata of each document under review. 
Figure I-7 plots the distribution of the primary font size used in the sampled 
documents which turns out to be approximately normal with a mean font size of 10 point.4 
However, the fat tail at the lower end of the distribution indicates that a sizeable number 
                                                          
2 See Part 3: Designing a KIID in the CESR guidelines. 
3 Note that the CESR guidelines are slightly more restrictive than those pertaining to the readability of patient 
information leaflets specifying “(…) a type size of 9 point (…) as a minimum.” (European Commission 2009, p.7). 
4 We define the primary font size of a document as the font size used for at least 85% of the words in that document. 
We drop observations in which multiple font sizes occur in the text body (excluding headings and legal disclaimers). 




of SPs and KIIDs under review do not heed the CESR design guidelines. Similarly, 
Figure I-8 illustrates the share of documents written in the recommended typeface (i.e. 
Arial or Times New Roman) as well as the share of documents which meet the minimum 
font size recommendation. To spell out the differences, Appendix I-2 provides examples 
of a KIID in conformity with the CESR design guidelines (LHS; typeface: Arial, font 
size: 12 point) as well as a KIID which does not meet the respective recommendations 
(RHS; typeface: Times New Roman, font size: 8 point). The left-hand side of Figure I-8 
shows that only about half of all sampled documents use either Arial or Times New 
Roman. Moreover, our results pertaining to font size show a virtually linear downward-
sloping trend. Whereas about 85% of SPs applied a font size of 10 point or greater 
(depending on typeface), only 53% of the most recent KIIDs meet the recommendations 
regarding minimum font size. The substantial decline could owe to the strict page limits 
of KIIDs which in turn might lead to fund companies cramming these documents full 
with information.5 Notably, this approach is counterproductive in that a reduction in font 
size of product information has been shown to discourage consumers from reading it (e.g., 
Adams and Edworthy 1995, Bernardini et al. 2001, Luna et al. 2019).
                                                          
5 In unreported analyses, we document that the configuration of typeface and font size seems to be a decision at the 
fund company level and is only marginally influenced by the degree of complexity of a given fund product. 




Figure I-5—Writing style – passive voice, personal pronouns and superfluous words 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the “writing style” used in the four product information documents under investigation. Passive voice captures verbs used in the “passive” form. Personal 
pronouns proxy for the ‘personality’ writing style and comprise all relevant pronouns (e.g., “I”, “You”, “We”, “Our”, “Your”, etc.). Superfluous words build on the Technical Writers’ 
Companion “Schwarze Liste: Füllwörter” ( ). Bar comparison lines describe 
the relative difference in passive voice (personal pronouns; superfluous words) for the change in relevant product information document type from SP to KIID. ***, **, and * indicate 









Figure I-6—Financial ‘jargon’ usage 
Notes: This figure shows the usage of financial jargon as captured by two widespread German finance/stock exchange glossaries (left: ING Börsenlexikon / right: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung [FAZ] Börsenglossar). Total ‘Jargon’ is defined as the relative share of financial jargon in a document contained in the respective glossary divided by the total number of words in 
this document (Total ‘Jargon’/Total Words). Unique ‘Jargon’ refers to the vocabulary’s unique overlap with the respective glossary (Unique ‘Jargon’ /Unique Words). Bar comparison 
lines describe the percentage difference in financial jargon usage for the change in relevant product information document type from SP to KIID. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 








Figure I-7—Font size distribution 








Figure I-8—Font typeface and font size compliance 
Notes: This figure illustrates the percentage share of product information documents written in accordance with the CESR’s guideline regarding typeface (font) and type size as specified 
in “Part 3: Designing a KIID”. Bar comparison lines exhibit the relative difference of documents written in accordance with those requirements for change in product information document 
type from SP to KIID (inner comparison). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We provide a detailed description of the applied 
variables in Appendix I-1. 




4.3. Further analyses 
4.3.1. Fund-specific differences in document readability 
It is conceivable that the readability of mutual fund product information also relates to 
fund characteristics other than the textual characteristics of the mandatory disclosure 
documents. Specifically, note that the CESR guidelines make the implicit assumption that 
investment companies are capable of preparing easy to read product information. Yet, 
this need not necessarily be the case. Even if fund managers comply with the new 
regulations related to content and structure of KIIDs, they might not be familiar with the 
‘art of plain language writing’ (e.g., Aboulian 2011). Following this rationale, we would 
expect fund companies domiciled in countries where German is among the official 
languages—i.e. Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland—to cope more easily 
with the plain language regulations specified for KIIDs. This is because writing in a 
foreign language is generally associated with specific difficulties (e.g., Reichelt et al. 
2012) and composing a text in plain language is particularly challenging for non-natives 
(European Commission 2016). 
Figure I-9 depicts the absolute improvement (LHS) and relative improvement 
(RHS) in the readability of the sampled product information documents by comparing the 
most recent (last) SP of a given fund with its first-ever KIID. Solid bars illustrate FRE 
scores of funds issued by investment companies domiciled in countries where German is 
among the official languages, whereas hashed bars represent funds domiciled in the 
remainder of domicile countries. Indeed, we observe a 47% difference in document 
readability between the two groups: while the average improvement in readability 
increases by 15.7 FRE points among countries in the former subsample, it only improves 
by 12.1 FRE points for funds domiciled in the latter group of countries.




Figure I-9—German vs. non-German speaking domiciled fund companies 
Notes: This figure shows the absolute (left) and relative (right) improvement in product information documents readability from the latest SP to the first KIID of a fund in our sample for 
funds of investment management companies that are (not) domiciled in a primarily German speaking country (Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, Switzerland). Readability is measured by 
the (German) Flesch Reading Ease (following Amstad 1978). Bar comparison lines indicate relative difference in document readability between funds domiciled in German vs. non-German 
speaking countries. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix I-1.




To analyze yet other sources of variation in the comprehensibility of the documents under 
review, we also regress the improvement in readability on a number of fund 
characteristics potentially associated with fund companies’ efforts to meet the 
intelligibility standards, formally: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑖
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖
+  𝛽4𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖
+  𝛽7𝑂𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖
+  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑑. 𝑑𝑒𝑣.𝑖
+  𝛽11𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +  𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where the dependent variable denotes the absolute or relative improvement in readability 
of document i measured by comparing the FRE score of the last SP of a given fund in our 
sample to that of its first KIID. German speaking indicates whether a fund’s management 
company is domiciled in a country where German is among the official languages. 
Additionally, we include a set of fund level controls described in Appendix I-1. 
Table I-4 reports the corresponding coefficient estimates. Even after controlling 
for a large set of fund characteristics, we find funds domiciled in German-speaking 
countries to improve their FRE score by an average 2.8 points more than their non-
German speaking equivalents, thus corroborating the univariate results illustrated in 
Figure I-9. Note that this difference is not only statistical significant, but also 
economically meaningful: the difference corresponds to an incremental increase in 
readability of 40.3% subsequent to the introduction of KIIDs. 
Second, three out of the five largest fund companies in Germany are in fact 
distributed by the asset management divisions of banks—referred to as ‘bank-affiliated 
funds’ in the literature—with Deka (central asset manager of all German savings banks), 
Union Investment (central asset manager of all German cooperative banks) and DWS 
(Deutsche Bank’s asset manager) leading the way (e.g., Ferreira et al. 2018, Heyden et 
al. 2020).1 Retail clients of banks with an affiliated investment management company are 
typically recommended a limited selection of funds issued by this particular provider 
(e.g., Florentsen et al. 2020, Heyden et al. 2020). Given the relevance of these funds in 
                                                          
1 Following extant research (e.g., Ferreira et al. 2018), we label funds as ‘bank-affiliated’ if the fund’s ultimate owner 
is a commercial bank, savings bank, or cooperative bank. 




Germany, we examine if there are differences in the readability of the mandatory fund 
information of affiliated versus unaffiliated funds. As can be taken from the regression 
equation (2), we include an indicator variable 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖, denoting whether fund i is a 
bank-affiliated fund. Indeed, our empirical results imply that the KIIDs of affiliated funds 
are easier to understand for retail investors. More precisely, we find that the readability 
of affiliated funds improved by 1.6 points on the FRE score which translates into an 
incremental improvement of 12.5%. 
Third and finally, there is some heterogeneity as to the product complexity of the 
sampled funds. Active portfolio management strategies, e.g., are arguably more difficult 
to explain to the investor than an investment which simply tracks a given benchmark 
index. This is likely to affect readability levels and, supporting this conjecture, Appendix 
I-3 reports higher FRE scores for exchange-traded funds (ETF). Moreover, even for the 
multivariate setting in equation (2), we find that ETFs, which we classify as being less 
complex fund products, are associated with a particularly large improvement in 








Table I-4—Readability improvement – multivariate analysis 
 Improvement of readability [FRE]  
(most recent SP to first KIID) 
 Absolute Relative 
























































N obs. 9,363 9,363 
R2 (overall) 0.113 0.092 
Robust SE YES YES 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from the regression model 
𝐴𝑏𝑠. 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑙. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑖
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖
+ 𝛽9 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖 +  𝛽10𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑑. 𝑑𝑒𝑣.𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where the dependent variable is documents i’s improvement in readability as measured by FRE from the latest SP to 
the first KIID in our sample. Specification (1) refers to absolute improvement, whereas (2) is linked to relative 
improvements in readability vs. the latest SP. German speaking is a binary variable and indicates whether a fund’s 
management company is domiciled in a German speaking country. Affiliated is a binary variable and denotes ‘bank-
affiliated’ mutual funds. ETF is a binary variable and indicates whether a fund qualifies as exchange traded fund 
(passive investment). We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 




4.3.2. Alternative measures of readability 
Lastly, we check whether our main findings are robust to the choice of the readability 
measure and replicate our analyses documented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 with alternative 
readability metrics available for texts in German language. 
Figure I-10 reports the results of this supplementary analysis. Our alternative 
measures of readability include the Wiener Sachtextformel (WST) and the German 
version of the SMOG index (gSMOG). Note that these metrics quantify readability by 
means of years of education necessary to understand a given text (Bamberger and 
Vanecek 1984, McLaughlin 1969) and lower levels therefore indicate better readability. 
Corroborating our main finding obtained using the FRE, we document a statistically 
significant improvement in readability regardless of which alternative metric we employ. 
Using the WST, for instance, we find that the education necessary to understand the 
average KIID amounts to 13 years, down from 15 years for the average SP. Taken 
together, our main results prove robust to alternative proxies of readability.




Figure I-10—Robustness: alternative readability measures 
Notes: This figure illustrates the average grade level necessary to understand a text within the four panels ([earliest/most recent] SP and [first/most recent] KIID) for alternative measures of textual 
readability. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix I-1.




5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigate whether the introduction of Key Investor Information 
Documents (KIIDs) facilitates the readability of pre-contractual mutual fund product 
information addressed to retail investors. As of 2012, KIIDs—short form disclosure 
documents limited to two pages in length—have replaced the Simplified Prospectus (SP). 
SPs had been found to be too long, poorly designed and written in an overly technical 
language. Thus, the European Commission requires KIIDs be written concisely and non-
technical. The introduction of KIIDs was accompanied by a guide on clear language and 
layout for the new disclosure document developed by the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR). 
Applying a fully automated textual analysis approach on a large-scale sample of 
mutual fund product information, we are the first to benchmark and assess this policy 
change with objective and replicable methods. Specifically, this study (i) quantitatively 
benchmarks the readability of mutual fund product information, (ii) evaluates the 
effectiveness of the change in product information documents, and (iii) assesses whether 
KIIDs live up to the CESR guidelines.  
We find that, while mutual fund product information documents are generally 
difficult to read, comprehensibility as captured by the Flesh Reading Ease (FRE) score 
has significantly improved ever since the introduction of KIIDs. The improvement in 
readability is primarily driven by shorter sentences, while we do not observe a reduction 
in word complexity per se. In addition, a more active and personal writing style and 
omitting superfluous words contributes to a better understandability of KIIDs versus SPs. 
However, fund companies tend to more frequently use financial jargon and significantly 
smaller font sizes in KIIDs, which compromise these efforts. While the CESR guidelines 
with respect to plain language have a positive effect on the overall presentation of 
information to retail investors, other parts of the guide (e.g., font size and financial jargon) 
do not seem to be broadly recognized in practice. Thus, we present mixed evidence with 
respect to the readability of mutual fund product information. While KIIDs provide 
investors with significantly more readable information and heed several of the 
recommendations made by the CESR, some of the respective guidelines are shown to be 
neglected. Compared to related evidence on the readability of package leaflets, e.g., we 




document room for improvement not only pertaining to the overall readability of the 
product information under review, but also with respect to font type and size. 
In light of the empirical evidence documented in this study, we suggest that the 
European standard setter provides stakeholders in charge of preparing financial product 
information with more detailed guidelines—potentially even accompanied by trainings—
on how to write in plain language, e.g., including examples and best practices. Moreover, 
we reiterate a claim originally made by former SEC president Christopher Cox and 
propose that regulatory authorities take advantage of automated textual analysis when 
checking for the compliance of product information documents (Cox 2007). In fact, given 
the novel directive for Packaged Retail Investment and Insurance-Based Products 
(PRIIPs) which extends the universe of investment products coming under the ambit of 
KIID requirements quite dramatically, efficiency gains will likely become more 
important for the fulfillment of regulatory tasks.1 In the US, the States of Florida and 
Massachusetts have already incorporated the FRE score as a readability metric in the 
authorization process of insurance policies, requiring the associated product information 
documents to score no lower than 50 and 45, respectively.2 To borrow from Robert 
Gunning, a pioneer in textual readability analysis, fund companies preparing product 
information for their investors should try and heed a simple rule of written 
communication: “Don’t write up. Don’t write down. Write to.” (Gunning 1952, p. 10). 
 
  
                                                          
1 PRIIPs regulations set out new methodologies and transparency requirements for investment products across the EU 
as of Jan. 1, 2018. In contrast to the UCITS IV directive, the PRIIPS regulation also covers non-UCITS retail schemes 
forwards, foreign exchange transactions (including futures and options), over the counter and exchange traded 
derivatives (such as caps, collars and swaps) and structured products and deposits. However, the European Commission 
has granted a 5-year grandfathering period for the KIID before deciding on its future under the new PRIIP regulation. 
2 Florida Statutes Title XXXVII. Insurance § 627.4145. Readable language in insurance policies; 2006 Massachusetts 
Code - Chapter 175 — Section 2B. Readability of policy form; definition; approval; actions based on language. 
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Appendix I-1—Variable description 
Variable name Description 
Textual characteristics  
Simplified Prospectus (SP) The simplified prospectus (German: “Vereinfachter Verkaufsprospekt”) is a legal 
document filed with securities regulators and disclosed to investors prior to the 
purchase of securities. It should provide investors important information about the 
mutual fund. In Germany the simplified prospectus was mandatory from 2004 to 2012 
and replaced by the Key Investor Information Document (German: 
“Produktinformationsblatt”) 
Key Investor Information 
Document (KIID) 
Becoming effective with the directive of the European Union UCITS IV, the Key 
Investor Information Document (KIID), a standardized product information fact sheet 
with a maximum length two pages, replaces the SP in an attempt to provide investors 
with better structured and more readable product information. 
Disclosure Date Date on which a product information document i has been disclosed. 
# Words Total number of words making up a specific fund product information document i. 
The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
# Sentences Total number of sentences contained in a specific fund product information document 
i. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Personal Pronouns Percentage share of personal pronouns on total words contained in a specific fund 
product information document i. Personal pronouns include “Ich”, “Du”, “Wir”, “Er”, 
“Sie”, “Es”, “Ihr”, “Meiner”, “Deiner”, “Seiner”, “Ihrer”, “Euer”, “Ihrer”, “Mir”, 
“Ihm”, “Uns”, “Euch”, “Ihnen”, “Dich”, Ihn”. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% 
level. 
Complex Words Percentage share of words consisting of three or more syllables (e.g., “Di-vi-den-de”) 
on total words contained in a specific product information document i. The variable 
is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Financial Jargon Percentage share of words in a specific fund product information document i that are 
also included in a financial glossary / stock exchange lexicon on total words contained 
in the product information document. We apply the “ING – Börsen Lexikon” as well 
as the “FAZ – Börsen Glossar”. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Passive Voice Percentage share of verbs on total words in a specific fund product information 
document i that are used in their ‘passive’ form (e.g., “was issued”, “is being 
prepared”). The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Superfluous Words 
(in %) 
Percentage share of “superfluous” words, i.e. words that do not alter the meaning of 
a sentences or phrase and therefore could be omitted, on total words contained in a 
specific fund product information document i. Superfluous words build on the 
Technical Writers’ 2016 “Schwarze Liste: Füllwörter”. Those words do not transport 
a meaning or any content, but rather serve as expletives. The variable is truncated at 
the 2.5% level. 
Unique words (in %) Percentage share of unique words (or vocabulary) represents the share of unique 
words on total words on total words contained in a specific fund product information 
document i. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
  





German speaking Indicator variable equals one if a fund’s investment management company is 
domiciled in a primarily German speaking country (Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland), zero otherwise. 
 
Affiliated Indicator variable equals one if a fund’s investment management company is 
affiliated to a commercial bank, zero otherwise. We follow Ferreira et al. 2018 in 
creating the variable. 
 
ETF Indicator variable equals one if a fund qualifies as entirely passively managed or 
exchange traded funds (ETF), zero otherwise. We screen the fund’s legal names for 
by screening fund names for the following words/phrases: “ETF”, “Exchange 
traded”, “index”, “tracker” and “passive”. 
 
Equity fund Indicator variable equals one if a fund is primarily invested in equities, zero 
otherwise. We use the Morningstar Directs’ fund classification.  
 
Fund Age (years) The fund age in number of years computed from the date of a fund's inception.   
Fund size (in € mn.) Total net assets under management of a fund as of December 2018. We use the 
logarithm of the variable in regression analysis. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% 
level. 
 
Yearly Fund Return  
’12-’18 (in %) 
Denotes the average yearly raw return of a fund in the period from 2012 to 2018. The 
variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Yearly Return Std. Dev. 
’12-’18 (in %) 
Denotes the average yearly raw return standard deviation in the period from 2012 to 
2018. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Turnover Ratio 
’12-’18 (in %) 
A fund’s average yearly turnover ratio, i.e. the percentage share of net assets of a fund 
invested / disinvested in a given year, in the period from 2012 to 2018. The variable 
is truncated at the 2.5% level. 
Morningstar Rating  
(1-5 stars) 
Morningstar rates mutual funds and ETFs from 1 to 5 stars based on how well they 
have performed (after adjusting for risk and accounting for sales charges) in 
comparison to similar funds and ETFs. Within each Morningstar Category, the top 
10% of funds and ETFs receive 5 stars and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. The 
variable denotes the Morningstar rating as of December 2018.  
Ongoing Charge (in %) Represents the average yearly costs as percentage of total net assets an investor can 
reasonably expect to pay from one year to the next, under normal circumstances. It 
encompasses the fund’s professional fees, management fees, audit fees and custody 
fees, but neglects incurred performance fees. The variable is truncated at the 2.5% 
level. 
Notes: This table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis.




Appendix I-2—Font size: compliant vs. non-compliant KIID 
Notes: This figure provide examples for the first page of two KIIDs in our sample. Documents vary in font size: We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix 
I-1. 
  




Appendix I-3—Readability: passive (ETF) vs. active mutual funds 
Notes: This figure shows the differences in product information documents readability as measured by their (German) Flesch-Reading Ease (following Amstad 1978) for passively vs. 
actively managed funds. We consider funds as being passive if the classify as Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) according to Morningstar Directs fund database. Hatched bars represent 
actively managed funds. Comparison lines indicate relative difference in document readability between active and passive funds. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix I-1.
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How do policy makers help consumers make sound investment decisions? Regulations 
which require the disclosure of information are among the most ubiquitous interventions 
in investor protection and authorities all over the world mandate that suppliers of financial 
products and services provide investors with an abundance of information.1 However, 
although a generally approved policy measure, there is a paucity of evidence documenting 
the effectiveness of information disclosure for consumer financial decision-making. 
Indeed, the benefits of disclosure requirements are not a foregone conclusion: owing to 
behavioral biases and cognitive limitations of investors, the intended effects of 
information disclosure might not take full effect and in some cases even backfire (e.g., 
Beshears et al. 2009; Loewenstein et al. 2014). 
In this study, we extend the scarce literature on the utility of investor information 
disclosure by evaluating an intervention of the New York Attorney General’s Investor 
Protection Bureau (NYOAG) into the market for mutual funds. In early 2018, the 
NYOAG investigated more than 2,000 actively managed funds distributed to US retail 
investors and, in an accompanying report, called on fund companies to make information 
available about fund managers’ activeness. Moreover, the report urges retail investors to 
study fund fees and managers’ degree of activeness in order to arrive at informed 
allocation decisions. Following the investigation, the NYOAG imposed the disclosure of 
Active Share (AS), a measure of fund manager activeness proposed by Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009), on several of the largest US mutual fund firms. As of April 2018, these 
companies have published the respective metric for their actively managed equity mutual 
funds on their corporate web sites.2 
Unlike passive funds, actively managed funds sell the potential to beat their 
benchmark (usually a market index) and investors who select this type of fund are 
typically looking for an opportunity to outperform the market. Moreover, actively 
                                                          
1 Standard economic theory promotes information disclosure as a powerful tool. If properly designed, it does not 
interfere with the autonomy of individual decision-making (cf., e.g., Sunstein 1999). However, given that the 
information provided in mandatory disclosures (e.g., product risk warnings, financial disclosures, or nutrition fact 
labels) typically is not provided on free markets, information disclosure is able to address unwanted market failure in 
situations characterized by asymmetric information and a risk of misaligned incentives (cf., e.g., Akerlof 1970). 
2 Active Share (AS) summarizes the extent to which a fund’s portfolio holdings differ from its benchmark index. The 
higher the AS, the greater the deviation from the benchmark, i.e. the more active the fund manager. See section 3.1 for 
further details about the AS metric and alternative measures of fund manager activeness. 
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managed funds usually charge significantly higher fees than passive funds: the average 
expense ratio of passive funds was 0.15% in 2017 while it amounted to 0.72% for active 
funds (Morningstar 2018). This cost difference may be justified by the fund manager’s 
effort to manage the portfolio in a way which creates an opportunity to generate excess 
returns by deviating from the fund’s benchmark. Therefore, information about the fund 
manager’s past commitment in pursuing her goal to beat the benchmark should be highly 
relevant for investors’ decisions about whom to entrust with the delegated portfolio 
management. Indeed, screening manager activeness seems worthwhile. Several studies 
have identified funds with relatively high fees which, at the same time, feature a relatively 
low degree of fund manager activeness, ultimately causing significant underperformance 
(Cremers and Petajisto 2009, Petajisto 2013, Cremers et al. 2016). These studies conclude 
that investors in such funds—dubbed as ‘closet indexers’—pay for a service, i.e. active 
portfolio management, which, essentially, they do not receive.3 
The NYOAG intervention constitutes an exogenous shock to the business 
operations of the affected fund companies and we apply a difference-in-differences 
regression approach to identify the intervention’s causal impact on (i) retail investors’ 
response to the sudden availability of information on fund manager activeness and (ii) 
fund firms’ reaction to the imposed disclosure.4 
Specifically, we capture the demand-side response by analyzing flows into (and 
out of) each of the sampled funds around the announcement of the disclosure. Since AS 
information has been available to institutional investors long before the intervention 
(cf. NYAOG 2018), we separate retail share classes from their institutional counterparts 
for all funds affected by the intervention. In doing so, we are able to unambiguously 
measure the flow response of the investor group targeted by the NYOAG by constructing 
individual within-fund control groups which allow us to control for all observed and 
unobserved fund and fund family characteristics potentially explaining investor demand. 
To gauge the supply-side reaction, we compare pre- and post-intervention AS levels of 
the sampled funds and a matched control group of actively managed mutual funds issued 
by fund companies unaffected by the NYOAG intervention. Because AS does not differ 
                                                          
3 Our assignment of funds to AS categories follows Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Funds featuring an AS below 60% 
rate as ‘closet indexers’, funds with an AS between 60% and 80% are classified as ‘moderately active stock pickers’ 
and funds with an AS in excess of 80% are referred to as ‘stock pickers’. 
4 Section 2 describes the intervention in detail. 
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across the share classes of a given fund, we construct a balanced control sample applying 
a 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching approach in order to allow for a difference-in-differences 
analysis of fund companies’ reaction to the intervention.  
Figure II-1 illustrates our main results. Retail investors strongly respond to the 
intervention. As can be inferred from the left-hand graph, net fund flows into retail share 
classes of funds affected by the intervention increase by as much as 6.8 percentage points 
(pp.) in the quarter that immediately follows the intervention. By contrast, the NYOAG 
intervention does not have any measurable flow effect among institutional investors. 
Moreover, the right-hand side of Figure II-1 shows that, compared to managers of 
control-group funds, fund managers affected by the NYOAG disclosure intervention have 
not adjusted their degree of active portfolio management any differently after publicly 
disclosing related information to retail investors. In fact, additional analysis reveals that 
even among managers of funds rated closet indexers—i.e. arguably those funds with the 
highest pressure to act—we do not observe any measurable effort to increase management 
activeness as captured by the fund’s post-intervention AS. 
Further investigation into the demand-side response suggests that retail investors 
do not differentiate between active stock pickers and closet indexers when increasing their 
holdings in the treated funds. Finally, a supplementary analysis of daily fund flows shows 
that the bulk of excess flows into the affected funds occurred right after the announcement 
of the disclosure intervention, which received broad news coverage. This evidence 
suggests that the investor response can be ascribed to a media attention effect rather than 
to investors’ trading on the newly available information about the degree of fund manager 
activeness. Given the largely positive connotation of the incidental press reporting, 
investors might have interpreted the affected fund companies’ collaboration with investor 
protection authorities as a signal of their commitment to improve transparency, thereby 
enhancing the respective firms’ reputation per se. 
Taken together, our findings are hard to square with the notion that retail investors 
have understood and traded on the newly available information about fund manager 
activeness. Hence, we conclude that the intended effects of the intervention, i.e. (i) to 
establish AS as a relevant decision criteria for retail investors and (ii) to curb closet 
indexing, have largely failed to materialize. 
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Figure II-1—Investor response and reaction of fund companies 
Notes: This figure illustrates our main results. The LHS graph plots the investor response as captured by net flows into the funds affected by the NYOAG intervention for each quarter 
during our sample period. Grey (black) bars represent fund flows pertaining to a funds’ institutional (retail) share classes. The RHS graph plots the reaction of the fund companies under 
review measured as the univariate difference in fund manager activeness (Active Share) between affected funds and control-group funds.
Investor response Reaction of fund companies 
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Our work contributes to several strands of literature. First, we inform the ongoing 
debate on the effectiveness of information disclosure for improved consumer financial 
decision-making. Notably, our results run counter to prior evidence obtained in 
comparable settings, where disclosure does not much affect the recipients of the 
information while it tends to trigger a significant industry response.1 For example, while 
most research to date suggests little or no evidence of consumer reaction to calorie 
labeling (e.g., Harnack et al. 2008), Namba et al. (2013) show that fast-food restaurants 
located in municipalities subject to menu-labeling laws increased their healthier menu 
options. Similarly, there is relatively weak evidence of consumer response to energy-
efficiency labeling, but much stronger evidence of manufacturer responsiveness (e.g., 
Newell et al. 1999, Waide 2001). Reasons why providers change their products in 
response to disclosure requirements which their customers largely ignore could be that 
they overstate the anticipated response (e.g., Gilovich et al. 2000) or have a guilty 
conscience about the information disclosed (Loewenstein et al. 2014). In such situations, 
the psychological factors at play even amplify the effectiveness of disclosure, although, 
from an economic standpoint, the expected consumer inattention should prevent the 
supply-side from taking action. However, this pattern does not seem to hold in the mutual 
fund market. Rather, our results suggest that fund companies anticipated the limited 
impact of disclosing information about their funds’ degree of activeness on retail 
investors. We discuss a number of explanations for the limited efficiency of the disclosure 
intervention. We argue that the heterogeneity in the presentation of the information as 
well as the lack of a reference point to interpret it are key drivers. 
Second, we extend the literature on the media attention effect. Barber and Odean 
(2007) find that investors are more likely to be net buyers of stocks mentioned in the news 
than of those not mentioned and Kaniel et al. (2007) confirm this finding for mutual fund 
investments. Da et al. (2011) document a positive link between Google search frequency 
of a given stock and subsequent stock prices. In a more recent study closely related to our 
work, Kaniel and Parham (2017) exploit a natural experiment to show that retail investors 
are subject to a media attention bias when investing in mutual funds. Specifically, the 
authors document a substantial discontinuity in flows into mutual funds mentioned in the 
                                                          
1 Note that such an outcome yet again differs from the generally intended effects of disclosure, i.e. prompting changes 
in the behavior of disclosees, which in turn cause disclosers to clean up their act (cf., e.g., Fung et al. 2007). 
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popular Wall Street Journal ‘Category Kings’ ranking when compared to the flows of 
those funds which just missed making the list. The post-intervention trading behavior of 
retail investors in our study constitutes evidence supporting the findings of Kaniel and 
Parham (2017). 
Lastly, we contribute to the few existing studies measuring fund manager 
activeness using AS. On the one hand, we add to the literature by investigating into the 
development of fund managers’ AS once it is being disclosed to retail investors. More 
importantly, however, we are the first to analyze if and how individual investors react to 
AS information once they (can) learn about it.2 This is an important contribution to prior 
research which documents that AS is highly decision-relevant but at the same time 
acknowledges that this information is inaccessible to retail investors, i.e. making it 
impossible for them to act on the conclusions presented in the respective literature. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) introduce the AS metric and document that funds with the 
highest AS significantly outperform their benchmarks, both before and after fees. By 
contrast, funds in the lowest AS bracket, which are nevertheless marketed as actively 
managed vehicles, underperform their benchmarks. The findings of Petajisto (2013) 
support this evidence. Cremers et al. (2016), in their international survey on closet 
indexing practices, show that actively managed funds are more active, charge lower fees 
and earn higher abnormal returns in countries in which they face more competitive 
pressure from explicit indexers. Recently, Cremers and Curtis (2016) argue that persistent 
closet indexing carries a number of legal issues, including potential liability for 
prospectus misstatements3, excessive fees4 and fiduciary breach5. Aside from the 
NYOAG initiative, this latter finding has prompted several other regulatory investigations 
into fund manager activeness (e.g., ESMA 2016, BaFin 2017, FCA 2018) which have all 
used AS as the relevant criterion in order to asses a funds’ level of activeness. 
                                                          
2 While, theoretically, retail investors might have been able to compute a given fund’s AS prior to the NYOAG 
intervention, we argue that this is an implausible scenario. First, data on the specific securities held in the fund portfolio 
are hard to come by for individual investors. Second, (historic) benchmark holdings are not available free of charge 
and it is highly unlikely that the average retail investor pays for obtaining them. Finally, prior research shows that, even 
if consumers can access the relevant data, they generally refrain from performing any calculations necessary to obtain 
actionable information (e.g., Cox and Payne 2005). 
3 Cf. Securities Act, 11(a) and 12(a). 
4 Cf. Investment Company Act, 36(b) 
5 Cf. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
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2. The NYOAG intervention 
In order to learn about the informativeness of fund fees with respect to manager 
activeness, the New York Attorney General’s Investor Protection Bureau (NYOAG) 
investigates more than 2,000 actively managed equity funds sold to US retail investors 
with respect to fees and AS disclosure practices in early 2018. Unsurprisingly, they find 
that fees charged for actively managed equity funds are significantly higher than those of 
passive index funds. Moreover, they document that fees vary widely and, importantly, 
that higher fees in an actively managed equity fund are not necessarily associated with a 
higher level of active portfolio management as measured by AS.6 In fact, the analysis 
reveals that some funds charge high fees, but deviate only marginally from their 
benchmark index. Clearly, the potential to outperform after fees is rather unlikely for 
these closet indexing funds. Finally, the investigation highlights that—even though 
mutual fund firms have long provided AS information to institutional investors—the vast 
majority of firms surveyed by the NYOAG did not disclose AS statistics to retail investors 
at the time of the NYOAG investigation. The report concludes that “(…) the lack of equal 
access to one valuable piece of information—Active Share—is an information gap that 
hinders retail investors’ ability to fully analyze the potential value proposition of an 
actively managed equity fund.” (NYOAG 2018, p.11). 
Based on these findings, the NYOAG called for the disclosure of AS by several 
of the largest US mutual fund firms. Starting April 2018, 13 companies including Alliance 
Bernstein, BlackRock, The Dreyfus Corporation, The Capital Group Companies 
(American Funds), Columbia Management Investment Advisors, Eaton Vance 
Management, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, JP Morgan Chase, Oppenheimer 
Funds, Nuveen, T. Rowe Price, USAA and Vanguard have published AS statistics for 
their actively managed equity mutual funds on their websites, which together cover more 
than 20 percent of the aggregate assets under management in this fund segment in the 
                                                          
6 Note that other measures of fund manager activeness have been proposed: Portfolio Turnover (Chevalier and Ellison 
1999), R2 (Amihud and Goyenko 2013), Tracking Error Volatility (Roll 1992), and Return Gap (Kacperczyk et al. 
2008). Unlike these measures of fund manager activeness, however, AS draws on the holdings of a fund instead of its 
returns. In doing so, AS focuses on the practice of portfolio management, whereas return-based metrics focus on 
assessing the portfolio management outcome. 
Leveling the playing field? The effect of disclosing fund manager activeness to individual investors 
69 
 
US.7 While the NYOAG remains silent about the criteria applied to select the affected 
fund firms, the data does not reveal a selection bias along arguably relevant dimensions.8 
Moreover, the treated funds are neither exclusively headquartered in New York City 
(exceptions are, e.g., American Funds and Vanguard), nor do they represent the universe 
of largest US fund firms in its entirety (Charles Schwab, State Street, and Prudential 
Investments, e.g., are not affected).9 
The NYOAG published their findings as well as details on the disclosure 
intervention on April 5th 2018 in a report entitled ‘Mutual Fund Fees and Active 
Share’ (NYOAG 2018) which is publicly accessible on the NYOAG website. The report 
received broad media attention in the weeks following the disclosure.10 
The report’s agenda addresses both retail investors and fund firms. On the one 
hand, retail investors are strongly advised to learn about a fund’s fees and AS statistics in 
order to make an informed investment decision.11 On the other hand, fund firms are 
imposed to make AS information available to retail investors and institutional investors 
alike.12 Taken together, these requests imply that—while not explicitly stated in the 
report—(i) retail investors should seek to avoid closet indexing funds and (ii) fund 
managers should adjust their funds’ AS, if necessary, so as to spell out to retail investors 
what value added they receive in exchange for higher fees. 
                                                          
7 Note that the report mentions a total of 14 fund companies which were constrained to disclose AS information to 
retail investors. However, one of them, Fidelity Investments, is different in that it already published freely accessible 
AS statistics prior to the NYOAG investigation, which we are able to confirm using the ‘Wayback Machine’. Thus, we 
omit funds issued by Fidelity Investment from our treatment group in the main analyses. In a supplementary analysis, 
we show that our results are robust to including Fidelity Investments funds. Results are available upon request. 
8 Cf. Appendix II-2. 
9 Have the treated funds disclosed AS prior to the NYOAG intervention? The results of a supplementary analysis 
suggest otherwise: using the Wayback Machine, a digital archive of the world wide web allowing to access historic 
versions of websites (web.archive.org), we visit the webpages of the treated funds for several points in time prior to the 
intervention and do not find AS information on any of them. 
10 Appendix II-3 documents the business press coverage of the report and section 5.1.2. analyzes the media attention to 
the event. 
11 The report includes several such calls, e.g.“(…) mutual fund investors should pay particular attention to the fees 
charged by mutual funds, as fees can significantly affect total returns on a mutual fund investment.” (p.13); “Investors 
who choose to buy actively managed funds are choosing to pay more than they would for index funds, and therefore 
should seek to understand what additional value they may obtain in exchange for higher fees. Active Share helps 
investors (…) evaluate one or more actively managed fund investments” (p.13); “Investors should seek to understand 
the Active Share metric and request Active Share information from their brokers or mutual fund providers if it is not 
publicly available.” (p.14). 
12 “Mutual fund firms that do not provide all investors equal access to Active Share information for their mutual funds 
deny certain investors an important piece of information they can use to make decisions about investing in particular 
funds” (NYOAG 2018, p.12). 
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In the US, financial regulation is a national matter with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in charge of legislation. Although the collective of state 
regulators (North American Securities Administrators Association, NASAA) can petition 
the SEC to adopt a rule, the NYOAG chose to deviate from this principle and 
independently imposed disclosure of AS on the affected fund firms, who “[r]esponding 
to the Attorney General’s pressure, (…) publish Active Share information quarterly.” 
(Mutual Funds Observer 2018). Consequently, the intervention into the portfolio 
management practices of the affected companies arguably could not be anticipated by 
these firms and thus can be considered an exogenous shock to their operations. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection and measurement of manager activeness 
From the NYOAG report, we obtain the names of the 13 fund firms which disclose AS 
information to retail investors on their websites starting April 2018. We retrieve data for 
all actively managed open-end equity mutual funds issued by these companies and 
marketed to US retail investors. We include funds which (i) feature at least one 
institutional and one retail investor share class, and (ii) manage aggregate assets of at least 
10 million USD in both institutional and retail share classes. Based on these criteria, 271 
funds, i.e. roughly two thirds of the total of 404 funds affected by the intervention, enter 
the sample. In case funds offer more than one share class to either retail or institutional 
investors, we follow Doshi et al. (2015) and convert variables at the share class level to 
retail and institutional aggregates weighted with their respective contribution to the fund’s 
total net assets. 
Since the relevant fund firms, at any given point in time, provide AS statistics only 
for the most recent quarter, we compute fund-specific time series of historical AS data by 
comparing end-of-quarter holdings of each fund with the portfolio composition of its 







− 𝑤𝑘,𝐵𝑀,𝑡| (1) 
where N is the total number of stocks included in either the fund portfolio i or the 
benchmark index, wi,k,t denotes the weight of stock k in fund i in quarter t, and wkBM,t is 
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the weight of stock k in the benchmark portfolio in quarter t. The higher the AS, the more 
a given fund’s holdings differ from its benchmark. 
In order to circumvent benchmark inconsistencies, we apply a three-step 
procedure to identify the relevant fund benchmarks.13 First, we retrieve the holdings of 
the sampled funds’ primary prospectus benchmark index for those funds which provide 
the respective data in the Morningstar Direct Portfolio Analysis Toolkit. Second, a 
minority of funds in our sample features a FTSE Russell index as their primary prospectus 
benchmark. Since we lack holdings data for those indices, we calculate AS time series 
for the respective funds using the readily available holdings of an ETF portfolio with 
sufficiently low tracking error to the FTSE Russell indices (e.g., the iShares Russell 1000 
ETF in case the FTSE Russell 1000 Index is the fund’s benchmark). Specifically, for an 
ETF portfolio to be considered as FTSE Russell fund benchmark proxy, we require the 
average tracking error of the replicating ETF’s past five year return to be less than 0.1, 
i.e. ensuring an almost perfect benchmark replication. Finally, for the small remainder of 
sampled funds left unassigned after the second step, we compute AS by using a ‘best fit 
index benchmark’ from Morningstar’s default indices (Morningstar Category Index, Best 
Fit Index, Morningstar Category Average, Morningstar Index, and ETF Index Proxy).14 
In doing so, we follow Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) and select the 
index generating the lowest AS as a given fund’s best fit index benchmark.15 
We merge our key variables with a host of fund characteristics which we obtain 
from Morningstar Direct. Since the NYOAG intervention is concerned with protecting 
retail investors, we omit funds exclusively distributed to institutional investors as well as 
funds of funds in our analysis. Our period under review starts on October 1st 2017, i.e. 
two quarters prior to the publication of the NYOAG report on April 5th 2018, which marks 
our intervention date, and ends on September 30th 2018, i.e. two quarters subsequent to 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Sensoy (2009) for a discussion on the presence and implicationsof ‘mismatched’ benchmarks for US equity 
mutual funds. 
14 In a final data cleansing step, we exclude all funds for which (i) the deviation of the calculated AS from the AS 
disclosed in December 2018 exceeds 3 pp., or (ii) we obtain inconsistent primary prospectus benchmark indices on the 
fund’s website as opposed to its prospectus, fact sheet, or Morningstar, or (iii) a lack of data does not allow us to 
calculate the full AS time series. 
15 Note that our universe of possible ‘best fit index benchmarks’, i.e. Morningstar’s default indices, differs from Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013), who select one out of 19 predefined benchmark indices commonly used in 
the US such that the fund under review features the greatest overlap with the index portfolio. In unreported analyses, 
we show that our AS calculations do not hinge on benchmark choice. The corresponding results are available upon 
request. 
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the intervention. Appendix II-1 provides descriptions of all variables included in the 
analysis. 
3.2. Summary statistics 
To illustrate how AS relates to fund fees, Figure II-2 plots the sampled funds’ AS against 
the gross expense ratio of their (aggregate) retail share class in the middle of our period 
under review. Supporting the findings documented in the NYOAG report, both AS and 
fund fees vary widely, ranging from below 20% all the way up to 100% and from virtually 
zero up to 3.0%, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between a given funds’ AS and 
expense ratio is indeed largely inconclusive. 
Table II-1 reports summary statistics of the sampled funds separated by retail 
versus institutional share classes. Total assets under management represented in our 
sample aggregate to almost 1.5 trillion USD, i.e. cover as much as 14.3% of the 10.5 
trillion USD invested in actively managed equity mutual funds in the US in 2017 (ICI 
2018). The average fund features an AS of 73.0% and thus qualifies as a ‘moderately 
active stock picker’. This percentage is broadly comparable to prior evidence on 
management activeness among US equity mutual funds: Cremers and Pareek (2016) 
report an average AS of 77%, while Petajisto (2013) documents an average AS of 81%. 
At the same time, roughly 18% of funds feature an AS of less than 60% and thus rate as 
closet indexers. Again, this share squares well with previously documented numbers: 
Petajisto (2013) observes 16% closet indexers, and, in an earlier study, Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) find that about 19% of funds under review practice closet indexing. 
Naturally, retail and institutional share classes of the funds under review feature mostly 
identical characteristics. Notably, institutional share classes of the sampled funds receive 
higher average net fund flows (0.8% versus -1.2%), are smaller (1.37 billion USD versus 
1.93 billion USD), slightly cheaper (0.880% versus 1.184% annual GER), and yield 
higher quarterly returns (0.462% versus 0.398%) as compared their retail counterparts.  
To illustrate how AS relates to fund fees, Figure II-2 plots the sampled funds’ AS 
against the gross expense ratio of their (aggregate) retail share class in the middle of our 
period under review. Supporting the findings documented in the NYOAG report, both AS 
and fund fees vary widely, ranging from below 20% all the way up to 100% and from 
virtually zero up to 3.0%, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between a given funds’ 
AS and expense ratio is indeed largely inconclusive. 
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Table II-1—Summary statistics 
  Mean Median SD 
Panel A: Dependent variables     
Net Fund Flows (%, quarterly)     
Retail SC  1.991 -2.273 18.54 
Institutional SC  1.802 -0.236 17.62 
All  1.897 -1.469 18.08 
Active Share (%, quarterly)  73.02 73.11 13.81 
Panel B: Key explanatory variables     
Intervention  0.5 0.5 0.5 
Retail     
Retail SC  1 1 0 
Institutional SC  0 0 0 
All  0.5 0.5 0.5 
Closet Indexer  0.181 0.000 0.385 
Panel C: Control variables     
Fund Age (years)  23.60 21.92 13.30 
Fund TNA (USD bn.)  5.301 1.281 12.83 
Fund Family TNA (USD bn.)  229.8 140.0 288.5 
Large Cap Fund  0.712 1 0.453 
Mid Cap Fund  0.192 0 0.394 
Small Cap Fund  0.096 0 0.295 
Growth Fund  0.487 0 0.500 
Value Fund  0.207 0 0.405 
Blend Fund  0.306 0 0.461 
# Managers  2.531 2 1.765 
Manager Ownership (1=Yes)  0.830 1 0.376 
Morningstar Rating (1–5)  3.262 3 0.966 
Segment Flows (USD bn.)  -1.383 -0.541 1.980 
Moderately Active  0.491 0 0.482 
Stock Picker  0.328 0 0.321 
Management Fee (%, annually)  0.680 0.675 0.173 
Turnover Ratio (%, annually)  62.77 52.00 43.70 
Return SD  12.51 12.12 4.212 
Tracking Error (%)  6.808 6.413 3.575 
TNA (USD bn.)     
Retail SC  3.334 0.480 8.182 
Institutional SC  1.486 0.412 2.585 
All  2.410 0.4505 6.135 
Return (%, annually)     
Retail SC  2.880 3.174 3.035 
Institutional SC  2.958 3.259 3.039 
All  2.919 3.197 3.036 
Gross Expense Ratio (%, annually)     
Retail SC  1.194 1.225 0.314 
Institutional SC  0.873 0.872 0.258 
All  1.033 1.002 0.329 
Net Expense Ratio (%, annually)     
Retail SC  1.104 1.147 0.294 
Institutional SC  0.799 0.801 0.224 
All  0.952 0.915 0.303 
Aggregate Total AuM (USD tn.)   
Retail SC  0.955 
Institutional SC  0.490 
All  1.445 
N funds   
Retail SC  271 
Institutional SC  271 
All  542 
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Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of (aggregated) retail and institutional share classes (SCs) for the mutual 
funds affected by the NYOAG intervention. Section 3.1 describes the sample selection. Share class information is 
obtained from Morningstar Direct. All fund characteristics are value-weighted by fund and share class category. 
Appendix II-1 provides variable descriptions.








Notes: This graph plots fund manager activeness as measured by Active Share (AS) against fund fees as captured by the (average) GER of the retail share class(es) of the sampled funds in 
the middle of the period under review (December 2017). Section 3.1 describes the fund sample selection. Following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), funds featuring an AS of less than 60% 
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4. Identification strategy 
4.1. Demand-side response 
We apply a difference-in-differences regression approach to identify the causal impact of 
the NYOAG disclosure intervention. To measure investor response, we follow prior 
literature and analyze the flows into (and out of) each of the funds in our sample.1 
Importantly, funds’ AS has been available to institutional investors already well before 
the intervention and therefore does not constitute any novel information to this part of the 
demand side (cf. NYAOG 2018). Thus, to unambiguously measure the flow response of 
the investor group targeted by the NYOAG—i.e. individual investors—we disentangle 
the demand-side by separating retail share classes from their institutional equivalents for 
all funds affected by the NYOAG intervention. In doing so, we are able to construct 
individual within-fund control groups which allow us to control for all observed and 
unobserved fund and fund family characteristics potentially explaining investor demand. 
We estimate several specifications of a generic difference-in-differences regression model 
to analyze investors’ response using net fund flows (FFi,t) as the dependent variable: 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where Interventiont is a binary variable distinguishing the pre-intervention period prior to 
April 2018 from the post-intervention period after April 2018, Retail SCi is a binary 
variable indicating whether a funds’ share class is available to retail investors, and Closet 
Indexeri denotes whether fund i rates as a closet indexer prior to the intervention. To 
                                                          
1 Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we define net fund flows as the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested 
dividends: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 (𝐹𝐹)𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the dollar value of total net assets (TNA) of fund i in quarter 𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  denotes the return of fund 
i in quarter 𝑡 as reported in Morningstar Direct. We differentiate between net fund flows of a funds’ retail vs. 
institutional share classes. We apply the fund merger correction as proposed in Lou (2012) and winsorize the variable 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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control for potential autocorrelation, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the 
time series data to a pre-intervention period (t=0; 2017Q4–2018Q1) and a post-
intervention period (t=1; 2018Q2–2018Q3) in either regression model.2 
Two interaction terms included in the model capture our effects of interest. The coefficient 
pertaining to Interventiont × Retail SCi estimates the difference in differences between the 
net fund flows of retail versus institutional share classes within a fund comparing them 
for the pre- and post-intervention periods. Additionally, the coefficient estimate for the 
triple interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi × Closet Indexeri gauges the above-
mentioned difference in net fund flow differences pertaining to a given funds’ retail share 
class versus institutional share class, however focuses on the subsample of funds which 
rate as closet indexers prior to the NYOAG intervention. 
Moreover, to account for potential performance-induced investor reactions which might 
coincide with the intervention, we interact Interventiont with the sampled funds’ returns 
and Morningstar rating, respectively. Finally, the vector ci,t contains all fund-specific 
control variables listed in Table II-1 and described in Appendix II-1. 
4.2. Supply-side response 
To gauge the reaction of the affected fund companies and their managers, we compare 
pre- and post-intervention levels of AS between the treatment group of funds and a 
matched control group of actively managed mutual funds issued by fund companies 
unaffected by the NYOAG intervention. Since AS does not differ across the share classes 
of a given fund, we follow prior literature in the field (e.g., Ernstberger et al. 2017, Kraft 
et al. 2017) and construct a balanced control sample applying a 1:1 nearest-neighbor 
matching approach in order to allow for a difference-in-differences analysis of the supply-
side reaction to the NYOAG intervention. To this end, we match each affected fund with 
a control group fund based on its individual propensity score to be treated.3 
The intervention targets the largest mutual fund providers in the US and we 
construct the control group accordingly. Specifically, we sample all actively managed 
                                                          
2 Note that our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use regular time series. The corresponding results are 
available upon request. 
3 Apart from the fund’s AS, the matching procedure incorporates several determinants previously shown to impact AS, 
i.e. fund size (Cremers and Petajisto 2009; Petajisto 2013) and investment focus (Jin et al. 2016) as well as a 
comprehensive set of additional fund characteristics (e.g., investment style, cost structure, fund family size). Appendix 
II-4 illustrates the pre- and post-matching bias between treatment group and matched control group and Appendix II-2 
reports the corresponding summary statistics. 
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equity funds distributed in the US which either rank among the 100 largest mutual funds 
in the Morningstar Direct Mutual Fund Database or are issued by the Top 50 US Asset 
Managers as listed in the Mutual Fund Observer. We evaluate the impact of the NYOAG 
intervention on the supply-side by comparing the funds included in this control group 
with our treatment group of funds issued by the 13 companies which were constrained to 
publish AS information as of April 2018. Since the intervention focuses on retail 
investors, we draw on the retail share classes of treated and control-group funds, 
respectively. 
Again, we estimate a generic difference-in-differences regression model 
comparing pre- and post-intervention levels of funds’ AS between the treatment group of 
funds and a matched control group, formalized as: 
𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡
+  𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
where ASi,t measures the AS of fund i in quarter t. Again, the interaction terms capture 
our effects of interest, estimating the difference in differences in AS between treated and 
control group funds for the pre- and post-intervention periods. Specifically, we focus on 
𝛽4, i.e. the interaction term capturing the difference in differences between treatment and 
control group, and 𝛽7 which gauges the three-way interaction effect between active funds 
and closet indexers affected by the intervention. Once again, we follow Bertrand et 
al. (2004) and collapse the time series to estimate the supply-side effect. 
5. Results 
5.1. Demand-side response 
5.1.1. Main findings 
First, we explore whether retail investors use the newly available AS information as 
intended by the NYOAG. A critical question to address in this context is if investors were 
in a position to learn about the disclosure intervention in the first place. In fact, the related 
news coverage suggests so: the NYOAG intervention received broad media attention in 
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some of the country’s largest and most popular news outlets. We screened the US business 
press in the two weeks after the publication of the report and found many articles related 
to the intervention in high-volume nationwide news outlets such as the Financial Times 
and the Wall Street Journal as well as Bloomberg and Reuters. Thus, we argue that retail 
investors could indeed get wind of the intervention and the new fund information item 
provided to them on the fund companies’ websites. 
Do retail investors react to the sudden availability of AS information, and if so, 
how? Table II-2 reports results obtained from estimating several specifications of the 
generic difference-in-differences regression model introduced in section 4.1 with 
quarterly net fund flows (FFi,t) as the dependent variable and shows our main findings 
regarding the investor response to the AS disclosure commitment. As can be inferred 
from the first row, the overall time trend effect of the intervention among the affected 
funds is inconclusive. However, the relevant difference in differences—captured by the 
coefficient of the interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi —turns out highly 
statistically significant and economical meaningful: a 5.79% difference in net fund flows 
of the retail versus institutional share classes is tantamount to extra investments by 
individual investors of as much as USD 55 billion in the post-intervention quarter.4 To 
put this into perspective: the NYOAG intervention effect on flows into retail share classes 
is almost three times the size of the well-documented flow-performance relationship (e.g., 
Gruber 1996, Carhart 1997) and twice the size of the flow effect associated with a one-
standard deviation improvement in the fund’s Morningstar Rating.5 Thus, the demand-
side evidence indicates that retail investors strongly reacted to the NYOAG intervention 
in that they significantly increased their investments in funds issued by companies 
affected by the intervention. Moreover, while only slightly decreasing in magnitude, at 
5.04%, this treatment effect remains highly statistically significant and, as can be inferred 
from specification (4), is robust to controlling for closet indexing.6 
                                                          
4 Total aggregate assets under management in the retail share classes of the 271 funds included in our sample amount 
to USD 955 billion. 
5 The within-fund difference in the increase in quarterly fund flows among retail versus institutional share classes 
amounts to 0.320 standard deviations, while the flow-performance relationship causes an increase in flows of 0.101 
standard deviations. Hence, the multiple amounts to 
0.320
0.101
= 3.17. In the same vein, the NYOAG intervention effect on 





6 Our results are qualitatively robust to clustering standard errors at the fund family level as well as to controlling for 
firm fixed effects in the treatment group. The corresponding results are available upon request. 
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Table II-2—Investor response: main results 
 Dependent variable: FFi,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interventiont 0.414 2.430 -0.819 -0.347 
 (1.045) (3.481) (3.274) (3.150) 
Retail SCi   0.895 1.225 
   (1.688) (1.701) 
Interventiont × Retail SCi   5.787*** 5.041** 
   (2.095) (2.027) 
Closet Indexeri    1.791 
    (3.408) 
Interventiont × Closet Indexeri    -2.642 
    (5.509) 
Retail SCi × Closet Indexeri    -2.182 
    (4.379) 
Interventiont × Retail SCi × Closet Indexeri    4.163 
    (7.763) 
Returni,t–1  0.603** 0.595* 0.605* 
  (0.321) (0.410) (0.372) 
Interventiont × Returni,t–1  -0.267 -0.274 -0.290 
  (0.499) (0.501) (0.506) 
Morningstar Ratingi,t  2.890*** 2.914*** 2.897*** 
  (0.783) (0.787) (0.780) 
Interventiont × Morningstar Ratingi,t  -0.603 -0.530 -0.514 
  (0.990) (0.980) (0.975) 
N obs. 1,084 1,058 1,058 1,058 
N funds 542 536 536 536 
R2 (within) 0.0000 0.2850 0.0387 0.0393 
R2 (overall) 0.0011 0.0015 0.0775 0.0919 
Min Size Requirement (USD 10m) YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from the regression model 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡. 
as specified in section 4.1. FFi,t measures net fund flows pertaining to fund i in quarter t. Interventiont is a binary variable 
distinguishing the pre-intervention period prior to April 2018 from the post-intervention period after April 2018, Retail 
SCi is a binary variable separating retail from institutional share classes at the fund level, and Closet Indexeri denotes 
whether fund i rates as a closet indexer prior to the intervention. The coefficient pertaining to Interventiont × Retail SCi 
estimates the difference in differences between the net fund flows of a funds’ (aggregated) retail share classes versus 
the same funds (aggregated) institutional share classes when comparing them for the pre- and post-intervention periods. 
The triple interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi × Closet Indexeri gauges the above-mentioned difference in 
differences for the subsample of retail share classes versus institutional share classes which rate as closet indexers prior 
to the NYOAG intervention. Returni,t–1 captures the funds’ lagged gross return. Morningstar Ratingi,t-1 is the lagged 
fund star rating provided by Morningstar. The vector ci,t contains the fund-specific control variables listed in Table 1. 
Data is collapsed to a pre-treatment period (Q4 2017 – Q1 2018) and a post-treatment period (Q2 2017 – Q3 2018). 
Section 3.1 describes the fund sample selection. Table A1 provides variable descriptions. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the fund family level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Counterintuitively, however, investors do not appear to rationally discriminate between 
stock pickers and closet indexers when increasing their holdings in the treated funds: the 
coefficient estimate β7 pertaining to the triple interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi 
× Closet Indexeri turns out insignificant.
7 
Note that our difference-in-difference design builds on the conjecture that, absent the 
NYOAG intervention, the development of fund flows in retail and institutional share 
classes would have represented parallel trends. 
Panel A of Figure II-3 plots the development of net fund flows into retail share 
classes (red line) and institutional share classes (black line) and documents a largely 
parallel trend in the pre-intervention quarters (Q4 2017 and Q1 2018). Immediately after 
the intervention, however, the graph suggests a sharp rise in retail inflows while 
institutional money decreases on net. To formally test if the assumption of parallel trends 
is valid, we follow recent research by Frydman and Wang (2020) and run a multiple 
placebo test with respect to the impact of the NYOAG intervention on fund flows. To this 
end, we split our time series into three pairs of adjacent quarters and run separate 
regressions for either pair. Panel B of Figure II-3 plots t-statistics of the coefficient 
estimates pertaining to the interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi (𝛽4), which captures 
our effect of interest. Indeed, the relevant coefficient turns out highly statistically 
significant only for the actual intervention quarter. Thus, assuming parallel trends in net 
fund flows of retail and institutional share classes of a given fund in the non-intervention 
quarters seems plausible. 
Taken together, investors seem to react to the intervention, but apparently not in 
the way intended by the NYOAG: while we document abnormally high post-intervention 
flows into the retail share classes of affected funds, evidence suggests that households do 
not allocate their investments rationally. Of course, AS is not the only relevant parameter 
for the mutual fund investment decision. Nevertheless, at least some of our findings 
indicate that investors behave diametrically opposed to what the NYOAG report would 
have advised them to do. In what follows, we explore investor behavior around the precise 
announcement date of the NYOAG report in an attempt to disentangle the possible causes 
of the counterintuitive evidence collected so far. 
                                                          
7 Supplementary analysis shows that our results do not hinge on the AS cutoff separating truly actively managed funds 
from closet indexers. The corresponding results are available upon request. 
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Notes: This figure plots the time series of net fund flows (top graph) and results of a multiple placebo testing (bottom 
graph). In the upper graph, fund flows are separated between funds’ retail (red line) and institutional assets (black line). 
Following Frydman and Wang (2020), we apply a multiple placebo test on our regression model specified in equation 
(2) using each pair of adjacent quarters in our sample. Specifically, we assume the NYOAG intervention to happen at 
the end of the first quarter for each pair of quarters, e.g., December 31st 2017 for the first bar in the lower graph. Quarters 
on the horizontal axis denote the second quarter of each pair. Bars in the lower graph represent the time-series of t-
statistics pertaining to the difference-in-differences estimator on the interaction term Interventiont × Retail SCi . The 
red bar marks the quarter in which the actual intervention takes place. We report regression coefficients of the multiple 
placebo testing below the quarters. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
5.1.2. Media coverage of the NYOAG intervention and investor attention 
Given that retail investors face a costly search problem, the mere appearance of a mutual 
fund company in the media might make them add the company and its funds to their 
limited set of salient investment opportunities (c.f. Merton 1987). Indeed, prior literature 
documents that investors are more likely to be net buyers of securities mentioned in the 
news (e.g., Barber and Odean 2007, Da et al. 2011, Sirri and Tufano 1998). Only recently, 
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Kaniel and Parham (2017) provide evidence of retail investors subject to a media attention 
bias when making mutual fund allocation decisions. Exploiting a natural experiment, the 
authors document a substantial discontinuity in quarterly capital flows into mutual funds 
mentioned in the popular Wall Street Journal ‘Category Kings’ ranking when compared 
to the flows of those funds which just missed making the list. Moreover, they conclude 
that the prominence of the publication and its visibility are key to driving the media effect. 
Hence, to proxy for a given fund company’s individual visibility, we count the number 
of intervention-related articles in the US business press which mention the respective 
company by name. To this end, we screen Dow Jones Factiva as well as Google News in 
the two weeks following the intervention. We obtain a number of articles which cover the 
AS disclosure intervention, most of which are published by well-known news outlets 
frequently accessed by retail investors such as the Financial Times (“Closet tracker funds 
face tougher regulatory scrutiny”), Wall Street Online (“Top mutual funds to disclose 
new active-management metric”), Bloomberg (“Picking a Mutual Fund Just Got Easier, 
Thanks to N.Y. Regulator”), and Reuters (“Thirteen mutual fund firms to reveal more 
about active funds”). We observe considerable variation in the number of articles in 
which a given fund firm appears by name. For example, Vanguard and BlackRock are 
mentioned in 78% and 84% of all articles covering the intervention, while Columbia 
Threadneedle Investments, a relatively smaller fund company, is mentioned in only 47% 
of articles. Hence, we use the number of press mentions of a given fund company as a 
proxy for the extent of media attention fund i received due to the intervention (Media 
Attentioni). FFi,d measures the daily net fund flows of fund i on day d. We separate fund 
flows into funds’ retail and institutional share classes. Data is collapsed to a pre-treatment 
period (starting 15 days prior to the NYOAG intervention on April 5, 2018) and a post-
treatment period (until 15 days after the intervention). The number of press mentions of 
a given fund company within two weeks after the intervention proxies for the extent of 
media attention fund i received owing to the intervention (Media Attentioni). Media 
Attentioni is standardized to assume a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The 
vector ci,d contains the fund-specific control variables listed in Table II-1. Fund company 
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the fund family level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table II-3—Investor response: media attention effect 











Media Attentioni 0.0125* 0.0144**  -0.0097 -0.0023 
 (0.0075) (0.0071)  (0.0124) (0.0111) 
N obs. 542 542  494 494 
N funds 271 271  247 247 
R2 (within) 0.0000 0.0168  0.0192 0.0192 
R2 (overall) 0.0034 0.0795  0.0933 0.0933 
Controls NO YES  NO YES 
Fund company FEs YES YES  YES YES 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from the regression model 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑑  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑑 + 𝑖,𝑑. 
 
Table II-3 reports coefficient estimates pertaining to the media attention effect around the 
intervention. Again, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the data to a pre-
treatment period (-15 to zero trading days before April 5th 2018) and a post-treatment 
period (zero to +15 trading days after April 5th 2018). Unlike for the institutional share 
classes of the funds affected by the NYOAG intervention, we find that media attention in 
the US business press indeed proves significant in predicting flows into their retail share 
classes. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in Media Attention causes average 
inflows into the affected funds retail share classes in the order of 1.44 bp. of aggregate 
retail TNA. To spell this out: for the largest fund family in our sample (American Funds), 
this amounts to daily net inflows of as much as USD 47 million.8 
In sum, the evidence provided in this section supports the notion that the investor 
response observed after the announcement of the AS disclosure intervention can be 
ascribed to an attention bias rather than to investors’ trading on the newly available 
information about fund manager activeness. Retail investors appear to ‘chase’ funds of 
the companies mentioned in the news articles related to the NYOAG intervention. 
Moreover, given the positive connotation of most of the coverage, investors might have 
interpreted the willingness of the affected fund companies to collaborate with investor 
                                                          
8 Active equity funds managed by American Funds account for approximately USD 330 billion in assets under 
management prior to the NYOAG intervention. 
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protection authorities as a signal of their commitment to increase transparency.9 If so, 
being named in the report and the associated news coverage could have gone along with 
a reputational benefit for the treated fund companies.  
5.2. Supply-side response 
Next, we turn to the question of whether the affected funds adjusted their level of AS 
subsequent to the intervention. 
Table II-4 reports the main results of our investigation into the NYOAG 
intervention effect on fund company behavior. We begin by analyzing the unconditional 
development of AS across all sampled funds before and after the intervention 
(specification (1)). At –0.116 pp., AS of actively managed equity funds slightly declines 
after April 2018. However, given a mean AS of 74% among the matched funds under 
review (cf. Appendix II-2), the overall time effect is economically negligible. Also, its 
statistical significance washes out once we include fund controls and use the matched 
sample (specification (2)). Note that our results remain qualitatively unaltered when we 
include fund fixed effects (specification (3)). In fact, incorporating fund fixed effects only 
marginally increases the within-model fit, while substantially worsening the overall-
model fit. Since fund controls already explain about 42% of the overall variation in AS, 
we thus continue estimating our main specifications (4) and (5) without fund fixed effects. 
Specification (4) includes β4, i.e. our coefficient estimate of the difference–in-differences 
of AS for the treated funds versus control group funds before and after the intervention. 
We find that the intervention effect turns out statistically and economically irrelevant. 
Thus, compared to control group funds, those funds affected by the intervention have not 
adjusted their degree of active portfolio management any differently ever since they have 
disclosed AS information as of April 2018.10 
Are our results confounded by the many moderate and active stock pickers which 
do not feel the urge to adjust their AS? To examine this possibility, we focus on the 
subsample of closet indexers, i.e. arguably those funds with the highest pressure to act. 
The full model (specification (5)) includes the relevant triple interaction term, but again, 
                                                          
9 We identify the sentiment of all press releases with respect to the NYOAG intervention and note that the majority of 
articles entails an either positive or neutral connotation. Appendix II-2 describes the methodology and reports the 
corresponding descriptives. 
10 Our results are qualitatively robust to clustering standard errors at the fund family level as well as to controlling for 
fund fixed effects in the treatment group. The corresponding results are available upon request. 
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the corresponding coefficient estimate, β7 (0.046), is miniscule and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Hence, we do not observe any meaningful effort to increase 
AS for managers of funds rated closet indexers at the time of the intervention, either. 
Moreover, the AS threshold level of 60% which—according to the definition of Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009)—separates truly actively managed funds from closet indexers might 
be (i) somewhat arbitrary and (ii) unknown to fund managers. Thus, we divide the 
universe of funds into quintiles depending on their AS prior to the intervention and 
replicate specifications (4) and (5) of our main analysis for each of the quintiles-based 
cut-offs. Yet, regardless of the respective quintile, we fail to find any measurable 
differences of AS adjustment among the treated versus control group funds.11 
Finally, the NYOAG report calls for retail investors to assess funds with respect 
to both manager activeness and cost. Thus, another plausible supply-side response would 
be to adjust fund fees instead of altering the level of active management. However, our 
analysis of the funds’ expense ratios does not support this notion. Specifically, the 
coefficient estimate pertaining to the interaction term Interventiont × Treatedi turns out 
economically and statistically insignificant when we replicate specification (5) using the 
funds’ Gross Expense Ratio (GER) as the dependent variable. Additionally, a 
complementary screening of the development of fund fees subsequent to our sample 
period shows that the affected funds have not adjusted fees in 2019 either.12 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that fund companies have not reacted to 
the intervention in the way intended by the NYOAG. 
  
                                                          
11 The corresponding results are available upon request. 
12 The corresponding results are available upon request. 
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Table II-4—Reaction of affected fund companies 
  Dependent variable: ASi,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















Closet Indexeri  











Interventiont ×  
Closet Indexeri 
 
    
0.131 
(0.332) 
Treatedi × Closet  
Indexeri 
 




Treatedi × Closet 
Indexeri 
 
    
0.046 
(0.474) 
N obs.  2,868 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,260 
N funds  1,434 630 630 630 630 
R2 (within)  0.0036 0.1261 0.1261 0.1267 0.2119 
R2 (overall)  0.0002 0.4210 0.4207 0.4225 0.5494 
Matched Sample  NO YES YES YES YES 
Controls  NO YES YES YES YES 
Fund FE  NO NO YES NO NO 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from the regression model 
𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
as specified in section 4.2. ASi,t measures the Active Share of fund i in quarter t, Interventiont is a binary variable 
distinguishing the pre-intervention period prior to April 2018 from the post-intervention period after April 2018, 
Treatedi is a binary variable indicating funds issued by fund companies which were imposed to disclose AS statistics 
by the NYOAG, and Closet Indexeri denotes whether fund i rates as a closet indexer prior to the intervention. The 
coefficient pertaining to Interventiont × Treatedi estimates the difference in differences between the AS of treated funds 
versus control group funds when comparing them for the pre- and post-intervention periods. The triple interaction term 
Interventiont × Treatedi × Closet Indexeri gauges the respective difference in differences for the subsample of treated 
funds versus control group funds which rate as closet indexers prior to the NYOAG intervention. The vector ci,t contains 
the fund-specific control variables listed in Table 1. All results are obtained from a balanced sample of treated funds 
and control-group funds matched using PSM (nearest neighbor 1:1 method) as described in section 4.2. Data is 
collapsed to a pre-treatment period (Q4 2017 – Q1 2018) and a post-treatment period (Q2 2017 – Q3 2018). Robust 
standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the fund family level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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6. Further analyses 
6.1. Investor reaction around the disclosure announcement date 
In a first supplementary analysis, we explore in detail when exactly investors reacted to 
the NYOAG intervention and for that draw on daily fund flow data from Morningstar 
Direct. We calculate cumulative abnormal fund flows (CAFFs) to trace the flows into 
retail share classes of treated versus non-treated funds around the NYOAG report 
disclosure.13 Our event window spans the 60 trading days from six weeks prior to the 
publication of the NYOAG report on April 5th 2018 until six weeks after that date. 
The bottom row of Table II-5 reports CAFFs of treated funds compared to their 
nearest-neighbor counterfactuals for various event windows relative to the NYOAG 
report disclosure date. While we do not observe any significant difference in fund flows 
prior to the intervention, treated funds indeed attracted significantly higher fund inflows 
directly after the publication of the NYOAG report. In fact, CAFFs amount to over 1% 
during the first 30 trading days subsequent to the disclosure of the intervention, i.e. 
equivalent to a substantial USD 6.4 billion in additional inflows for the (matched) treated 
funds. Moreover, we find that the monotonous increase in CAFFs until d=30 diminishes 
thereafter.14 Thus, the bulk of abnormal inflows to the treated funds seems to have 
occurred soon after the announcement of the fund companies’ commitment to disclose 
AS information. This finding corroborates the notion of a media attention effect 
explaining investors’ response as documented in section 5.1.2. 
6.2. Exposition of AS information 
Second, we take a closer look at how the relevant AS information is presented to investors 
on the websites of the fund companies. Salience of information disclosure has been shown 
to significantly impact consumers’ decision making (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 2014, Shaton 
                                                          
13 Specifically, we calculate CAFFs for treated fund 𝑖 over matched control-group fund 𝑗 following Cooper et al. (2005): 
 









where FF (treated fund)i,d is the daily net fund flow of treated fund i on trading day d and FF (control fund)j,d is the 
daily net fund flow of the nearest-neighbor untreated fund j on trading day d. Matching is based on the following set of 
covariates: AS, fund size (TNA), fund style (Large Cap, Growth), and past return. 
14 The corresponding results are available upon request. 
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2017, Badoer et al. 2020). While we confirm that AS information has been disclosed by 
all affected fund companies as of April 2018, we observe considerable variation in the 
accessibility of the published AS statistics. 
Specifically, only 28.7% of the treated funds provide AS statistics as part of the fund 
overview information. For the remaining funds, AS is either disclosed in the fund’s details 
(e.g., portfolio composition), the fund’s fact sheet or in a general AS report (including AS 
metrics for all funds distributed by the respective company) and hence more difficult to 
access for investors. Similarly, only 54% of treated funds feature an explanation of how 
to interpret the AS information. Appendix II-5 provides examples of AS presentation 
modes. 
Given the variation in the way AS is disclosed to retail investors, it is conceivable 
that (i) the counterintuitive investor response might be limited to funds for which AS 
statistics were difficult to retrieve and that (ii) the non-response on the supply-side 
predominantly stems from those funds which do not care to provide AS information in an 
accessible way. To explore this possibility, we augment our baseline analysis by including 
the binary variable SalienceHigh, which separates highly salient AS disclosure modes 
from their relatively low-salient counterparts.15 As with our main analyses, we capture 
the effect of interest by interacting Intervention with Salience High. 
Panel A of Table II-6 reports the coefficient estimates pertaining to the demand-side 
response and produces two additional results. First, we do not observe a significant effect 
of AS information salience on fund flows. Second, we fail to find evidence of investors 
eschewing closet indexers when AS information is easy to obtain.  
Analogously, Panel B documents the supply-side response. First, we find that 
managers of funds issued by companies affected by the intervention have not adjusted 
their degree of active portfolio management any differently in case the AS information is 
presented more salient on their funds’ website. Second, manager behavior with respect to 
the closet indexers among the affected funds proves insignificant once again. Third and 
finally, as can be inferred from the coefficient of the respective triple interaction term, 
fund manager behavior does not appear to be mediated by disclosure salience for the 
subsample of closet indexers.
                                                          
15 Specifically, we define a given funds’ AS information salience as high if its AS information may be retrieved with 
no more than one mouse click on the funds’ front-page. Analogously, if accessing AS information requires longer 
clickstreams, the respective fund’s salience is flagged as low. 
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Table II-5—Investor response: daily fund flows around announcement 
 
 
[-30;0] [-25;0] [-20;0] [-15;0] [-10;0] [-5;0] [0;5] [0;10] [0;15] [0;20] [0;25] [0;30] N 
Mean CFF 
treated 
 -2.79 -3.93 -2.60 -3.79 -2.48 0.67 1.00 1.85 0.67 0.46 2.46 1.94 281 
Mean CFF 
control 
 -2.31 -3.60 -2.30 -3.61 -2.48 0.72 1.17 2.20 1.07 0.98 3.29 2.99 281 
CAFF 
(Difference) 
 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.18 -0.01 0.05 0.17* 0.35** 0.39** 0.52** 0.82*** 1.05*** 
562 
 (1.60) (1.20) (1.38) (0.94) (-0.05) (0.45) (1.67) (2.19) (1.97) (2.02) (2.55) (2.63) 
Notes: This table reports average Cumulative Abnormal Fund Flows (CAFF) of treated funds over a matched sample of control funds for various periods prior to and subsequent to the 
NYOAG intervention on April 5, 2018 as specified in section 5.2. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) test against the null hypothesis of CAFFs in the respective time window being zero. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table II-6—AS disclosure salience 
  Panel A: Demand-side response (FFi,t)  Panel B: Supply-side response (ASi,t) 
































































N obs.  1,058 1,058  630 630 
N funds  536 536  315 315 
R2 (within)  0.0247 0.0308  0.1265 0.3132 
R2 (overall)  0.2621 0.2649  0.4459 0.5878 
Additional Controls  YES YES  YES YES 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from the regression model specifications 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 /𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖
∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡 , 
FFi,t (ASi,t) measures the net flows into (AS of) fund i in quarter t, Interventiont is an binary variable distinguishing the pre-intervention period prior to April 2018 from the post-intervention 
period after April 2018, Closeti denotes whether fund i rates as a closet indexer prior to the intervention. The variable of interest in this specifications is Salience High indicating that fund 
i discloses AS salient on its website. The coefficient pertaining to Interventiont × Salience Highi estimates the difference in differences between the AS of funds (difference in retail net fund 
flows) transparently disclosing the AS metric versus funds that chose a rather opaque disclosing method when comparing them for the pre- and post-intervention periods. The triple 
interaction term Interventiont × SalienceHighi × Closeti gauges the above-mentioned difference in differences for the subsample of ‘transparent disclosers’ versus funds with rather difficult 
to access AS information which rate as closet indexers prior to the NYOAG intervention. The vector ci,t contains the fund-specific control variables listed in Table 1. The sample is restricted 
to retail share classes of funds issued by fund families affected by the NYOAG intervention (treatment group). Table A1 provides variable descriptions. Data is collapsed to a pre-treatment 
period (Q4 2017 – Q1 2018) and a post-treatment period (Q2 2017 – Q3 2018). We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
7.1. Discussion of key results 
In early 2018, the New York Attorney General’s Investor Protection Bureau (NYOAG) 
investigated more than 2,000 actively managed equity funds distributed to US retail 
investors and, in an accompanying report, called on fund companies to make AS 
information available to retail investors, too. Following the investigation, the NYOAG 
imposed the disclosure of AS on several of the largest US mutual fund firms and, as of 
April 2018, these companies have published AS statistics for their actively managed 
equity mutual funds on their websites. In this study, we evaluate the effectiveness of this 
disclosure intervention. 
While we confirm that all affected fund companies comply with the disclosure 
commitment, we conclude that the intended effects have largely failed to materialize. 
Compared to managers of control-group funds, fund managers affected by the NYOAG 
intervention have not adjusted their degree of active portfolio management—as measured 
by Active Share (AS)—any differently after having been constrained to publicly disclose 
AS information. Even for managers of funds rated closet indexers—i.e. arguably those 
funds with the highest pressure to act—we do not observe any measurable effort to 
increase AS post-intervention. Moreover, fund managers’ non-response is not altered by 
whether or not the AS metric is presented in a visible fashion. 
Why don’t fund managers adjust AS levels following the disclosure commitment? 
First, fund managers might not be able to adjust AS in the short run. On the one hand, 
they might face a lack of suitable investment opportunities outside the funds’ benchmark 
portfolio. On the other hand, while AS seems easy to manipulate on the face of it, 
unobservable company-specific policies might make it difficult for managers to react to 
the disclosure commitment in the way they would have wished to. However, this notion 
is hard to square with prior evidence: Cremers and Curtis (2016), e.g., provide examples 
of substantial short-term AS adjustments among managers of large mutual funds. They 
Leveling the playing field? The effect of disclosing fund manager activeness to individual investors 
93 
 
argue that AS can be easily manipulated by simple portfolio selection and weighting, with 
almost no lead-time required.1 
Second, managers might fear it could be taken as a sign of their poor pre-
intervention activeness if they scale up AS levels of their funds immediately after the 
NYOAG intervention. Instead, they might consider it tactically wise to adjust AS 
gradually over time rather than increasing it all at once. Yet, we do not observe any 
patterns of incremental AS adjustments during the six-month post-intervention period for 
which we have AS information available. While our data does not allow us to explore 
potential long-term effects of the NYOAG intervention, we interpret the lack of gradual 
adjustments until September 2018 as indicative of manager inertia rather a strategy 
regarding the funds’ AS. 
Third, managers might not adjust AS levels subsequent to the announcement of 
the intervention because they have already done so. To check for potential information 
leakage or anticipation effects of the imposed disclosure, we replicate our analysis of the 
supply-side response for the last quarter of the pre-intervention period (18Q1), i.e. three 
months prior to the official announcement. However, (unreported) results do not support 
any measurable pre-announcement AS adjustment activity and corroborate the notion that 
the intervention marked a shock to the affected fund firms’ operations.2 
Fourth, managers might not consider AS relevant for their operations (e.g., 
Frazzini et al. 2016). However, empirical evidence documents that AS drives fund 
performance and, as such, indeed constitutes a relevant piece of information for investors 
and fund managers alike (e.g., Cremers and Petajisto 2009, Petajisto 2013, Cremers and 
Pareek 2016). Moreover, fund companies have traditionally provided AS information to 
institutional investors and internally use AS for benchmarking, hence making it difficult 
for them to deny the metric’s meaning.3 
Fifth and finally, fund managers might anticipate that investors will not trade on 
the newly available AS information and thus might not feel the urge to adjust AS levels. 
                                                          
1 Yet an alternative explanation for fund managers’ non-response could be that fund managers willing but unable to 
adjust AS instead altered management fees in order to react to the NYOAG intervention. However, a related analysis 
(unreported; results available upon request) shows that management fees are virtually unchanged during and after our 
period under review. 
2 The corresponding results are available upon request. 
3 E.g., fund companies set AS guidelines for their portfolio managers, employ AS to review their performance, and use 
AS as a metric to assess fund sub-advisors (NYOAG 2018). 
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While we lack the data necessary to test this hypothesis, the documented investor 
response indeed points to a lack of understanding with respect to how AS should be used 
for mutual fund investment decisions. 
Unlike fund managers, investors strongly respond to the NYOAG intervention. 
Investments in the retail share classes of affected funds significantly increase as compared 
to that same funds’ institutional shares. Counterintuitively, however, investors do not 
appear to make a difference between active stock pickers and closet indexers when 
increasing their holdings in the funds affected by the NYOAG intervention: regardless of 
whether the fund qualifies as truly actively managed or rather hugs its benchmark index, 
the respective fund inflows are statistically indistinguishable. 
A supplementary investigation of daily fund flows shows that the bulk of excess 
flows into the affected funds occurred right after the announcement of the fund 
companies’ commitment to disclose AS information. This suggests that the investor 
response can be ascribed to an attention bias rather than to investors’ trading on the newly 
available information about fund manager activeness. In fact—given the mostly positive 
connotation of the related news coverage—investors might have interpreted fund 
companies’ collaboration with investor protection authorities as a signal of their 
commitment to increase transparency. If so, being named in the report and the associated 
news would have enhanced the affected companies’ reputation. Taken together, these 
findings are hard to square with the notion that retail investors understand the concept 
behind AS and trade on this newly available information. 
7.2. Towards a comprehensible measure of fund manager activeness 
Generally, consumers tend to process information in the format in which it is made 
available to them and typically are not prepared to convert data into actionable 
information first (Cox and Payne 2005). Therefore, “for [financial] information to have 
a positive impact on the consumer decision-making process, it must be easily accessible 
and presented in a clear and understandable format.” (Kozup et al., 2008, p.38) However, 
several issues might obstruct the comprehensibility of the AS disclosure under review. 
First, investors are presented with a numerical value and—except for the rather 
technical descriptions of AS on fund companies websites—typically receive no guidance 
on how to interpret it. This runs counter to robust evidence indicating that the ability to 
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derive meaning from numerical information is key to processing it efficiently.4 
Specifically, investors require external reference information as an interpretational aid to 
differentiate suitable from unsuitable funds based on their AS.5 At this, fixed baseline 
comparison has been shown to be a particularly important reference type (e.g., Hieke and 
Newman 2015). Hence, an extension of the AS measure—i.e. a fund’s Active Fee (AF), 
as introduced by Cremers and Curtis (2016)—might be a promising metric to effectively 
inform retail investors. AF combines a funds’ AS information with the fees charged on 
the actively managed part of the portfolio.6 Assuming that the ‘passive’ part of a fund’s 
holdings could be invested in the benchmark index at the respective expense ratio, AF 
tells investors how much they pay for the truly actively managed part of the fund 
portfolio, i.e. the part that deviates from the benchmark.7 
Figure II-4 illustrates the AS-AF relationship. Univariately, we observe a 
significant inverse relation supporting the conjecture that funds with low levels of active 
portfolio management charge comparatively higher fees. Thus, one avenue to provide 
investors with easy-to-understand information about fund manager activeness might be 
to compare its AF to the average AF of peer funds (cf. Kozup and Hogarth 2008). 
Second, investors are presented with a snapshot of the fund’s AS which need not 
be indicative of its long-term asset management strategy (Cremers and Curtis 2016).8 
Thus, besides a missing reference point, retail investors also lack information on the 
development of a fund’s AS over time. Such historical AS information is valuable, 
however, since manager activeness could be subject to window-dressing practices 
                                                          
4 See Kwon and Lee (2009) for a review of related studies. 
5 While not the scope of our study, it is conceivable that fund companies deliberately choose not to provide investors 
with a reference point to assess a given funds’ AS relative to an industry or product benchmark. This practice is referred 
to as ‘baseline omission’ in the literature (e.g., Xie and Johnson 2015). 
6 A fund’s Active Fee is calculated as 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑎 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑎 − (1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑎) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑎 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑎
  
where Expense Ratioi,a represents the investors’ total expenses for fund i in year a, Active Sharei,a is the AS of the fund 
in year a and Index Fund Feei,a is the typical expense ratio charged by an index fund closely tracking fund i ‘s 
benchmark. 
7 In a supplementary analysis, we test whether affected fund companies adjusted Active Fee levels. Corroborating our 
main findings, however, we do not observe a measurable reduction in AF. If anything, we find that funds which already 
charge high fees relative to their degree of manager activeness further increase their Active Fee. The corresponding 
results are available upon request. 
8 A small number of fund companies disclose AS in a separate AS report and occasionally provide AS information for 
the two most recent quarters. 
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(Cremers and Curtis 2016). In the vein of existing disclosure requirements regarding 
after-tax fund returns, policymakers could mandate fund companies to present individual 
investors with AS and AF statistics over one-, five-, and ten-year periods.9 
 
Figure II-4—Active Fee and Active Share 
 
Notes: This figure plots the sampled funds’ Active Fee (AF) as specified in section 7.2. in relation to funds’ manager 
activeness as measured by Active Share (AS) in the middle of the period under review (December 2017). AF is 
computed following Cremers and Curtis (2016). *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Third and finally, as documented in section 6.2, we observe large heterogeneity in 
the way AS is disclosed for the affected fund companies under review. Given the rather 
opaque presentation of AS statistics by some of the sampled fund companies, 
harmonization efforts should not be limited to content, but instead extend to the exposition 
of AS information. 
Taken together, our evaluation of the NYOAG intervention documents a number 
of unintended consequences and reveals substantial limits to the effectiveness of this 
disclosure initiative. As has been advocated by the NYOAG, it is for the SEC to establish 
(i) the legislation required to effectively curb closet indexing and (ii) the mandatory 
                                                          
9 SEC Final Rule: “Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns” - 17 CFR Parts 230, 239, 270, and 274. (Younger 
funds: after-tax returns over entire fund life.) 
β
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disclosure standards to alert investors’ to rogue firms.10 Indeed, action seems imperative: 
in a review of the legal aspects to closet indexing, Cremers and Curtis (2016) argue that 
persistent closet indexing entails delinquencies including prospectus misstatement under 
the Securities Act 11(a) and 12(a), excessive fees under the Investment Company Act 
36(b), and fiduciary breach under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.  
                                                          
10 The SEC provides an online guide which describes several relevant factors related to risk, return, and expenses that 
need to be considered by investors (https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf). As of now, 
however, the document lacks any guidance with respect to funds’ degree of active management. 
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Appendix II-1—Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description 
Panel A: dependent variables 
Active Share (AS) 
(%, quarterly) 







𝑖=1 − 𝑤𝑘,𝐵𝑀,𝑡| 
where N is the total number of stocks included in either the fund portfolio j 
or the benchmark index, wi,j,t denotes the weight of stock k in fund i in 
quarter t, and wi,BM,t is the weight of stock i in the benchmark portfolio in 
quarter t. The higher the AS, the more a given fund’s holdings differ from its 
benchmark. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
(Quarterly / Daily) Net 
Fund Flows (FF) 
Quarterly / daily net fund flows are the net growth in fund assets beyond 
reinvested dividends: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 (𝐹𝐹)𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the dollar value of total net assets (TNA) of fund i in 
quarter t (on day d) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  denotes the return of fund i in quarter t (on day d) 
as reported in Morningstar Direct. We apply the fund merger correction as 
proposed in Lou (2012). The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
Panel B: key explanatory variables 
Treated Equals one if a fund company has been mentioned in the report “Mutual 
Fund Fees and Active Share” by the New York Attorney General Investor 
Protection Bureau (NYOAG report) on April, 5th 2018, zero otherwise. 
Intervention Binary time variable distinguishing the pre-intervention period prior to April 
2018 from the post-intervention period after April 2018. Equals one for the 
post-intervention period, zero otherwise. 
Closet Indexer Equals one if a funds’ Active Share (AS) is below 60%, zero otherwise. 
Definition taken from Cremers & Petajisto (2009). 
Retail SC Equals one if a funds’ share class is available to retail investors, zero 
otherwise. 
Salience High Equals one if a (treated) fund company transparently discloses the AS metric 
on its website, (i.e. AS information can be obtained within one mouse-click 
from the funds’ overview website), zero otherwise.  
Panel C: control variables 
Fund Age (years) Age in years since a funds’ inception date. We use the logarithm of Fund 
Age in our main regressions. 
Large Cap Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in large cap stocks, zero otherwise.  
Mid Cap Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in mid cap stocks, zero otherwise. 
Small Cap Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in small cap stocks, zero otherwise. 
Growth Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in growth stocks, zero otherwise. 
Value Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in value stocks, zero otherwise. 
Blend Fund Equals one if a fund primarily invests in blend stocks, zero otherwise. 
Institutional SC Equals one if a fund is available for institutional investors only, zero 
otherwise. 
# Managers Number of managers responsible for managing a fund as reported by 
Morningstar. 





Equals one if at least one of the funds’ managers is privately invested in the 
fund he/ she manages, zero otherwise. 
Morningstar 
Rating 
(1 to 5 stars) 
Morningstar rates mutual funds and ETFs from 1 to 5 stars based on how 
well they have performed (after adjusting for risk and accounting for sales 
charges) in comparison to similar funds and ETFs. Within each Morningstar 
Category, the top 10% of funds and ETFs receive 5 stars and the bottom 10% 
receive 1 star. 
Segment Flows  
(USD bn.) 
(Quarterly) net fund flows in (and out of) a specified Morningstar fund 
segment. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Fund TNA  
(USD bn.) 
Funds total net assets – aggregating both, institutional as well as retail share 
classes of a given fund. We use the natural logarithm of Fund TNA in our 
main regressions. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Fund TNA  
– Retail 
(USD bn.) 
Funds total net assets aggregated over retail share classes (available to retail 
– excluding any share classes labeled as “institutional” as reported on 
Morningstar Direct). We use the natural logarithm of Fund TNA - Retail in 
our main regressions. 
Fund Family TNA  
(USD bn.) 
Total net assets of fund family (company). Refers to the total net assets 
reported in Morningstar Direct for a fund family. Total net assets are 
restricted to actively managed equity mutual funds, excluding fund of funds. 
The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Moderately Active Equals one if a funds’ Active Share (AS) is below 80% but above 60%, zero 
otherwise. Definition taken from Cremers & Petajisto (2009). 
Stock Picker Equals one if a funds’ Active Share (AS) is above 80%, zero otherwise. 
Definition taken from Cremers & Petajisto (2009). 
Gross Expense Ratio  
(%, annually) 
A fund’s annual gross expense ratio in percent. The variable is winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Net Expense Ratio 
(%, annually)  
A fund’s annual net expense ratio in percent. The variable is winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Management Fee 
(%, annually) 
Percentage that was deducted from an investment's average net assets to pay 
the investment's management. 
Turnover Ratio 
(%, annually) 
Percentage amount of a mutual fund's portfolio that has changed within a 




A funds’ (quarterly) raw return before any fees and cost in percent. The 
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Return SD 
(%, annually) 
A funds’ (quarterly) standard deviation of raw return in percent. The variable 
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Tracking Error 
(%, annually)  
Standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s and the benchmark 
index’ return. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
N Benchmark 
Holdings 
Total number of (long) equity holdings in a funds’ benchmark. The variable 
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Top10 Assets in BM 
(%, quarterly) 
Sum of weights of the top 10 stocks in the funds’ benchmark in percent. The 
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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Appendix II-2—Summary statistics: matched sample 
  Matched treatment group  Matched control group 
  Mean P50 SD  Mean P50 SD 
Panel A: matching covariates         
Ln (Fund TNA)  25.445 25.195 0.710  25.421 25.461 0.685 
Ln (Fund Family TNA)  19.465 19.786 2.196  19.317 19.621 2.349 
Large Cap Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.721 1 0.449  0.716 1 0.451 
Value Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.232 0 0.422  0.228 0 0.420 
Gross Expense Ratio (%, 
annually) 
 
1.321 1.258 0.607  1.333 1.198 0.700 
Active Share (%)  74.072 74.655 14.034  73.751 74.782 15.412 
Panel B: non-matching covariates         
Net Fund Flows (%, quarterly)  1.234 -1.994 10.877  0.296 -2.424 10.861 
Intervention  0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 
Treated  1 1 0  0 0 0 
Fund Age (years)  20.651 19.667 12.429  18.449 18.250 12.441 
Mid Cap Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.178 0 0.383  0.199 0 0.400 
Small Cap Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.102 0 0.302  0.085 0 0.279 
Growth Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.444 0 0.497  0.424 0 0.495 
Blend Fund (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.324 0 0.468  0.348 0 0.477 
# Managers  2.606 2 1.746  2.935 2 1.832 
Manager Ownership (0=No; 
1=Yes) 
 
0.752 1 0.432  0.631 1 0.483 
Morningstar Rating (1-5)  3.124 3 0.993  3.029 3 1.151 
Closet Indexer (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.171 0 0.377  0.218 0 0.413 
Moderately Active (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.394 0 0.489  0.396 0 0.490 
Stock Picker (0=No; 1=Yes)  0.449 0 0.498  0.403 0 0.491 
Net Expense Ratio (%, annually)  1.133 1.159 0.293  1.137 1.135 0.296 
Management Fee (%, annually)  0.709 0.710 0.163  0.740 0.750 0.191 
Turnover Ratio (%, annually)  63.528 56.335 39.184  53.570 42.000 39.040 
Return (%, annually)  2.775 2.936 2.910  2.497 2.823 3.128 
Return SD  12.598 12.190 4.165  13.391 12.918 3.867 
Tracking Error (%)  6.636 6.307 3.299  7.126 6.996 3.467 
N funds  315  315 
N obs.  630  630 
Panel C: matching characteristics  Post-matching  Pre-matching 
Mean covariate bias  1.5  39.2 
Median covariate bias  1.0  34.6 
Rubin’s B  5.1  104.4* 
Rubin’s R  0.93  2.21* 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of our sample pre and after matching. Treatment and Control Group are 
matched using propensity score matching (nearest neighbor 1:1 method). Matching is based on a comprehensive set of 
covariates, which include Active Share (AS), fund style (Growth Fund), investment focus (Large Cap Fund), fund size 
(Fund TNA - Retail), the funds cost structure (Gross Expense Ratio) and fund family size (Fund Family TNA). Panel C 
reports PSM matching characteristics.  
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Appendix II-3—Business press coverage of NYOAG intervention 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the business press coverage of the NYOAG intervention on April 5, 2018. The LHS graph 
displays the overall sentiment (connotation) of the press articles as captured by using Intencheck 
(https://www.intencheck.com/). The RHS graph plots the frequency distribution of articles stacked with respect to the 
number of affected fund firms mentioned in the respective article. 
  





Appendix II-4—Propensity score matching 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the (standardized) mean covariate bias between affected funds and control-group funds prior to and after the propensity score matching. Circles indicate the 
pre-matching covariate bias, while crosses indicate the respective post-matching bias.
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Appendix II-5—Salience of Active Share disclosure 
Panel A: Active Share disclosed as part of the fund overview 
 
Panel B: Active Share disclosed in the fund risk measures (or holdings) 
 
 
Panel C: Active Share disclosed in a funds’ fact sheet 
 
 
Panel D: Active Share disclosed in a separate report 
 
 
Notes: This figure provides examples of how Active Share is disclosed by the mutual fund companies. 
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Abstract–Skin-in-the-game (‘sitg’), a fund manager’s private investment in her own 
funds, allows to align investors’ and managers’ interest. However, this information 
can be regarded as almost unattainable for retail investors under current disclosing 
practices. Using fund managers’ letter to the shareholders (LS), a different, yet more 
salient information channel of ‘sitg’ disclosure, on a large sample (~16,000 
observations) of US mutual funds, we show that verbal signaling of fund manager 
investment alters fund flows. Specifically, we find that ‘sitg’ signaling translates 
into substantial fund inflows up to two weeks after the LS is sent out. Furthermore, 
we document that this effect is most pronounced after poor fund performance. In 
contrast, investors do not react on the actual amount invested by portfolio as 
currently required to be disclosed by the SEC. Our findings highlight the increasing 
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“Don’t tell me what you think, tell me what you have in your portfolio.” 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
Mutual funds constitute the most popular professionally managed investment vehicle in 
the US. Estimated 100 million individuals in 56 million households own shares in at least 
one of the large universe of mutual funds available for private investors. The total amount 
of assets managed reached about 19 trillion dollar at the year-end 2017.1 Investing in an 
actively managed mutual fund is tantamount to delegating the management of a securities 
portfolio. Consequently, fund investors face ongoing uncertainty about the standard of 
care investment professionals exercise when managing their savings and whether they act 
in their best interest. Hence, understanding the incentives of the individuals responsible 
for managing those funds is of major importance to investors given the asymmetric 
information setup. 
Responding to a series of governance scandals in the fund industry2, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all managers of mutual funds to 
disclose their personal investment in the funds they manage since March 2005. The 
disclosure requirement is meant to bring more transparency, reduce agency cost and align 
interests in the relationship between shareholders and managers of mutual funds. As the 
SEC argues, “a portfolio manager’s ownership in a fund provides a direct indication of 
his or her alignment with the interests of shareholders in that fund” - SEC Rule S7-12-
04.3 While fund manager ownership might be motivated by a variety of reasons4, it can 
in turn establish a useful incentive alignment mechanism: fund managers, who invest their 
private money in self-managed funds, should refrain from excessive risk taking and 
                                                          
1 The Investment Company Institute - 2018 Investment Company Fact Book.  
2 Among them, late trading and market timing have revealed misaligned incentives in the fund industry in the early 
2000s and carried penalties of more than $ 4billion imposed on fund companies (Bullard 2005). 
3 SEC Rule S7-12-04: Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies. 
4 For example, fund manager ownership can be justified as a personal portfolio decisions, i.e. when the manager has 
superior information on the funds’ future performance, or linked to fund family policies such as requiring minimum 
investments or (partly) compensating managers with shares of self-managed funds. However, referring to compensation 
contracts, Ma et al. (2019) do not find evidence for this to be the case in practice. 
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exercise caution on the shareholder money employed.5 According to Nassim Taleb, 
author, mathematical scientist and former options trader, having “skin-in-the-game” 
(‘sitg’), i.e. being exposed to risk when taking a decision, is at the heart of an effective 
principal-agent setting. He argues, “[h]ow much you truly believe in something can be 
manifested only through what you are willing to risk for it.”  
Indeed, prior research largely documents that in the mutual fund setting manager 
ownership relates positively to fund performance (Ma and Tang 2019, Khorana et al. 
2007, Evans 2008) with the incentive alignment mechanism between fund managers and 
shareholder being the main driver for the positive return relation (Ma and Tang 2019, 
Martin and Sonnenburg 2015). 
Theoretically, retail investors should benefit from the mandated disclosure of 
manager ownership. However, the information on managers’ private investments is 
disclosed in a lengthy (>50 pages), word-heavy (>10,000 words) and most-probable 
unread document that is only provided upon request –the Statement of Additional 
Information (SAI). For the vast majority of private investors this document is, at best, a 
secondary source of information and therefore remains unread (SEC 2019). 
Yet, interestingly, fund managers regularly use another medium to voluntarily 
disclose ‘sitg’ to their investors: the Letter to the Shareholder (LS).6 In the LS, the fund 
management directly speaks to the funds’ shareholders and discusses, among others, past 
performance, market outlook and sometimes stock picks (Hillert et al. 2016). Constituting 
the initial section of the semi-annual fund reporting, the LS is presumably read more often 
than other parts of the reporting and therefore can be regarded as the main communication 
tool for the fund management (Chu and Kim 2019).  
Using advanced textual analysis building on a self-coded Python routine, we are able 
to automatically process a large sample (~16,000) of mutual funds’ shareholder letters. 
We analyze whether investors response to fund managers’ communication of ‘sitg’ in the 
LS controlling for a comprehensive set fund, manager and market characteristics. First, 
                                                          
5 Note that other incentive alignment mechanisms are also at play, e.g., performance-based compensation contracts, 
fund manager dismissal after poor performance or removal of the fund management company by the funds’ board of 
directors. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the case that fund man-ager ownership is a requirement from the fund 
management company and consequently does not display a personal portfolio choice. However, there is only little 
evidence suggesting so (cf. Khorana et al. 2007). 
6 Examples of how ‘sitg’ is communicated are, e.g., “I remain a significant investor in the fund alongside you“ or “I 
am committed to invest a substantial part of my private wealth in the fund” and addressing fund investors as “fellow 
shareholders“. 
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we show that communication of personal investment by fund managers triggers 
substantial retail investor net inflows in the month following the filing of the LS. In fact, 
this effect is substantially larger than the well-established performance-flow relationship 
in our setting and amounts to USD 20.6 million for the average fund in our sample. Thus, 
‘sitg’ communication approximately doubles flows in the post filing month. Moreover, 
the effect is substantial in the first week after the filing and persistent throughout time, 
i.e. it does not revert until the next reporting period. By contrast, the actual dollar amount 
invested by the manager, which is only accessible via the funds’ SAI, does not alter retail 
investor flows. Second, we show that the investor’s response to ‘sitg’ communication is 
most pronounced when the fund has performed badly, the market is bullish, funds are solo 
managed as well as when the LS is short and ‘easy to read’. This suggests that ‘verbal 
commitment’ of the fund manager creates an opportunity to retain assets after bad 
performance (see, e.g., Coval and Stafford 2007) and to differentiate from competition in 
a booming market. Third, we find that investors are highly sensitive to changes in the 
signaling of fund managers’ commitment in the LS. We observe significant positive 
(negative) net flows if fund managers start (stop) to signal their ‘sitg’ of the funds they 
manage. Again, this finding is solely driven by the verbal commitment and unaffected by 
the actual dollar amount invested. Fourth and finally, we provide evidence that ‘sitg’ 
communication is only affecting retail investors’ decision. Institutional investor flows 
remain unaltered by whether (or not) fund managers signal aligned incentives in the LS.  
Our study contributes to different strands in the literature. First, we build on the 
existing literature analyzing the impact of ‘sitg’ in the mutual fund domain. Khorana et 
al. (2007), Evans (2008) and Ma and Tang (2019), e.g., show that mutual funds in which 
the fund managers hold significant private investments yield higher risk-adjusted returns 
and conclude that – all else equal – ‘sitg’ is desirable for the individual investor.7 Using 
(non-public) accounts of fund managers’ private portfolios, Ibert (2018) supports these 
findings in concluding that fund managers possess superior information on their ability 
to generate abnormal returns and invest their money accordingly.8 The positive 
ownership-performance relation is shown to be most pronounced for single managed 
                                                          
7 To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper not documenting a positive relation between SitG and future 
fund performance: using data on finish mutual funds, Kumlin and Puttonen (2009) find no such relation.  
8 Recently, Gupta and Sachdeva (2019) find the performance enhancing ability of managerial co-investment also in the 
context of hedge funds. 
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funds (Hornstein and Hounsell 2016). Furthermore, ‘sitg’ significantly decreases the 
probability of a fund to encounter the disposition effect (Fu and Wedge 2011) or to feature 
high annual asset turnover (Evans 2008). Focusing on private investments of the funds’ 
board of directors’, Cremers et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2008) show that directors’ ‘sitg’ 
impacts fund operations. Specifically, they find that a lack of ‘sitg’ among directors is an 
indicator of ineffective governance.  
However, the aforementioned studies draw on the SAI in order to capture manager’s 
(director’s) personal holdings in their funds and remain silent about how retail investors 
are supposed to know about their fund managers’ ownership. Unlike these studies, we 
analyze aggregate fund flows to learn if and to what extent retail investors incorporate 
voluntarily disclosed information using a piece of communication that is readily available 
to the average investor – the mutual funds’ LS. Second, by doing so we built on the 
various existing studies analyzing the determinants of mutual fund flows (e.g., Sirri and 
Tufano 1998, Barber et al. 2005). Our contribution in this regard relates to the 
investigation of which role the signaling of incentive alignment as well as the salience 
thereof plays for retail investors. Third, we extent the increasing stream of literature 
applying textual analysis on written communication in accounting and finance to gauge 
supply- or demand-side effects (e.g., Tetlock et al. 2008, Li 2010, Loughran and 
McDonald 2014).9 Most of the existing studies in this context focus on corporate 
disclosures. By contrast, textual analysis related to mutual fund textual disclosure remains 
rather untapped. Recent research by Hillert et al. (2016), Du et al. (2019) and Chu and 
Kim (2019), which to our knowledge are the only existing studies to examine LSs so far, 
mark an exception. Supporting the importance of LS as fund managers’ primary 
communication tool, they also document that LS influence investors’ asset allocation: 
focusing on the LS writing style, they find that flows are significantly lower the more 
negatively and impersonal it is written (Hillert et al. 2016). With respect to return 
predictability, however, prior evidence is mixed. While Chu and Kim (2019) document 
pessimistic tone in the LS to be associated with superior future fund performance and Du 
et al. (2019) even conclude that hyperbole language in LS includes hidden information 
investors can use to differentiate luck from skill, Hillert et al. (2016) found no such 
                                                          
9 Loughran and McDonald (2016) review textual analysis in accounting and finance. More recently, they issued a 
working paper with special emphasis on finance related text analysis, which has been published since their initial 
literature review (Loughran and McDonald 2019). 
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relation. In the corporate context, several studies report that negative sentiment within the 
corporate annual filing or press releases is related to negative future performance (e.g., Li 
2010, Davis et al. 2012). We extent this nascent field of research by exploring retail 
investor reaction to strategic fund manager signaling. 
2. Data, variables and regression model 
2.1. Data  
In order to learn about fund managers signaling in the LS and their impact on investors, 
we need to link different sources. First, we sample our fund data from Morningstar 
Directs’ fund database. From Morningstar we obtain a host of fund characteristics, among 
them a history of all portfolio managers per fund, which allows us to link disclosure of 
ownership to a specific person, and net assets, which allow us to trace investor reaction.10 
Following prior literature, we focus on actively managed equity mutual funds, thereby 
excluding money market funds, fund of funds and index funds.11 Next, we collect LSs for 
each fund in our sample to identify which fund managers communicate ‘sitg’. For this 
purpose, we coded a Python-based routine to download all relevant fund (semi-)annual 
reports and SAIs from the SEC EDGAR online archive. As mentioned earlier, LS are not 
required by the SEC and therefore represent an optional communication tool for fund 
managers. In consequence, there is no clear-cut section for the LS in the funds’ (semi-) 
annual reporting. Therefore, we extract the LS (if applicable) using common phrases, 
such as “Dear Shareholder” (“Best regards”), that identify the beginning (end) of a 
shareholder letter and clearly separate it from other parts of the funds’ financial report 
(methodically following Hillert et al. 2016 and Chu and Kim 2019). In case we lack the 
identification of LS beginning (end), we flag the respective annual report and extract the 
corresponding LS manually. Additionally, we apply selective manual checks to ensure a 
high quality of this slicing exercise. We observe large heterogeneity in format and design. 
In our sample, the length of LS ranges from only 113 words to over 3000 words and from 
fairly complex language to more narrative texts presumably easy to understand by all 
                                                          
10 In addition, we retrieve a host of control variables common in the literature. Appendix II-1 provides descriptions of 
all variables. 
11 Morningstar labels money market and fund of funds. We exclude index funds checking for fund name indicators 
such as “ETF”, “Exchange-Traded” or “Index” following Pastor et al. (2015). 
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investors.12 Finally, we merge actual fund manager investments to our dataset. To this 
end, we retrieve ownership levels from the funds’ SAI filings. The SEC requires all 
mutual funds to disclose managerial ownership in mutual fund since March 2005.13 
Ownership levels are provided annually within the funds’ SAI accompanying the annual 
report. Beneficial holdings are not reported in exact amounts, but rather refer to one of 
seven dollar ranges specified by the SEC.14 Analogously to the funds’ LS, there is no 
standardized requirement on the display format in the SAI.15 Hence, automated collection 
is not applicable. Therefore, we hand-collect the dollar-denominated brackets of fund 
managers’ private investments disclosed in the SAI for each fund, fund manager and year 
in our sample at the respective fiscal year end. We link data between the three data sources 
(Morningstar, LS, SAI) applying a multi-step procedure using SEC share class IDs, which 
we extract from the funds’ LS (SAIs), in combination with SEC class ticker symbols 
provided by the SEC and entailed in the Morningstar fund database. We provide details 
on the matching in Appendix III-2. 
Since the extraction and cleaning of LSs and data collection on fund manager 
ownership involves substantial manual efforts, we restrict our sample of actively managed 
equity funds in the style of Chen et al. (2004) and Pastor et al. (2015) concentrating on 
funds with more than USD 100 million total assets as of 2018.16 This procedure also 
allows us to focus on the potential incentive alignment mechanism of fund manager 
investments. By contrast, large managerial ownership in small funds could imply ‘control 
stake’ intentions, which would bias our findings. Furthermore, we store same funds’ retail 
and institutional fund characteristics, if applicable, in separate accounts in our database 
allowing us to distinguish non-professional from professional investors’ response in the 
following.17 Our observation period spans the years 2013 throughout 2018.  
                                                          
12 We measure the length of a LS counting the total number of words as implemented via the Python Natural Language 
Toolkit (NLTK). Accordingly, we compute the textual comprehensibility using the Flesch-Reading Ease Score, a 
widespread formula to assess the readability of written text, using modules of the NLTK. Python code is available upon 
request. 
13 SEC Rule S7-12-04, “Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies”. 
14 $0, $1–$10,000, $10,001–$50,000, $50,001–$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1,000,000, and above 
$1,000,000. 
15 We find various different modes on how funds disclose potential beneficial ownership of their funds managers 
ranging from indicating dollar ranges in plain text over structured tables (aggregating the entire fund family and all 
fund managers) to graphical illustrations. 
16 Chen et al. (2004) and Pastor et al. (2015) use a threshold of USD 15 million. 
17 As we retrieve fund information on the share class level from Morningstar, we convert fund-level retail (institutional) 
aggregates weighted with their respective contribution to the fund’s total net assets (e.g., Doshi et al. 2015). 
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In order for a funds to qualify for our sample, we require a fund to (a) being an 
actively managed equity fund with a fundsize of more than USD 100 million, (b) include 
a LS in each annual report in our observation period, (c) disclose information on fund 
manager ownership in the fund’s SAI for all years the fund manager has been active in a 
given fund and (d) allow for a link between the three data sources. In sum, 1,334 actively 
managed mutual funds fulfill those requirements. To the best of our knowledge, this 
database represents the most comprehensive and recent collection of fund manager 
private investments, while being the first to link actual investments with investor 
communication.18 
2.2. Key variables  
2.2.1. Net fund flows 
Of major interest to us is whether retail investors respond to fund managers’ strategical 
use of ‘sitg’ communication in the fund’s LS. Therefore, our key dependent variable is 
retail investors net fund flows, which we measure following Sirri and Tufano (1998): 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 (𝐹𝐹)𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the dollar value of total retail (institutional) net assets (TNA) of 
fund i in month t (on day d) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 denotes the retail (institutional) return of fund i in 
month t (on day d) as reported in Morningstar Direct. We apply the fund merger 
correction as proposed in Lou (2012). We distinguish fund level assets and returns 
between retail and institutional share classes to be able to separate retail from professional 
investors’ response. 
2.2.2. ‘sitg’ communication 
As the LS is a non-mandatory narrative section within the (semi-)annual shareholder 
reports, it is largely unregulated and therefore fully at the fund managers’ discretion to 
verbally communicate ‘sitg’. Manually screening a comprehensive set (~150) of LSs, we 
identify a number of terms, phrases and expressions that unambiguously indicate fund 
managers’ attempt to signal ‘sitg’ to her shareholders. Typical examples of how this is 
done are: “I remain a significant investor in the fund alongside you“, “I am committed to 
                                                          
18 Our cross sectional sample compares in size to that of Khorana et al. (2007) with 1,406 funds, however instead of 
relying on one year only (2004 in their paper), we obtain data for six consecutive years. 
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invest a substantial part of my private wealth in the fund” and addressing fund investors 
as “fellow shareholders“. We screen each LS for the potential inclusion of such ‘sitg’ 
signaling using a Python-based text-mining algorithm. To this end, we make use of the 
‘bag-of-words’-technique of text-mining (Loughran et al. 2009). Specifically, we employ 
our list of ‘sitg’ terms and phrases as dictionary, for which we count the frequency of 
term/phrase occurrences in the respective fund LS. We create an indicator variable, 
‘sitg’_Communicationi,t, denoting whether a fund manager communicates her personal 
investment in fund i managed in year t in the funds’ LS. The variable equals to one if 
personal investment is communicated, zero otherwise. In total, we screen 15,746 LS from 
the 1,334 funds in our sample and find instances of ‘sitg’ communication in about 21 
percent of the LSs. 
2.2.3. Fund manager ownership 
We use our hand-collected database on fund manager ownership from SAIs filed with the 
SEC to construct our measures of ‘real’ fund manager ownership. Following Khorana et 
al. (2007), we convert dollar-ranges into actual money amounts invested by using the 
midpoint of the respective range. E.g., for the range $500,001–$1,000,000, we assume 
the fund manager to be invested with $750,000. For managerial ownership reported at the 
dollar-range boundaries, none (lower) or above $1,000,001 (upper), we refer to $0 and 
$1,000,001, respectively.19 In case a fund is managed by more than one fund manager, 
we aggregated fund manager investments by simply adding up individual levels:  




where 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual investment of manager j in 
fund i and year t. To account for the skewed distribution of ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ −
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_$𝑖,𝑡 we use log values of the variable in our regression models. Furthermore, 
we create two alternative measures of fund manager ownership building on the above 
measure. First, we create a dummy variable, ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖,𝑡 
indicating whether the absolute investment is positive, i.e. at least one of the fund 
managers holds ownership in the fund. 
                                                          
19 For robustness checks of our results, we also construct fund manager ownership variables using the lower (upper) 
bound of the dollar-ranges provided in the SAI. All results reported remain qualitatively unchanged. Results are 
available upon request. 
‘skin-in-the-game’: Investors’ reaction to fund managers’ strategic signaling of mutual fund ownership 
117 
 
Second, we follow Ma and Tang (2019) and compute the average investment per 
fund manager to compare single with team-managed funds: 






Figure III-1 illustrates descriptive statistics of fund manager ownership and ‘sitg’ 
communication in our sample for each year under observation. ‘sitg’ communication is 
present in approximately 21% of the funds LS. By contrast, fund managers hold beneficial 
ownership in roughly 68% of funds in our sample. The absolute amount averages at 
$698,050 representing 0.09% of fund’s net assets20, while the average investment per 
manager amounts to $253,117 taking account of the average team size of three managers. 
While the share of funds with managerial ownership monotonically increases starting 
2013, we observe a drop in absolute investment in 2017. Interestingly, a closer look into 
the fund managers’ stakes reveals, that investments are not constant. In a given year, we 
observe that every third fund manager increases (or decreases) her investment. This 
corroborates evidence reported in Hornstein and Hounsell (2016), who find that about 
37% of managers investments fluctuate from one year to the next. Our descriptives square 
in well with prior evidence on portfolio manager ownership. At the lower end, Khorana 
et al. (2007) report that 51% of funds feature fund manager ownership with an average 
(percentage) investment with roughly $210,000 (0.10% of TNA). At the upper end, Ma 
and Tang (2019) report that 71% of funds in their sample feature managerial ownership 
with an average investment of portfolio managers of $540,000 (0.30% of TNA). Thus, 
our descriptives suggest the percentage share of funds with managerial ownership lies in 
the middle of those extremes, while the average absolute amount invested is fairly larger 
than those reported by Ma and Tang (2019). This is not surprising keeping in mind that 
we focus on the largest funds in the industry. In fact, Ma and Tang (2019) report an 
average investment of $646,000 for large-cap funds, which is comparable in terms of 
fundsize to our sample. 
                                                          
20 In supplemental analysis, we repeat our main regressions using the percentage fraction of total net assets owned by 
fund managers. Results remain qualitatively unchanged and are available upon request. 
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Figure III-1—Descriptive statistics on letter to shareholders and fund manager investment 
         
Letter to the Shareholder (LS)  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
‘skin-in-the-game’-communication (Dummy=1 if yes)  0.206 0.222 0.204 0.228 0.218 0.202 0.210 
Day difference (days) (Reporting Date to Filing Date)  62.81 63.79 62.45 63.22 62.61 62.36 62.87 
N (Shareholder Letter)  2,505 2,609 2,613 2,660 2,647 2,712 15,746 
Fund manager investment (SAI)  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d (Dummy=1 if yes)  0.619 0.645 0.678 0.692 0.701 0.719 0.676 
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$ (USD k)  645.219 709.130 744.911 742.365 650.949 695.726 698.050 
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_avg_$ (USD k)  238.431 256.817 272.430 268.660 232.438 249.925 253.117 
N (Funds)  1,267 1,292 1,319 1,327 1,331 1,324 1,334 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the share of funds with at least one of the managers being invested (blue line), the average aggregated investment per fund (grey bar), the average investment 
per fund manager (dark grey bar) and the percentage share of fund managers communicating ‘skin-in-the-game’ in the LS (red line) for the period 2013-2018. ‘skin-in-the-game’-
communication is a binary variable indicating whether a fund manager strategically communicates her skin-in-the-Game, i.e. private co-investment, in the LS. Day difference captures the 
difference in absolute days between the reporting date, which marks the fiscal year end of a fund and the filing date with the SEC. ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d captures whether at 
least one fund manager is invested (dummy), whereas ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$ (‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_avg_$) indicate the absolute fund level investment (average 
investment per manager), respectively.
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Furthermore, Table III-1 reports summary statistics for the 1,334 funds and 
roughly 96,000 fund-month observations in our sample. From Morningstar Direct we 
retrieve all fund characteristics also used by recent studies in the field. The average fund 
in our sample experienced monthly net inflows of 0.73% of its total net assets (however, 
with marginal negative median), has been run 10 years since inception, manages USD 2.4 
billion in assets, is managed by three fund managers with an average tenure of 8 years, 
yielded a yearly (gross) return of 9.3 percent1, however, with a slightly negative risk-
adjusted four-factor alpha, turns over 54% of its assets in a given year and charges fees 
of approximately 1.2% to its retail investors.2 
 
Table III-1—Sample descriptive statistics  
  Mean P1 P50 P99  
Panel A: Fund managers       
‘skin-in-the-game’-communication (Dummy=1 if yes)  0.210 0 0 1  
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d (Dummy=1 if yes)  0.676 0 1 1  
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$ (USD k)  698.058 5 600.000 5,800.004  
Manager Tenure (Years)  8.045 0 7.280 22.920  
Panel B: Fund characteristics       
Net Fund Flows (in %, monthly)  0.731 -45.731 -0.557 83.860  
Fund Size (USD bn)  2.430 0.109 0.834 26.001  
Total Net Assets – Retail SC (USD bn)  1.791 0.083 0.542 22.950  
# Managers per fund  2.972 1 2 13  
Fund Age (Years)  10.501 7.797 10.167 44.500  
Advisor Fee (%)  0.731 0 0.750 1.500  
Director Fee (%)  0.005 0 0 0.050  
Total Net Assets - Fund Family (USD bn)  161.000 0.109 60.680 2,297.000  
Segment Net Fund Flows (USD bn)  13.140 3.268 13.770 17.810  
Segment Growth (%)  -0.171 -2.105 -0.244 2.378  
Morningstar Rating  2.087 0 2 5  
(Yearly) Gross Return (%)  9.307 -22.323 7.543 45.458  
(Yearly) 4F Alpha Return (%)  -0.242 -2.697 -0.185 2.244  
Risk (Yearly) Standard Deviation (%)  11.790 0 11.870 25.090  
Turnover Ratio (%)  53.893 3 42 240  
Tracking Error (%)  7.422 1.640 6.630 24.371  
Gross Expense Ratio (%)  1.242 0.409 1.210 2.485  
N (Observation)  96,048  
N (Funds)  1,334  
Notes: This table reports (monthly) descriptive statistics of our sample. The sample covers the period between January 
2013 and December 2018 (72 months). A detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix III-1. 
                                                          
1 The average yearly (gross) return of the S&P 500 in our sample period amounts to 12.81%. 
2 For reference, Ma and Tang (2019) report the average fund in their sample to feature USD 1.4 billion assets, being 17 
years old, achieving a yearly return of 9.82% and charging an expense ratio of 1.26%. 




Note that the date investors receive a mutual funds’ (semi)-annual reporting (filing date) 
differs from the fiscal year end of that fund (report date). The report date of mutual funds 
in our sample is evenly distributed across the entire year. On average, fund disclosures 
are filed with the SEC within 63 days from the funds’ fiscal year-end (cf. Figure III-1).3 
Following Hillert et al. (2016), we assume that management companies have no incentive 
to postpone the distribution of shareholder reports to retail investors and therefore label 
the SEC filing date of the funds’ reports as the date on which retail investors receive the 
LS.4 Furthermore, as we intend to measure investors’ reaction on ‘sitg’ communication 
using monthly fund flows acknowledging that filing dates are not restricted to months’ 
beginning, we have to define which month to consider in our regression model. We refer 
to fund flows in month t if the filing date is prior to or on the 15th calendar day of month 
t. In case the filing occurs after the 15th day of month t, we refer to fund flows in month 
t+1.5 
2.3. Model 
First, in order to identify the determinants of whether a fund manager signals her ‘sitg’ to 
investors in the funds’ LS6, we apply a logit regression  
′𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
where ′𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is a binary dependent variable denoting 
whether a fund manager communicated her personal investment in fund i in the LS filed 
in the month t. We either include a dummy variable on the actual fund manager 
investment (‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖,𝑡) or employ the logarithm of the 
absolute amount invested (‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_$𝑖,𝑡) as explanatory 
variable. The vector 𝒄𝑖,𝑡−1 includes lagged fund, fund family and manager controls 
specified in Appendix III-1. Furthermore, we include reporting-period lagged control 
                                                          
3 Note that the time span from reporting to filing date varies between 43 and 71 days. 
4 The SEC requires management companies to distribute the (semi-)annual fund reports within 10 days from the SEC 
filing date to their investors. 
5 According to Hillert et al. (2016) we apply robustness test to test if our results hold when referring to fund flows in 
month t (the actual filing month), irrespective of the day the filing occurred in the month. Our findings prove robust to 
this specification. Results are available upon request.  
6 Note that the SEC requires that LSs need to be certified by the executive committee and are required by law to present 
a “fair and truthful picture“, i.e. no untrue or misleading statement should be made in the letter. 
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variables to capture long-term confounding effects, e.g., risk and return in the reporting 
period (six months). Appendix III-3 provides summary statistics of the classification 
quality of this logit regression model and an alternative probit regression model 
(unreported). With a predicted mean of 20.6% (20.5%), the logit (probit) model is very 
close to the mean of the underlying sample (21%). Furthermore, the logit model reaches 
a sensitivity (‘true positives’) of almost 80% and a specifity (‘true negatives’) of close to 
95%. In sum, the logit model classifies roughly 90% of the ‘sitg’ communication in LS 
correctly based on fund manager investments as well as fund and manager controls. 
Second, with regard to investors’ reaction, we try to assess the impact of both, 
fund manager signaling in the LS and actual amount invested by the manager, on mutual 
fund flows. We use a time-series linear regression model to investigate investors’ 
response, formally: 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1′𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒′ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽2‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,−1𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡 
(5) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 measures monthly (daily) net fund flows into (and out of) funds i’s retail 
assets in month (on day) t. We estimate the effect of fund manager signaling in the LS, as 
proxied by the indicator variable ‘skin-in-the-game’-communicationi,t and fund managers 
actual aggregate investment measured by ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$i,t together 
with a large set of (lagged) control variables as well as fund and time fixed effects from 
equation (4). 
3. Regression results 
3.1. Determinants of ‘sitg’ communication 
We start by analyzing the determinants of ‘sitg’ communication. Table III-2 reports 
coefficient estimates and odds ratios pertaining to the logit regression model in equation 
(4) using ‘skin-in-the-game’-communicationi,t as binary dependent variable. As can be 
taken from the first row, the choice whether to verbally communicate co-ownership of 
the fund managers strongly depends on whether at least one of the fund managers is 
privately invested in the fund. While the effects’ magnitude in the unconditional setting 
(specification 1) decreases when including fund category (specification 2) and firm level 
fixed effects (specification 3), the statistical significance of the observed relation persist. 
In specification (4) including the full set of fund and fund manager controls as well as 
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fixed effects, we observe actual fund manager investment to increase the odds of 
communicating ‘sitg’ in the LS by 1.35. Replacing the manager investment dummy by 
the (log) absolute dollar investment (‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$i,t), we observe a 
(significant) positive coefficient indicating that higher private investment relates to a 
higher propensity of communicating ‘sitg’ in the LS in specifications (5)–(8). Thus, we 
find a strong positive link between fund managers ownership and the strategic signaling 
thereof in the LS. 7 Interestingly, ‘sitg’ communication also depends on various fund and 
fund manager characteristics.8 While there are plenty economic reasons explaining why 
fund managers might hold beneficial ownership in self-managed funds9, it is ex ante not 
clear to us which mechanisms drive the signaling of ‘sitg’ in the LS. For instance, we find 
that the propensity to signal ‘sitg’ (slightly) decreases with manager tenure on the fund, 
while Khorana et al. (2007) document managerial ownership to increase in tenure. In the 
same vein, we do not observe a significant impact of past performance on fund manager 
‘sitg’ signaling, although Khorana et al. find a strong positive relation on actual 
investment. For fund manager signaling, however, one could argue that an 
“advertisement” of aligned incentives might be of special importance after weak fund 
performance –we do not find evidence for this to be the case either. Surprisingly, we find 
a negative association between fund risk and ‘sitg’ signaling, which runs counter to the 
general hypothesis that fund managers have a higher incentive to communicate their 
private wealth investment the higher their investment is at risk. With respect to fund 
characteristics, we document that managers in smaller teams, managing older funds, 
smaller funds, growth funds, funds with lower Morningstar ratings and funds associated 
to larger fund families show a higher tendency to communicate their co-investment with 
retail investors.10 
  
                                                          
7 While incidental to our main analysis, we also document that fund managers do not arbitrarily or dishonestly 
communicate ownership in the funds’ they manage For all of cases, in which we detect ‘sitg’ communication in the LS, 
fund managers in fact hold shares in the fund. Results are available upon request. 
8 In our analysis, we employ all variables used by Khorana et al. (2007) in determining managerial ownership (section 
5 of their paper), except measures on board effectiveness as we lack data thereof. 
9 For example, rational (and risk-averse) managers should refrain from investing their money in funds with high return 
volatility or ceteris paribus high expenses resulting in lower returns (see, e.g., Wermers 2000). On the other side, longer 
tenure on the fund allowing more time to build up ownership and team size should positively affect managerial 
ownership. Please refer to Khorana et al. (2007) section 5 (The determinants of managerial ownership) for a detailed 
discussion on the different mechanisms. 
10 For reference, Khorana et al. (2007) find managerial ownership to be higher for well performing funds, small funds 
and fund families, funds with low front end loads, funds with high board compensation and long manager tenure.  
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Table III-2—Determinants of ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication – logit model 


















1.354***     
’skin-in-the-game’ 
-investment_$ 




















Gross return   -0.005*** -0.003 0.997  -0.005*** -0.003 0.997 
  [0.002] [0.004]   [0.002] [0.004]  
Alpha return  0.089*** 0.082 1.086  0.092*** 0.086 1.090 
  [0.027] [0.052]   [0.027] [0.053]  
Risk  -0.054*** -0.036*** 0.964***  -0.058*** -0.037*** 0.964*** 
  [0.006] [0.012]   [0.006] [0.012]  
Fund size   -0.225*** -0.162*** 0.851***  -0.257*** -0.161*** 0.852*** 
  [0.029] [0.055]   [0.029] [0.056]  
Family assets   -0.101*** 1.030*** 2.801***  -0.091*** 1.036*** 2.819*** 
  [0.013] [0.236]   [0.013] [0.236]  
Fund age   0.005** 0.031*** 1.032***  0.005** 0.031*** 1.032*** 
  [0.002] [0.006]   [0.002] [0.006]  
Expense ratio  -0.454*** -0.151 0.860  -0.481*** -0.151 0.860 
  [0.070] [0.108]   [0.070] [0.110]  
Morningstar rating  0.045*** -0.151*** 0.860***  0.043*** -0.155*** 0.857*** 
  [0.013] [0.034]   [0.013] [0.034]  
Turnover ratio   -0.005*** -0.001 0.999  -0.004*** -0.001 0.999 
  [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001]  
Tracking error   0.055*** -0.012 0.988  0.060*** -0.012 0.988 
  [0.006] [0.012]   [0.006] [0.013]  
Value  -0.055 -0.093 0.911  -0.080 -0.104 0.901 
  [0.059] [0.129]   [0.060] [0.129]  
Growth  0.294*** 0.315*** 1.370***  0.253*** 0.306*** 1.358*** 
  [0.051] [0.115]   [0.052] [0.115]  
  





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Small-cap  -0.000 -0.194 0.823  -0.012 -0.201 0.818 
  [0.071] [0.156]   [0.071] [0.156]  
Large-cap  -0.001 0.353*** 1.424***  0.004 0.335*** 1.398*** 
  [0.052] [0.114]   [0.052] [0.114]  
# managers per fund  -0.089*** -0.135*** 0.874***  -0.101*** -0.136*** 0.872*** 
  [0.010] [0.027]   [0.011] [0.027]  
Advisor fee  0.193*** -0.227*** 0.797***  0.190*** -0.230*** 0.794*** 
  [0.029] [0.058]   [0.029] [0.058]  
Director fee  0.082*** 0.405*** 1.500***  0.082*** 0.407*** 1.502*** 
  [0.021] [0.062]   [0.021] [0.062]  
Category dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
N 10,181 9,916 5,732 5,732 10,181 9,916 5,732 5,732 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.080 0.521 0.521 0.027 0.086 0.521 0.521 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and odds ratios obtained from time series (2013-2018) logit regression 
models using ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication, which indicates whether a fund manager communicated her personal 
investment in fund i managed in year t in the funds’ letter to shareholders (LS), as dependent variable. The variable 
equals to one if personal investment is communicated, zero otherwise. As key explanatory variable, logit regression 
models use either a dummy variable on the actual fund manager investment, ’skin-in-the-game’-investment_d, in 
models (1)-(4) or the aggregated absolute (logarithmized) dollar investment of fund managers in a fund, ’skin-in-the-
game’ -investment_$, in models (5)-(8). Odds ratios in model 4 (8) refer to the regression coefficient of model 3 (7), 
respectively. All explanatory variables except Gross Return and Alpha Return are measured in the month prior to the 
disclosure of the shareholder letter (and therefore the potential communication of ’skin-in-the-game’ in it). A detailed 
description of the variables is provided in Appendix III-1. We include fund investment category dummies (e.g., 
domestic, sector, global, etc.) in models (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) and control for fund family (firm level) fixed effects in 
models (3)-(4) and (7)-(8). We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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3.2. Investor response to ‘sitg’communication  
Next, we turn to the investor’s side and analyze whether they act on the prevalence of 
‘sitg’ communication in the funds’ LS. Table III-3 reports results on the time series 
regression model introduced in equation (5) using monthly net flows of retail investors as 
dependent variable. We observe a statistically significant and economical meaningful 
effect on the coefficient pertaining to ‘sitg’ communication. Including our full set of 
(lagged) controls previously shown to impact investor flows, e.g., return (Sirri and Tufano 
1998), risk (e.g., Spiegel and Zhang 2013), Morningstar rating (e.g., Del Guercio and 
Tkac 2008) and expenses (e.g., Barber et al. 2005), as well as fund and time fixed effects 
(specification 3), we find that retail investors strongly respond to ‘sitg’ communication 
which manifests in an increase in fund flows of almost 0.85%. For reference, monthly 
fund flows in our sample average at 0.73% of funds’ TNA (cf. Table III-1) with the mean 
fund managing USD 2.4 billion assets, this translates into USD 20.7 million, which 
represents more than a doubling of monthly net inflows in the LS filing month under 
investigation. 
By contrast, we do not find a significant retail investor reaction to actual fund 
manager investment as disclosed in the SAI. While the unconditional effect even indicates 
a negative relation (specification 4), the significance on the coefficient pertaining to our 
binary variable, ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d, washes out once including controls 
(specification 5) and fixed effects (specification 6). In specifications 7-9 of the table, we 
replace the dummy by the (log) of absolute fund manager investment to control for the 
potential impact of low (high) fund manager investments. Again, we do not find any 
positive (significant) relation of fund manager ownership on retail investors’ fund flows. 
When including ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication and actual fund manager investment, 
either using absolute managerial ownership (specification 10) or our investment dummy 
(specification 11), our results prove robust. Thus, we document that salient signaling of 
‘sitg’ in the LS indeed alters funds flows, while the level of wealth investment, which is 
presented to investors only in form of the SAI does not. Our findings on the investor non-
response to actual fund manager investment are in line with prior evidence from Hornstein 
and Hounsell (2016), who conclude that fund flows are generally unrelated to managerial 
investment.
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Table III-3—Investor response to ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication 
 Dependent variable: Net fund flows 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
‘skin-in-the-game’-communication 0.819** 0.994** 0.847**       0.833** 0.847** 
 [0.385] [0.389] [0.425]       [0.424] [0.425] 
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d    -1.064*** -0.310 0.034     0.035 
    [0.298] [0.283] [0.289]     [0.288] 
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$       -0.101*** -0.027 -0.055 -0.053  
       [0.035] [0.032] [0.037] [0.037]  
Gross return   0.013** 0.036***  0.013** 0.035***  0.013** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  [0.005] [0.010]  [0.005] [0.010]  [0.005] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Alpha return  -0.040 -0.093  -0.035 -0.086  -0.036 -0.082 -0.089 -0.092 
  [0.079] [0.092]  [0.080] [0.092]  [0.080] [0.092] [0.092] [0.093] 
Risk  -0.027*** -0.057**  -0.028*** -0.057**  -0.027*** -0.057** -0.057** -0.057** 
  [0.010] [0.024]  [0.010] [0.024]  [0.010] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
Fund size   -2.309*** -2.285***  -2.274*** -2.270***  -2.278*** -2.240*** -2.258*** -2.286*** 
  [0.412] [0.471]  [0.413] [0.473]  [0.412] [0.475] [0.474] [0.472] 
Family assets   1.144*** 1.440**  1.161*** 1.401**  1.155*** 1.397** 1.436** 1.440** 
  [0.317] [0.629]  [0.312] [0.630]  [0.312] [0.629] [0.629] [0.629] 
Fund age   -0.148*** -0.085  -0.142*** -0.079  -0.147*** -0.075 -0.082 -0.085 
  [0.030] [0.091]  [0.030] [0.091]  [0.030] [0.091] [0.092] [0.091] 
Expense ratio  -0.524 -0.568  -0.519 -0.565  -0.519 -0.561 -0.564 -0.568 
  [0.520] [0.564]  [0.524] [0.565]  [0.522] [0.565] [0.563] [0.563] 
Turnover ratio   -0.007** -0.007**  -0.007** -0.007**  -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
  [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Tracking error   0.058** 0.049  0.057** 0.048  0.056** 0.047 0.048 0.049 
  [0.025] [0.032]  [0.025] [0.032]  [0.025] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
MoSt segment fund flows  1.233*** 1.078***  1.236*** 1.080***  1.237*** 1.077*** 1.075*** 1.078*** 
  [0.128] [0.146]  [0.128] [0.146]  [0.128] [0.146] [0.146] [0.146] 
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Table III-3 (cont’d) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
# Managers per fund  0.028 -0.031  0.029 -0.030  0.028 -0.029 -0.031 -0.032 
  [0.123] [0.141]  [0.123] [0.141]  [0.123] [0.141] [0.141] [0.141] 
MoSt rating  1.187***   1.170***   1.175***    
  [0.260]   [0.260]   [0.261]    
Value   1.442   1.434   1.433    
  [1.323]   [1.322]   [1.324]    
Growth  0.057   0.130   0.126    
  [1.019]   [1.019]   [1.021]    
Small-cap  -0.328   -0.381   -0.384    
  [1.469]   [1.466]   [1.468]    
Large-cap  0.760   0.752   0.765    
  [1.009]   [1.007]   [1.009]    
Manager tenure  0.138*   0.148*   0.146*    
  [0.078]   [0.077]   [0.077]    
Fund fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,136 12,718 12,718 13,136 12,718 12,718 13,136 12,718 12,718 12,718 12,718 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.077 0.101 0.001 0.076 0.101 0.000 0.076 0.100 0.102 0.101 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates of a time series (2013-2018) linear regression model. (Monthly) net fund flow is the dependent variable. Fund flows are measured in the 
month the LS is filed with the SEC (sent to all investors). We replace flows of the filing month by flows of the subsequent month whenever the filing of the LS takes place after the 15th 
calendar day (Hillert et al. 2016). ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication is a binary variable indicating whether a fund manager communicates her personal investment in fund i managed in 
year t in the funds’ LS. The variable equals to one if personal investment is communicated, zero otherwise. In models (4)-(9), we regress fund flows on actual fund manager investment, 
either using a dummy variable, ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d, in models (4)-6)) or by using log aggregate dollar investments, ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$, in models (7)-(9). A 
detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix III-1. We include fund and time (year-month) fixed effects as indicated. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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3.3. ‘sitg’ investor reaction over time 
Our prior results suggest that retail investors read the LS and respond strongly in terms 
of asset allocation in the month they receive the LS, if it entails a verbal communication 
of ‘sitg’. In this section, we elaborate on the temporal dynamics of the effect, analyzing 
a) the short-term effect using daily data and b) the long-term effect on fund flows from 
one filing to the next (6 months later) methodically building on Hillert et al. (2016). This 
will allow us to understand better when investors trade on the ‘sitg’ information and if 
the effect is time persistent. To analyze daily data, we retrieve daily net assets for all funds 
and days (for the years 2013-2018) in our sample from Morningstar. We compute the 
change in daily net assets as the respective fund flow. To gauge cumulative effects, we 
investigate accumulated daily (monthly) fund flows starting the day (month) the LS has 
been filed with the SEC. 
Figure III-2 plots the development of cumulated daily (upper graph) and monthly 
(lower graph) net fund flows around the SEC filing date (t=0) restricted to all funds, for 
which ‘sitg’ communication is in principle possible, i.e. funds with at least one fund 
manager being privately invested. The red line indicates cumulative fund flows for funds, 
in which the fund manager communicates her ‘sitg’ to investors in the LS, while the grey 
line represents those funds not communicating ‘sitg’. On a daily basis, we notice a steady 
increase in cumulative flows up to 15 days after the filing date for the ‘sitg’ 
communicating funds (red line). In contrast, net fund flows for the non-‘sitg’ 
communicating funds remain close to zero for up to 8 days after the filing (grey line). 
Turning to monthly data, we observe that cumulative fund flows of ‘sitg’ communicators 
vs. non-communicators differ by almost 5% one month after the filing. While this effect 
gradually vanishes in the months thereafter, a difference of cumulative flows persists until 
the next reporting periods’ filling.  
To formally test if those effects turn out significant in a multivariate setting, we 
re-estimate our model from equation (5) with cumulative daily (monthly) data. Table 
III-4 reports coefficient estimates on cumulative monthly (specifications 1 to 3) and daily 
net fund flows (specifications 4 to 7). As before, we include the full set of (lagged) 
controls as well as fixed effects. Analogously to the univariate setting of Figure III-2, 
cumulative monthly fund flows in the filing month (specification (1)) and one month 
thereafter (specification (2)) are (weakly) statistical significant. The cumulative 
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difference in fund flows one month after the filing amounts to roughly 1.5%, which 
translates into an amount of USD 35.9 million for the average fund in our sample. 
Notably, the significance of the effect disappears starting two months after the filing, but 
does not revert. Turning to the daily perspective, we find a significant positive coefficients 
on the cumulative daily fund flows within one and two weeks after the filing. 
Interestingly, however, we do not report a positive impact of ‘sitg’ communication on the 
day of the SEC filing itself. We have a practical interpretation for this finding. First, the 
lag between the electronic filing of the fund management company with the SEC and the 
receipt of the actual paper based copy1 by retail investors is driven by post-delivery, 
which, according to the US Postal service, usually ranges between one and three days.2 
Second, investors might not be able or willing to read the LS the day they receive the 
information, but intentionally wait for an opportunity to do so, e.g., the next weekend. 
Third, retail investors might not be able or willing to trade on the information the day 
they have read the LS. Prior literature documents instances of increased buying and 
selling activity of retail investors after the weekend (e.g., Venezia and Shapira 2007). 
Thus, it might be an impractical assumption to see investor funds being altered by fund 
manager signaling on the day the LS is filed with the SEC. A closer look on the 
regressions in specification (5) and (6) of Table III-4 supports this notion. While being 
statistically significant within one week (1st to 7th day) from the filing, the coefficient 
pertaining to fund managers’ ‘sitg’ communication is of greater magnitude for the 
window ranging from one week to two weeks (8th to 15th day) after the SEC filing. In 
addition, we document that the effect of ‘sitg’ signaling becomes insignificant from two 
weeks until 30 days after the filing (specification 7).  
In sum, we document a substantial investor reaction to manager signaling in the 
first two weeks after the filing. Moreover, the reaction seems to be time persistent. 
Furthermore, when replicating the temporal analysis using actual dollar investment, we 
find no relation of managerial ownership on monthly (daily) net funds flows.3
                                                          
1 In the US, (semi-)annual fund reports including the LS have to be send as paper copies to all investors in the fund (cf. 
SEC 2018). Beginning January 2021, the SEC permits management companies to stop sending out paper based 
shareholder reports and instead allows them to use a new “notice and access” method (rule 30e-3) for delivery of fund 
reports. 
2 For reference, Amazon's average ‘click-to-door’ time in the United States has been reported to 3.07 days by 2018 
(eMarketer 2019). 
3 Results are available upon request. 
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Notes: This figure illustrates cumulative net funds flows around the filing date of the funds’ Letter to the Shareholders (LS). The period spans the time from one day prior to 15 days after 
(last figure: 1 month prior to 5 months after) the funds’ filing. The red line indicates cumulative net funds flows for funds of fund managers that communicated their ‘skin-in-the-game’ in 
the funds’ LS, whereas the grey line displays funds flows for fund managers that did not communicate ‘skin-in-the-game’ in their respective LS. The sample is restricted to funds with 
managerial investment larger than $0.
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Table III-4—Temporal dynamics–cumulative investor reaction around LS filing date 
 Cumulative monthly 
Net fund flows 
Cumulative daily  































Gross return 0.036*** 0.103*** 0.154*** 0.083*** -0.011 -0.001 -0.028 
 [0.010] [0.021] [0.025] [0.005] [0.013] [0.016] [0.024] 
Alpha return -0.093 -0.528 -0.146 -0.108 0.795 0.191 0.975 
 [0.092] [0.422] [0.283] [0.066] [0.800] [0.121] [0.785] 
Risk -0.057** 0.115 -0.226*** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.011** 
 [0.024] [0.090] [0.064] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
Fund size  -2.285*** -4.749*** -9.842*** -0.009* -0.066*** -0.087** -0.106* 
 [0.471] [0.772] [1.153] [0.005] [0.018] [0.041] [0.061] 
Family assets  1.440** 1.977* 2.121 0.018*** 0.041* -0.449*** -0.826*** 
 [0.629] [1.081] [1.673] [0.006] [0.024] [0.125] [0.192] 
Fund age  -0.085 -0.383*** -0.645*** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.048*** -0.108*** 
 [0.091] [0.131] [0.230] [0.001] [0.003] [0.012] [0.018] 
Expense ratio -0.568 -0.927 -2.184 0.016 -0.029 -0.112** -0.188*** 
 [0.564] [1.041] [1.568] [0.011] [0.035] [0.047] [0.071] 
Turnover ratio  -0.007** -0.015** -0.012 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.009] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Tracking error  0.049 -0.218* 0.025 -0.003* -0.009* -0.021*** -0.000 
 [0.032] [0.113] [0.088] [0.002] [0.005] [0.008] [0.012] 
MoSt segment flows 1.078*** 1.941*** 1.579*** 0.039*** 0.235*** 0.281*** 0.378*** 
 [0.146] [0.346] [0.342] [0.007] [0.019] [0.023] [0.035] 
# managers per fund -0.031 -0.181 0.100 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.058 
 [0.141] [0.208] [0.254] [0.003] [0.011] [0.030] [0.045] 
Fund & manager controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,779 9,779 9,770 11,286 11,285 11,286 11,224 
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.106 0.123 0.081 0.074 0.075 0.070 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates of a time series (2013-2018) linear regression model. The dependent 
variable is cumulative monthly (models (1)-(3)) and daily (models (4)-(7)) net fund flows. Flows are cumulated on 
monthly (daily) basis with the LS filing date (t) as reference. We apply several time windows: from the filing date up 
to five months after the filing for the analysis of cumulative monthly fund flows and up to 30 days after the filing for 
the daily dynamics. Fund, fund family and manager controls as applied in Table 3 are included in all regressions – 
please refer to Appendix III-1 for a detailed description of those variables. Standard errors are clustered on the fund 
level. We include fund and year-month (daily) fixed effects in all models. We report robust standard errors in 
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4. Further analyses 
4.1. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
To investigate whether our main results from section 3 remain robust and gain a deeper 
understanding of fund managers’ signaling, we perform several additional analyses. In 
this section, we explore whether the magnitude of retail investors’ reaction depends on 
fund and market characteristics using heterogeneous treatment analysis. First, we expect 
‘sitg’-communication to be of major importance when a fund has performed poorly in an 
attempt to retain investors’ money and prevent capital outflows (e.g., Coval and Stafford 
2007). Retail investors might be emotionally inclined to stay invested in a previously 
poorly performing fund, when they are persuaded that their fund management is 
personally committed on the funds’ future success. Therefore, we create an indicator 
variable, Good Performance, indicating that the respective fund features an above-median 
performance in our cross section in the last reporting period (6 months). 
Second, we analyze whether the market environment plays a role when 
communicating ‘sitg’. We expect that fund managers in a bullish market strategically use 
‘sitg’ communication to provide investors with a differentiating ‘value proposition’ of 
their fund. In order for them to stand out from the crowd of passive investment strategies, 
which naturally perform well in absolute terms during bullish markets, actively managed 
funds potentially build on fund manager commitment as to attract investors. Following 
prior literature, we obtain monthly S&P 500 returns for our observation period to proxy 
for the overall market environment. The median monthly return of the S&P 500 in our 
sample is 1.08%. We create an indicator variable, Bullish Market, which marks months 
with above median S&P 500 market returns in the prior month.  
Third, we hypothesize that investors’ reaction is most pronounced when funds are 
single-managed, as incentive alignment signals are most credible when investors can 
clearly identify and attribute commitment to a solo manager (Hornstein and Hounsell 
2016). In this regard, studies on consumer preferences have revealed a predilection for 
brands with attributable personalities (e.g., Aaker 1997). Consequently, we create a 
dummy, Single Managed, distinguishing single and team managed mutual funds.  
Fourth, information-processing cost increases with document length. Everything 
else equal, longer and ‘less well written’ documents are more deterring and more difficult 
to read (e.g., Li 2008). Therefore, given the limited information search capacity of retail 
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investors, we expect that investors may refrain from reading long and ‘hard to read’ LS 
and consequently are unable to respond on fund manager signaling contained therein. 
Thus, we construct two indicator variables capturing the complexity of the LS. Short LS 
indicates funds with LS with below median length measured as total count of words. In 
addition, we measure the readability of the LS as proxied by the Flesh Reading Ease Score 
(Flesh 1948) applying textual analytics. We assign a LS to be ‘easy to read’ for above 
median readability scores based on the Flesh Reading Ease.1  
Finally, as already indicated in Table III-3, we do not expect the absolute amount 
invested to impact the signaling effect of ‘sitg’ communication. We split our sample based 
on the median absolute investment to test this formally, assigning the indicator variable 
High FM Investment to those funds with above median cross sectional fund manager 
investment on the filing date. 
To formally test for heterogeneous treatment effects of ‘sitg’ communication, we 
separately interact our key explanatory variable, ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication, with 
all six indicator variables described above. We estimate the linear regression model 
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽2 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡]
+  𝛽3 ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’
− 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 x [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡] +  𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,−1𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(6) 
where the dichotomized variables enter our regression model from equation (5). 
Table III-5 presents coefficient estimates for the above regression model row-
wise by indicator variable. For example, ß1 in the first column and row captures the ‘sitg’ 
signaling effect on fund flows for the subgroup of funds with below median cross 
sectional performance in the last reporting period (i.e., Good Performance = 0). 
Conversely, ß1+ß3 denotes the effect for funds with above median returns and the 
coefficient pertaining to ß3 indicates the difference between good and bad performing 
funds. Starting with the separation based on lagged fund performance (first row), we find 
that our regression coefficient estimate on ß1 is positive and statistically significant, while 
there is no significance on the ß1+ß3 coefficient. This means that the signaling effect of 
                                                          
1 As we manually ‘clear cut’ extracted LS from the (semi-) annual shareholder reporting only for 2013, we assign the 
LS length and readability to all fund-year LS observations, assuming constant length and readability of same fund LS 
throughout time. 
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‘sitg’ communication is sizeable only after poor fund performance. In addition, we 
document a highly significant difference between the two subgroups (ß3), supporting our 
expectations regarding the relation of fund performance, strategic signaling and investor 
flows. Fund managers privately committed, not only by contract but also through private 
money invested, most probable emotionally approach investors after poor performance. 
When convincing shareholders that the fund management ‘is in the same boat’ the effect 
on net fund flows is substantial. Next, we observe that the overall market environment in 
which ‘sitg’ is communicated influences the effects’ magnitude. According to our 
hypothesis, ‘sitg’ communication affects investor flows significantly when markets are 
bullish (row 2). We interpret strategic signaling in strong markets as a differentiating 
factor. From the retail investors’ standpoint, co-investment of the fund manager might be 
associated with particular managing efforts that enable the fund to outperform. 
Furthermore, we find a significant stronger effect of ‘sitg’ communication for solo versus 
team managed funds (row 3). Single managed funds have a clear-cut responsibility of an 
individual. The signaling of ‘sitg’ might be worth most, when investors can project their 
investing hopes (and fears) in a single person.2 Turning to investors’ search cost measured 
by document length and language complexity, we observe a substantial difference of the 
signaling effect depending on the number of words and Flesch Reading Ease score. While 
short LS are subject to a significant treatment effect (ß1+ß3 coefficient for Short LS), 
long LS are not. Search costs (and potentially investors’ willingness) associated to read 
long LS potentially cause investors to refrain from processing it. Analogously, we 
document the ‘sitg’ treatment effect on retail investor only to be significant for fairly easy 
to read LS, supporting our notion on the limited information search and processing 
capabilities of investors, Finally, when splitting our sample on funds with below and 
above median fund manager investment, we do not observe any measurable difference of 
the effects’ magnitude. This underpins our results from Table III-3 indicating that retail 
investor reaction is not affected by the actual amount invested.  
 
  
                                                          
2 Our finding is line with results obtained by Massa et al. (2010) showing that named-manager funds receive higher 
inflows. 
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Table III-5—Heterogeneous effects of ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication 
  Dependent variable: Net fund flows   


















































Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from a linear panel regression model of the generic form:  
𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ𝑒 − 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡]
+  𝛽3 ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ𝑒 − 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡] + 𝛿
′𝒄𝑖,−1𝑡
+  𝑖,𝑡 
where ‘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ𝑒 − 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒’ − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether a fund manager 
communicates her personal investment in fund i managed in year t in the funds’ LS. All indicator variables are dummy 
variables of our continuous variables (Gross Return, Market Return, # Managers per fund, ‘skin-in-the-game’-
investment_$, LS length and LS readability) via cross sectional median splits. Performance is based on funds’ previous 
6-month (reporting period) cross sectional return rank within its Morningstar category. Good (Bad) Performance 
includes funds above (below) the median rank (50), respectively. Market environment is split on the previous 6-month 
return of the S&P 500 as proxy for the US market. Bullish Market denotes fund-month observations for which the 
lagging 6-month return of the S&P 500 has been above the sample median. Single and Team Managed funds are split 
based on the number of managers as reported in Morningstar. We assign a fund to be single-managed if one fund 
manager manages it at the time of the funds’ reporting. Short LS feature LS with below median length as measured by 
the total number of words. ‘Easy to read’ LS refers to the readability of the LS as proxied by the Flesh Reading Ease 
Score (Flesh 1948). We assign LS to be ‘easy to read’ for above median readability based on its Flesh Reading Ease 
Score. As we manually extracted LS only for 2013, we assign the LS length (readability) to all fund-year LS 
observations, assuming constant length (readability) of same fund LS throughout time. Finally, High FM Investment 
indicates funds with above median aggregated managerial ownership. We refer to the cross-sectional reporting date 
managerial ownership for the median and assign funds accordingly. For the first row, 𝛽1􀏆reports the effect of ‘sitg’ 
communication in the funds’ LS on retail investors fund flows (dependent variable) for the group of fund-month 
observations with below median performance in the last reporting period (i.e., Good Performance = 0). Conversely, β1 
+ β3 reports the signaling effect of ‘sitg’ communication on funds with above median performance in the reporting 
period. The coefficient of the interaction term, β3, shows the difference in the reported effects for Good vs. Bad 
performing funds. We include fund and year-month fixed effects in all models and apply robust standard errors 
clustered on fund-level. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.2. Investor reaction to changes in SitG signaling 
The relative share of fund managers communicating their ‘sitg’ in the funds’ LS remains 
fairly stable at around 20% as can be taken from Figure III-1. Nevertheless, we observe 
time-serial variation in fund managers communication strategy. On average, about 11% 
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of LS differ from the funds’ previous LS in that the fund manager starts (stops) to signal 
‘sitg’ therein (given she is (still) invested). Based on our evidence from the previous 
sections, we expect investors to carefully read the LS. Therefore, we explore the signaling 
effect if managers are communicating ‘sitg’ in the LS for the first time (or stopping it). 
We create an indicator variable, Change in ‘sitg’-communication, for whether a fund 
manager started (or stopped) communicating her ‘sitg’ in the funds’ LS from one year to 
the next. The variable takes the value 1, if ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication is started, -
1 if it is stopped and zero if no change to the previous year appears. In Table III-6, we 
restrict our sample to all filing months, in which the variable holds non-zero values, i.e. 
in which a change in communication occurred. Specification (1) reports the coefficient 
on the change in ‘sitg’ employing the full set of controls and fixed effects as before. We 
find a positive effect, which is slightly larger in magnitude and gains in statistical 
significance compared to the main effect from Table III-3. Thus, investors’ appear to be 
especially sensitive to changes in the signaling efforts of their fund managers. Next, we 
separately test starting (ending) ‘sitg’ communication to better understand what drives 
investor flows. As expected, the effect increases in magnitude for fund managers 
signaling their ‘sitg’ for the first time (specification 2). By contrast, we find a large and 
significant negative coefficient related to the ending of ‘sitg’ communication in 
specification (3). This effect is not only statistical significant, but also economically 
meaningful. For the average fund in our sample, the coefficient pertaining to the ending 
of ‘sitg’-communication in the LS, -1.8%, translates into almost USD 44 million net 
outflows.  
To control for the possibility, that our results are biased by the actual amount 
invested by fund managers, we repeat the analysis using the change in fund manager 
ownership as predictor. In specifications (4) to (6) of Table III-6 we restrict our sample 
to those filing months, for which we retrieve a change in the absolute amount invested 
from one year to the next from the funds’ SAI. Specification (4) reports the coefficient 
on our dummy, ‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d, in case fund managers start investing 
private money in the funds, which they have not done before. Specification (5) reports 
the coefficient taking into account the (log) absolute investment of the initial investment. 
Finally, specification (6) reports the estimate on the change in (log) absolute investment 
from one year to the next considering not only initial investments, but all changes in 
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absolute fund manager ownership in our sample. Note that none of the regression 
estimates turns out significant.  
In sum, those diametric results point to the importance of fund manager’ signaling 
of ‘sitg’ as an incentive alignment mechanism in the LS. Furthermore, they corroborate 
our prior notion on the inaccessibility of valuable fund manager ownership information 
in the funds’ SAI as retail investors are not trading on any changes in beneficial co-
ownership of their fund managers. 
 
Table III-6—Investor reaction to changes in ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication/-investment 
 Dependent variable: Net fund flows 
 ‘sitg’ Communication in LS Actual fund manager investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in ‘sitg’-communication 0.896***      
 [0.276]      
Starting ‘sitg’-communication   1.792***     
  [0.552]     
Ending ‘sitg’-communication   -1.801***    
   [0.556]    
Starting ‘sitg’-investment_d    9.597   
    [9.350]   
Starting ‘sitg’- investment_$     0.913  
     [0.973]  
Δ ‘sitg’- investment_$      4.435 
      [4.236] 
Fund & manager Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,271 1,271 1,271 456 456 4,864 
Adjusted R2 0.292 0.263 0.271 0.073 0.073 0.081 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates of a time series (2013-2018) linear regression model. The dependent 
variable is (monthly) net fund flow. The sample is restricted to observations for which either a change in the ‘skin-in-
the-game’-communication (models (1)-(3)), an initial investment by the fund management (models (4)-(5) or a change 
in the actual amount invested from the last observation period (year t-1) to the current period (year t) appeared (model 
(6)). Models (1)-(3) report coefficient estimates on fund managers’ verbal communication of beneficial ownership in 
own funds, their ‘skin-in-the-game’. Change in ‘sitg’-communication is an indicator variable for whether a fund 
manager started/stopped communicating her ‘sitg’ in the funds’ letter to the shareholder from one year to the next. 
Starting (Ending) ‘sitg’-communication differentiate those cases in model (2) (model (3)), respectively. Models (4)-(6) 
report coefficient estimates on fund managers’ actual investment as disclosed in the Statement of Additional 
Information. Starting ‘sitg’-investment_d is a binary variable indicating whether the fund management starts holding 
beneficial ownership in the fund at time of the observation, whereas no prior ownership has been disclosed. 
Analogously, Starting ‘sitg’-investment_$ refers to the (logged) total dollar amount of (initial) investment. Δ ‘sitg’- 
investment_$ indicates the change in money invested from one year to the next. Fund, fund family and manager controls 
as applied in Table III-3 are included in all regressions – please refer to Appendix III-1 for a detailed description of 
those variables. Standard errors are clustered on the fund-level. We include fund and year-month fixed effects in all 
models. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.3. Individual vs. professional investors 
Lastly, we explore whether signaling of ‘sitg’ in the LS affects individual and professional 
investors differently. In contrast to retail investors, we expect professional investor fund 
flows not to be influenced by the fund managers’ communication style in the LS, because 
information on fund manager ownership is readily available via professional fund data 
providers.3 Therefore, we replicate our analysis from Table III-3 using fund level 
aggregates of institutional share classes only. We refer to share class labeling 
“Institutional” within Morningstar Direct to identify fund share classes restricted to 
professional investors only.  
Appendix III-4 reports the corresponding regression results. Using the full set of 
fund and manager controls and applying fund and time fixed effects, we observe no 
impact of ‘sitg’ communication on institutional investor flows in specification (1). 
Moreover, we find signaling to be unrelated even after bad fund performance 
(specification 2) or in bullish markets (specification 3), which has been the case for retail 
investors (cf. Table III-5). Against what would be predicted as ‘rational’ investor 
behavior following prior literature establishing a positive link between fund manager 
investment and performance, neither of our measures on actual fund manager investments 
turns out significant. Regardless of whether we apply the investment dummy 
(specification 6), the (log) absolute investment (specification 7) or focusing on funds with 
an increase or change in managerial investment (specifications 8 and 9), professional 
investors seem to be trading on fund manager ownership information. 
  
                                                          
3 For example, Morningstar reports the actual fund manager investment dollar range in its licensed fund database. 
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
(Potential) mutual fund investors are provided with an abundance of information and data 
in order to make an informed investment decision. However, when it comes to the 
assessment on how committed the fund managers are on the funds’ success, it has been 
difficult for investors to gain a thorough understanding. 
Since 2005, US fund managers have to provide an indication of their personal 
wealth investment in the fund(s) they manage, which, according to the regulator, 
constitute a good proxy for whether their incentives are aligned with those of the 
shareholders. Prior research has documented superior fund performance in case fund 
managers have their own money at risk. In consequence, the information if and to what 
extent fund managers have “skin-in-the-Game” (‘sitg’) should matter to investors. 
Unfortunately, the valuable information is disclosed only in a supplemental fund 
reporting, which can be considered unread by the average retail investor and, in contrast 
to the semi-annual shareholder reporting, is only provided upon request. Unlike this non-
salient disclosure document, we built on an alternative source for investors to explore 
whether fund managers wealth is tied with the funds’ success - the funds letter to 
shareholders (LS). We find that about one fifth of the LS include verbal signaling of co-
ownership by the fund management. Most important, our results, based on a 
comprehensive sample of roughly 16,000 LS and 96,000 fund-month observations for 
1,334 actively managed US equity mutual funds, provide evidence that retail investors 
strongly react on the fund manager signaling of ‘sitg’ in the LS controlling for a 
comprehensive set of controls. ‘sitg’ communication triggers substantial retail investor 
net inflows up to one month following the filing of the LS, which amount to 0.85% or 
USD 21 million for the average fund in our sample. This effect is most pronounced in the 
first two weeks after the LS has been sent to investors. Moreover, our documented effect 
seems to be persistent, i.e. it does not revert until the next periods filing. In addition, we 
document the effect to be substantial after bad fund performance, during a bullish market, 
for single managed funds and lastly for short and easy to read LS. Furthermore, we 
identify investors to be potentially sensitive to LS of fund managers starting or stopping 
to signal their ‘sitg’ in the LS. In contrast, we observe no reaction of retail investors on 
the actual amount invested by fund managers. Finally, we show that ‘sitg’ communication 
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is only altering retail investors’ decision. Institutional investors do not react upon fund 
manager signaling. 
Taken together, our strong and carefully identified investor reaction suggests that 
retail investors do read the LS. This supports findings in the field, which stress the 
importance of the LS as a communication tool affecting investors’ asset allocation (Hillert 
et al. 2016, Chu and Kim 2019). In this regard, the LS turns out to be an important 
strategic device for fund companies to manage mutual fund flows, especially for those 
funds that are concerned with redemptions (e.g., Coval and Stafford 2007).4 In addition, 
retail investors appreciate their fund managers being committed to their funds success. 
Thus, ‘sitg’ represents an accurate proxy for aligned incentives as anticipated by the SEC. 
Given the performance enhancing ability of managerial ownership establishing a ‘natural’ 
incentive alignment mechanism between fund managers and investors, regulators may 
review current disclosure rules on beneficial holdings with special emphasis on the 
presentation format. The prevalent trade-off herein has been summarized by Kozup et al. 
(2012): “At one end of the continuum, […] regulators find simple availability of 
information to be sufficient. At the other end, a cohort believes that information 
comprehension and actual use by the consumer must be the norm.” – Kozup et al. (2012), 
p. 313.  
                                                          
4 Clearly, our findings bear implications for practitioners, as well: Management companies should keep in mind 
investors’ sensitivity and the effects of strategic signaling, when crafting LS in their (semi-)annual filings. Analogous 
to the corporate context, where easy to read disclosures have been found to positively impact firm value (Hwang and 
Kim 2017), it [may] pay off “to write well” for fund companies too. 
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Appendix III-1—Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
‘skin-in-the-game’ 
-communication 
Dummy variable indicating whether a fund manager communicated her 
personal investment in fund i managed in year t in the funds’ letter to 
shareholders. The variable equals to one if personal investment is 
communicated, zero otherwise. 
(monthly / daily)  
Net fund flows (FF) 
Monthly / daily net fund flows are the net growth in fund assets beyond 
reinvested dividends: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 (𝐹𝐹)𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the dollar value of total net assets (TNA) of fund i 
in month t (on day d) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  denotes the return of fund i in month t (on 
day d) as reported in Morningstar Direct. We apply the fund merger 
correction as proposed in Lou (2012). The variable is winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile. 
Panel B: Key explanatory variables 
‘skin-in-the-game’- 
investment_d 
Dummy variable equals one if in a given year at least one of the funds’ 
managers has beneficial ownership (greater than $0) in a self-managed 
fund, zero otherwise. Fund manager ownership is retrieved from the 




Aggregate amount of beneficial ownership (greater than $0) of all fund 
manager in a fund for a given year, formally:  




where 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual investment 
of manager j in fund i and year t We translate dollar ranges as provided 
in the funds’ SEC filing [SAI] using the mid-point of ranges according to 
Khorana et al. (2007). We use the logarithm of ‘skin-in-the-game’-
investment_$ in our main regressions. 
Panel C: Fund, fund manager and director controls 
Gross return 
(%, annually) 
A funds’ (yearly) raw return before any fees and cost in percent. The 
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Alpha return 
(%,annually) 
A funds’ (yearly) four-factor model abnormal return employing three 
factors used by Fama and French (1992) as well as the momentum factor 
(Carhart 1997). We retrieve monthly factor loadings from Kenneth 
French’s database.  
Fundsize  
(USD bn.) 
Funds total net assets – aggregating both, institutional as well as retail 
share classes of a given fund. We use the natural logarithm of Fund TNA 
in our main regressions. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
Fund family TNA  
(USD bn.) 
Total net assets of fund family (company). Refers to the total net assets 
reported in Morningstar Direct for a fund family. The variable is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. We use the logarithm of Fund 
Family TNA in our main regressions. 
# managers per fund Number of managers responsible for managing a fund as reported by 
Morningstar. 
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Fund age (years) Age in years since a funds’ inception date. 
Gross expense ratio  
(%, annually) 
A fund’s annual gross expense ratio in percent. The variable is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Morningstar 
rating 
(1 to 5 stars) 
Morningstar rates mutual funds and ETFs from 1 to 5 stars based on how 
well they have performed (after adjusting for risk and accounting for 
sales charges) in comparison to similar funds and ETFs. Within each 
Morningstar Category, the top 10% of funds and ETFs receive 5 stars 
and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. 
Turnover ratio 
(%, annually) 
Percentage amount of a mutual fund's portfolio that has changed within 
a given year in percent. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
Tracking error 
(%, annually)  
Standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s and the 
benchmark index’ return. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile.  
Value Equals one if a fund primarily invests in value stocks, zero otherwise. 
Blend Equals one if a fund primarily invests in blend stocks, zero otherwise. 
Growth Equals one if a fund primarily invests in growth stocks, zero otherwise. 
Small Cap Equals one if a fund primarily invests in small cap stocks, zero otherwise. 
Mid Cap  Equals one if a fund primarily invests in mid cap stocks, zero otherwise. 
Large Cap Equals one if a fund primarily invests in large cap stocks, zero otherwise.  
Institutional Equals one if a fund is available for institutional investors only, zero 
otherwise. 




The amount charged by manager(s) as represented in the fund's annual 
report. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. We use 
the logarithm of Gross Expense Ratio in our main regressions. 
Director fees 
(USD k) 
The amount the fund paid to the board of directors and trustees during 
the last fiscal year, as reported in the most recent annual report. The 
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. We use the logarithm 
of Gross Expense Ratio in our main regressions. 
 




Appendix III-2—Data matching procedure 
 
 
 We use three different data sources: 
a) Morningstar Direct Fund Database (fund characteristics: e.g., fund flows) 
b) SEC EDGAR: (Semi-) annual shareholder reporting containing Letter to Shareholders 
(LS) 
c) SEC EDGAR: Statement of Additional Information (SAI) containing information on 
fund manager ownership (dollar ranges) 
 Sources do not share a unique identifier in order to link data across sources. 
 We apply a multi-step procedure to address this issue: 
1. From Morningstar we obtain the entire universe of actively managed equity mutual 
funds for sale in the US.  
2. From the SEC EDGAR archive, we download all (semi-)annual shareholder reports 
filed in our observation period and retrieve Share Class IDs using textual analysis1 
from each report. 
3. We link shareholder reporting Share Class IDs with Class Tickers2 using data provided 
by the SEC in their filing on “Investment Company Series and Class Information” 
retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/open/datasets-investment_company.html for all 
years in our observation period. 
4. We map data from a) Morningstar and b) (semi-) annual shareholder reports based on 
the Class Ticker. 
5. We restrict our sample to all funds, which a) manage more than USD 100 mn total 
assets by 2018 and b) can be linked on the Class Ticker 
6. From the SEC EDGAR archive, we download all SAIs for our restricted sample (using 
the Morningstar variable SEC ID as unique identifier) and manually extract information 
on fund manager ownership from the SAIs. 
                                                          
1 Share Class IDs are an unique identifier assigned by the SEC to each series of an investment company. Share Class 
IDs are provided in the format of a "C" followed by nine digits, for which we screen using text mining techniques. 
2 The stock market symbol (if any) for a class. An investment company series may include one or more share classes 
with differing sales charges and expenses. (cf. SEC 2020 – Investment Company Series and Class Information). 




Appendix III-3—Quality of logit and probit regression models 
  
 
‘skin-in-the-game’-communication in Letter to the Shareholder 
 Summary Statistics  Classification 
 







Sample 0.210 0.407 0 0 1     
Predictions - Logit Model 0.206 0.332 0.0004 0.168 0.813  89.43% 79.16% 94.58% 
Predictions - Probit Model 0.206 0.334 0.0007 0.175 0.780  89.36% 79.11% 94.50% 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics as well as prediction classifications of the logit (Table III-2) and probit (unreported) model on the dependent variable ‘skin-in-the-game’-
communication. ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication equals one if personal investment of fund manager(s) is communicated in the funds’ letter to the shareholders, zero otherwise. 
Classification statistics indicate the model fit. Correctly classified measures the percentage share of fund manager ‘sitg’ communication that is correctly specified by the logit (probit) 
regression model. Sensitivity measures the share of funds, for which the respective model correctly classifies them to communicate ‘sitg’ when in fact they do. Specifity measures the share 
of funds, for which the models correctly classified those funds as not communicating ‘sitg’ in the shareholder letter when in fact they do not communicate. 
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Appendix III-4—Institutional investor response to ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication 
 Dependent variable: Institutional Net fund flows 
 Full Sample Bad Perform. Good Perform. Bearish Market Bullish Market Full Sample Full Sample Change in ‘sitg’ Change in ‘sitg’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
‘skin-in-the-game’-communication 0.793 2.260 1.050 -1.205 2.587     
 [0.509] [0.331] [0.541] [0.575] [0.200]     
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_d      0.212    
      [0.863]    
‘skin-in-the-game’-investment_$       -0.257   
       [0.420]   
Starting ‘sitg’-investment_d        -0.150  
        [0.281]  
Δ ‘sitg’- investment_$         0.736 
         [2.357] 
Fund & Manager Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,738 884 854 834 925 1,738 1,738 2,712 2,712 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.169 0.230 0.139 0.112 0.114 0.114 0.085 0.092 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates of a time series (2013-2018) linear regression model. (Monthly) net fund flow of institutional share classes is the dependent variable. 
Institutional funds are labelled based on Morningstar Directs’ fund database. Fund flows are measured in the month the shareholder letter is filed (sent to) investors and replaced by flows 
of the subsequent month whenever the filing of the shareholder letter takes place after the 15th calendar day (Hillert et al. 2016). ‘skin-in-the-game’-communication is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a fund manager communicates her personal investment in fund i in the funds’ LS. The variable equals to one if personal investment is communicated, zero otherwise. 
In models (2)-(5), we split our sample according to Table III-5 applying a cross-sectional median splits on performance (market returns), respectively. In models (6)-(9), we regress 
(institutional) fund flows on actual fund manager investment, either using a dummy variable (model (6)) or by using log aggregate dollar investments (model (7)), while we focus on funds 
with a change in managerial investment in models (8) and (9). Please refer to Appendix III-1 for a detailed description of those variables. Standard errors are clustered on the fund-level. 
We include fund and year-month fixed effects in all models. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
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41% more likely to deviate from the advertised investment style. Moreover, while 
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1. Introduction  
“Epidemic of narcissism” – Twenge and Campbell (2009), the renowned psychologists 
and experts on the personality trait narcissism, label their finding that narcissism is on the 
rise and further call these days the age of entitlement. Narcissism as a personality trait has 
been the focus of psychology studies for decades now1. Yet, only recently has finance 
research shed light upon personality traits and potential consequences thereof on 
professional investors even though findings indicate meaningful impact of cognitive traits 
on actions and decisions of top-level executives (e.g., Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, 
Carpenter et al. 2004).  
Clinically diagnosed narcissists as classified by the American Psychology 
Association’s (APA) DSM-V criteria feature at least three main characteristics: an 
exaggerated sense of self-importance, a lack of empathy and the persistent need for 
admiration from others (APA 2013). Psychology literature suggests that decision-making 
of narcissistic personalities is impaired in at least two fundamental ways. In the pursuit 
of preserving a favorable image of ones’ self to others, narcissists are prone to 
overestimate their own capabilities. Moreover, the second element pertains to risky 
decision-making which may be a result of narcissists’ inflated self-beliefs that facilitate 
them to misjudge probabilities of failure (Campbell, Goodie and Forster 2004). Both 
aspects are potentially detrimental for stakeholders involved in these decisions. 
In the light of continuously growing assets under management2 with half of all 
American households being invested in at least one mutual fund, understanding 
antecedents of fund managers investment decision-making process is vital for 
stakeholders. As the majority of fund assets are invested in actively managed funds (ICI 
2019), investors’ return arguably relies on rational decision-making of the fund manager. 
Yet, professional investors, such as fund managers, are shown to be susceptible to 
cognitive biases3, which are adverse to the investors’ goal of maximizing (risk-adjusted) 
returns. In contrast to biases such as overconfidence or herding, narcissism is a complete 
                                                          
1 Havelock Ellis (1898) was the first to introduce the term narcissism as a concept of psychology. Yet, he introduced 
the term rather with a focus on perverse self-love. 
2 Mutual fund industry is expected to further increase in importance: by 2025 assets under management will have almost 
doubled in comparison to 2016 – rising to USD 145.4 trillion (PWC 2017). 
3 See, for instance, evidence from overconfidence (Puetz and Ruenzi 2011) and herding (Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
1995) among mutual fund managers. 
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personality trait and remains stable regardless of time and context. Thus, it seems 
worthwhile to examine the effect of narcissism on fund management and potential 
consequences thereof for investors. It is of utmost importance, if narcissistic fund 
managers are able to attract more investors compared to non-narcissistic ones, as evidence 
from the organizational business literature has established (Galvin, Balthazard and 
Waldmann 2010). Galvin, Balthazard and Waldmann (2010) point out that, in a leader-
follower context, narcissists are apt to attract followers as they are perceived to be 
charismatic leaders. In a similar vein, we believe that the leader-follower relation holds 
true in the mutual fund context and therefore expect investors to be lured by the fund 
management leaders with narcissistic tendencies to a greater extent compared to non-
narcissistic managers. Thus, if narcissism negatively affects fund managers’ decisions, 
investing with them could be detrimental for these investors. Similarly, this investigation 
may have also practical implications for fund companies. When appointing fund 
managers, screening potential candidates with respect to their personalities is potentially 
beneficial for the fund company in the long run. 
Due to the above outlined impact, this study aims to address this research gap. 
While narcissism in psychology research is a well-documented phenomena and an 
increasing body of literature examines the impact of narcissism among CEOs, 
professional investors and in particular fund managers have not been in focus yet. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate narcissism among fund managers by 
examining verbatim transcribed interviews. In that, we identify the impact of narcissistic 
fund managers on investor relevant fund characteristics (i.e.: style drift, performance, 
risk-taking, management fees and fund size). 
Thus, our study adds to various strands of the literature. First, by investigating 
narcissism, we add to research on the impact of personality traits and behavioral biases 
among professional investors. By establishing the link between narcissism and fund 
management, we confirm previous findings on cognitive biases and personality traits that 
found meaningful impact on the fund managers’ decision-making (for a summary see 
e.g., Kumar and Goyal 2015).  
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Second, we contribute to literature on textual analysis in finance by analyzing 
transcribed verbatim interviews of fund managers4 We show that interviews indeed 
provide indication of the individuals’ personality traits in that we are able to detect 
narcissistic tendencies in the fund managers’ use of words. 
Finally, we are able to contribute to finance literature on narcissism by examining 
the impact thereof on fund managers. Closely related studies on CEO narcissism were 
able to show that narcissism indeed has an impact on investment behavior. First, CEO 
narcissism is associated with a rather bold investment style. The continuous aspiration of 
narcissistic personalities to seek for attention of others, invites them to engage in large 
stake initiatives with great exposure to the public. Aktas et al. (2016), for instance, find 
that narcissism is linked to greater frequency of M&A deal initiation and deal size. At the 
same time, the probability of deal completion is decreased for narcissistic CEOs. Second, 
further studies indicate that narcissism is a determinant of performance and volatility of 
firm performance. While Lubit (2002), Petrenko et al. (2016) and Ham et al. (2017) find 
evidence of poorer performance for narcissistic CEOs, Wales, Patel and Lumpkin (2013) 
and Kim (2018) find opposing results and argue that pronounced entrepreneurial spirit 
rather increases firm performance. Even though studies remain inconclusive on the 
direction of the impact on firm performance, consensus among studies prevails regarding 
the impact of performance volatility. Among them, Wales, Patel and Lumpkin (2013) 
show that narcissism is positively linked to higher risk in terms of performance volatility. 
Third, CEO narcissism is associated with unethical behavior and failure to adhere to rules. 
By investigating Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases released by the SEC for 
the S&P 500 companies’ CEOs, findings of Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013) suggest 
that firms headed by narcissistic CEOs are more frequently accused of fraud. In addition, 
(Chen 2010) shows that narcissism increases financial misreporting and that this effect is 
moderated by CEOs dishonesty. 
To address the research question, we draw on a comprehensive dataset of fund 
manager interviews provided by The Wall Street Transcript that we match to their 
respective fund characteristics gathered using the Morningstar Direct database. We apply 
                                                          
4 See e.g., Loughran and Mcdonald (2016) for a summary on textual analysis in finance literature. We provide details 
on our sample and methodology in section 3. 
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textual analysis5 to the fund managers’ interviews and retrieve a proxy of narcissism as 
proposed by (Raskin and Shaw 1988), which to date has been the only unobtrusive proxy 
of narcissism that has been confirmed by experimental psychology literature. 
Supporting a narcissism effect, we document that narcissistic fund managers 
invest less conform with their defined investment style as stated in the funds’ prospectus. 
Controlling for several previously identified determinants of deviation from investment 
style, we observe an economically significant effect with narcissistic fund managers being 
41% more likely to deviate from their advertised investment style. Thus, these fund 
managers seem do not seem to adhere to conventions regarding the composition of their 
portfolios in terms of style. More importantly, we find that narcissistic fund managers 
engage in significantly riskier investment, while performance on average does not differ 
from their counterparts. Interestingly, we find that this effect is mediated by gender. In 
that, narcissistic female fund managers are far less risk prone than their narcissistic male 
counterparts. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence for narcissistic fund managers’ 
pursuit of making their mark in a competitive environment in the form of managing 
greater assets under management. We document a significantly positive link between 
narcissism and fund size that is also significant in economic terms. In that, a one standard 
deviation increase in narcissism translates into 10% higher assets under management, 
which corresponds to an average of USD 54.9 million higher net assets for our sample of 
mutual funds. Lastly, neither do we find evidence of more narcissistic fund managers 
charging higher management fees, nor do we find that those managers are able to keep 
investors loyal to their funds regardless of their previous performance. We argue that fund 
managers are not able to arbitrarily set the management fees themselves, as it is at the 
fund directors’ discretion to set appropriate management fees. In addition, we do not find 
evidence for the investors reacting to fund manager narcissism neither after good, nor 
after poor performance. We believe that the average investor does not know about the 
personality of the fund manager and thus has no chance to react to it. This also implies 
that the investor does not have the opportunity to dodge the narcissistic fund managers’ 
risky and less consistent investment decision-making. Therefore, investors appear to be 
rather unable to forgo the full consequences of narcissistic fund management including 
significant style deviations and higher risk taking. Results are robust to the application of 
                                                          
5 The approach of the present study follows the 'bag-of-words' method (Salton and McGill, 1983) . 
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a further narcissism proxy, the number of lines in biography, which has been utilized in 
prior studies (Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013; Buchholz, Lopatta and Maas 2019) by 
accessing the respective fund managers’ LinkedIn profiles and identify their voluntarily 
provided description of themselves in their profile biography. 
We discuss our findings in the light of practitioner implications: on the one hand, 
we recommend fund companies - if possible – to consider personality criteria when 
screening potential fund manager candidates. On the other hand, we believe that investors 
should familiarize themselves with the fund managers that they entrust their money with. 
While we believe that investors should consider prospective return on their investment 
before investing in a fund, we also suggest to critically reflect one’s risk-preferences and 
the preferred investment style, which both should ideally match those of the fund manager 
invested with. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Impact of narcissism on decision-making  
Actions and decisions of top-level managers are greatly influenced by their personalities 
and past experiences (e.g., Carpenter et al. 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
Contrary to the assumptions of fully “rational” agents as the predominant notion in 
neoclassical finance suggests, more recent findings established that behavior and 
decision-making is susceptible to each executives’ information processing, preferences 
and dispositions (among others see Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). Thus, agents and 
may not at all times act fully rational. 
In general, there are numerous studies in finance focusing on the impact of biases 
and heuristics on investment decision-making6. Surprisingly, not only individual 
investors are inclined to draw on simple heuristics and biases, but even professionals 
investors. Evidence suggests that cognitive biases, such as herding, familiarity bias, home 
bias, the disposition effect or overconfidence significantly impact fund managers’ 
decisions and trading behavior. Studies closest to the present study examine the “Big 
Five” personality dimensions and find that these significantly impact fund management, 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Kumar and Goyal (2015) for a comprehensive review on behavioral biases in investment decision-
making.  
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in particular, the fund manager performance (e.g., Camgoz et al. 2011)7. However, 
literature has not shed light on the impact of narcissism as complete psychological trait 
on investment decision-making of professional investors. 
Research identified the cognitive frame and personality dimension narcissism to 
fundamentally influence strategic decision-making of top-level executives (see Braun 
2017, for a comprehensive review). Narcissism is a well-studied personality trait in 
psychology that in its essence can be described as a personality disorder (“narcissistic 
personality disorder” (NPD)) which is characterized by three main elements: an 
exaggerated sense of self-importance, a lack of empathy and the persistent need for 
admiration from others (APA8 2013). These characteristics typically cover up the 
narcissists lack of self-confidence as a self-protection mechanism in that the narcissist 
aims to feel superior to others and seek attention and admiration from them (APA 2013; 
Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013). The DSM-V criteria further state that narcissism 
develops early in adulthood and remains a stable trait irrespective of the time and setting 
the individual is situated.9  
Research in the business and organization context finds that narcissists tend to 
compensate anger and overlook negative feedback by means of engaging in 
counterproductive work behavior (CWB) (Penney and Spector 2002). Chatterjee and 
Pollock (2017) find that this also holds true for executives. Decision-makers with 
narcissistic tendencies that continuously seek admiration and approval make it difficult 
for co-workers and employees to work with them, which in turn may impede management 
team performance. Moreover, the sense of self-importance rather often manifests itself in 
entitlement and arrogance towards others that in turn arguably affects their decision-
making style (Campbell et al. 2011).  
                                                          
7 The Big-Five personality pertains to 5 dimensions: Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Extraversion (E), 
Neuroticism (N) and Openness to Experience (O) (McCrae & John 1992). 
8 The American Psychiatric Association established the DSM-5 criteria which serve as a guideline for diagnosis of 
mental disorders for health care professionals. The first release of the DSM was in 1952 and has been updated a five 
times since. More than 1,500 mental health and medical experts contributed to the criteria.  
9 Note that this study does attempt to claim that fund managers reveal a clinical and mental disorder of narcissistic 
personality disorder (NPD), but rather addresses the personality trait narcissism (also referred to as or “normal“ or 
“grandiose” narcissism) as defined by Raskin and Hall (1979) and Raskin and Terry (1988) in their narcissistic 
personality inventory (NPI) that is derived from the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-III criteria. We mainly 
refer to the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM criteria to outline the characteristics of a narcissistic personality. 
Moreover, we refer to managers scoring high in terms of “normal” narcissism as narcissistic fund managers. 
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Only recently, research in finance has shed light on narcissism and found 
meaningful impact, particularly, upper echelon research analyzing the impact of 
narcissism among CEOs of a firm. Evidence suggests that the investment style of a firm 
is moderated by fund manager narcissism. By analyzing CEO interviews recorded on 
Lexis Nexis and The Wall Street Transcript (TWST), Aktas et al. (2016) study the effect 
of narcissism on takeover negotiations and find that target and acquirer CEO narcissism 
correlates with more frequent M&A deal initiations, greater deal size and faster 
negotiations. They reason that narcissistic CEOs are in constant search for admiration and 
thus rather frequently engage in high-stake endeavors, such as M&A deals. However, 
they also find that M&A deal completion is less likely. Ham et al. (2017) confirm this 
finding by showing that in particular R&D and M&A expenditures are increased for 
companies led by narcissistic CEOs. CEO narcissism may also impair company value by 
executive dismissals even in times when their value is rather high (Johnson, Kolasinski 
and Nordlund 2018). Johnson, Kolasinski and Nordlund (2018) argue that this can be 
attributed to a lack of empathy which arguably makes narcissistic CEOs more likely to 
let off staff.  
The impact of CEO narcissism on firm performance, however, remains 
controversially discussed. While Lubit (2002), Petrenko et al. (2016) and Ham et al. 
(2017) find poorer firm performance for rather narcissistic CEOs compared to non-
narcissistic ones, Wales, Patel and Lumpkin (2013) and Kim (2018) find the opposite. 
Ham et al. (2017), for instance, ascribe inferior performance to lower operating cash 
flows and thus profits, whereas Wales, Patel and Lumpkin (2013) and Kim (2018) argue 
that narcissism positively attributes to performance, due to a pronounced entrepreneurial 
spirit among narcissistic CEOs. 
In addition, studies on CEO narcissism were able to confirm the findings of 
psychological research that narcissistic personalities fail to adhere to rules and are linked 
to unethical behavior (e.g., Morf and Rhodewalt 2001). Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 
(2013), for instance, find that narcissism is associated with higher fraud accusations 
among CEOs. In addition, Chen (2010) illustrates that narcissism and CEOs dishonesty 
positively attributes to financial misreporting. Even though CEO narcissism has been in 
the spotlight of recent studies, narcissism among mutual fund managers has, to the best 
of our knowledge, not been considered in prior research. 
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2.2. Hypothesis development  
In the light of increasing assets under management (estimated to rise to a total of US$ 
145.4 trillion in 2025 by PWC 2017) and the majority of fund assets being invested in 
actively managed funds that are subject to the fund managers’ rational decision-making 
(ICI 2019) it is of key interest to stakeholders to understand how narcissistic tendencies 
of managers affects fund management.  
Inflated self-beliefs and feelings of uniqueness manifest themselves in a failure to 
adhere to rules (Brunell and Buelow 2017; Kets de Vries 2004; Morf and Rhodewalt 
2001). Research in the sports context shows that narcissism is predictive of making use 
of antisocial behavior (such as an aggressive action in a soccer match) which is triggered 
by moral disengagement (Boardley and Kavussanu 2008; Jones et al. 2016). Narcissists 
are convinced that rules and standards apply to others, yet not to themselves. 
Consequently, in the prospect of enjoying an advantage, narcissists are inclined to violate 
rules and social norms. The divergence from standards has also been confirmed by the 
finance literature in the context CEO narcissism (Chen 2010; Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 
2013). 
Moreover, the need for admiration may also nurture grandiose strategic decisions. 
Findings of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) demonstrate that narcissistic CEOs are prone 
to greater strategic dynamism measured by the number and size of acquisitions. In the 
mutual fund context, a greater style inconsistency has been found to significantly 
outperform the less style-consistent funds (cf. Brown, Harlow and Zhang 2009). In 
addition, comparability between funds of the same style is impaired by managers 
diverting from the targeted style, which makes investment less transparent for the 
investor. Due to above outlined findings, we propose that fund managers with narcissistic 
tendencies may arguably be more drawn to fail to adhere to conventions, such as the style 
framework they operate in, but rather deviate from its benchmark investment strategy and 
therefore exhibit a greater style drift.  
Hypothesis 1): Narcissistic fund managers exhibit a greater style drift. 
The need of admiration and applause from others drives narcissistic individuals to 
actively pursue compensating opportunities (Finkel et al., 2006). In their study, the find 
that these individuals do not shy away from going over and above their natural 
environments for their goal of admiration from others. Therefore, narcissists are prone to 
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make decisions that are considered to be bold and very noticeable in the search of 
continuous affirmation (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; APA 2013). In that they do not 
consider preventing negative outcomes, but rather focus on their ultimate goals (Foster et 
al. 2009). Lakey et al. (2008) call this approach a “myopic focus on reward”. Ignoring 
the probability to having to accept losses, paves the way for risky decision-making 
(Sanders and Hambrick 2007). As managers with narcissistic tendencies remain rather 
unconcerned in the light of prospective loss, they are also willing to tolerate a greater 
range of consequences (Campbell, Goodie and Forster 2004). Research has shown that 
narcissism is indeed related to riskier decision-making (Foster et al. 2009; Lewellen 2006; 
Campbell, Goodie and Forster 2004). Accepting a greater dispersion of possible outcomes 
has also been linked to narcissistic CEOs. In their study, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
find mixed results with regards to the firm’s performance and conclude that it is not clear 
whether CEOs with a higher level of narcissism have a negative or positive impact on the 
firms’ performance. However, they find that performance volatility is increased compared 
to their non-narcissistic counterparts. Thus, firms headed by narcissistic CEOs evidently 
engage in riskier investment decision-making. Analogously, we hypothesize that 
narcissistic fund managers tend to be attracted by bold and rather risky investments that 
would results in greater fund risk (volatility of returns): 
Hypothesis 2a): Fund performance of narcissistic fund managers is more volatile. 
Increased performance volatility reduces the investors to anticipate performance, 
dispersion of returns is increased and if this risk does not pay off in terms of 
outperformance, the investor is arguably impaired. Based on the above outlined findings, 
we therefore hypothesize that narcissistic fund managers on average do not outperform 
less narcissistic managers: 
Hypothesis 2b): Average fund performance of narcissistic fund managers is not 
significantly different from less narcissistic fund managers. 
Highly narcissistic top-level managers tend to have an exaggerated sense of their 
own importance, in their personal capabilities and a lack of empathy towards others (APA 
2013). Combined with a great sense of entitlement narcissistic fund managers may feel 
to be able to take advantage of others, as they do not experience the feelings of guilt 
compared to non-narcissists (Campbell and Foster 2007). Evidence from Ham et al. 
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(2017) indeed shows that narcissistic CEOs compensation was higher (in absolute and 
relative terms) compared to less narcissistic executives. Thus, we hypothesize that 
narcissists reveal their feelings of self-importance and a certain degree of ruthlessness 
towards the investors by requesting a higher payment from them, resulting in a higher 
management fee:  
Hypothesis 3): Narcissistic fund managers charge higher management fees. 
Wallace and Baumeister (2002) find that narcissists perform well in competitive 
environments. As rivaling in highly competitive environments is also a great opportunity 
for the narcissist to reach more external admiration and glory, narcissists arguably 
appreciate competitions.10 Combined with the tendency of narcissistic managers in the 
quest of making their mark and thus gaining approval by others, we hypothesize that fund 
managers manage greater funds (i.e. reflected in assets under management (AUM)). In 
that, lager assets under management may function as a benchmark for narcissistic fund 
managers with which they can gather recognition from peers. Moreover, the fund 
managers compensation depends on the AUM, as managers typically receive a percentage 
of the total assets under management. Therefore, these fund managers are arguably 
pursuing to increase their fund size. At the same time, in their quest for appreciation, fund 
managers may prefer to work for greater funds in the first place.  
Hypothesis 4) Narcissistic fund managers manage larger funds. 
Furthermore, literature on psychology established that narcissism correlates with 
leadership and in particular charismatic leadership (Brunell et al., 2008; Galvin, 
Balthazard and Waldmann 2010). Galvin, Balthazard and Waldmann (2010) state that 
this link is channeled via visionary boldness. Inspirational and convincing rhetoric is 
arguably a gift for narcissists that helps them to attract followers (Maccoby 2004). In the 
context of fund managers, we thus expect narcissistic fund managers to be able to attract 
a greater flock of investments when performing well and keep their investors onboard in 
times of poor performance. 
Hypothesis 5) Narcissistic fund managers generate higher inflows after good 
performance, no penalty after bad performance. 
                                                          
10 See also (Uziel 2007) for a review of social facilitation and personality traits. 
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3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1. The Wall Street Transcript fund manager interviews 
Our main data consists of fund manager interviews by The Wall Street Transcript 
(TWST), a paid subscription publication and web site that features first-hand transcripts 
of interviews with CEOs, money managers, equity analysts and top-level corporate 
executives11. Specifically, we obtain all transcribed interviews with fund managers since 
2012 from the websites’ archive in the “investment strategies” category. Interviews differ 
in style and content but most often serve fund managers to discuss a fund’s investment 
strategy, explain the investment environment or provide expert insights on a funds’ 
management philosophy including ideas for specific stock picks (see excerpts in 
Appendix IV-2 for examples of those interviews). In contrast to existing literature 
analyzing textual information in regulatory documents (e.g., annual reports: Chatterjee 
and Hambrick 2007) or analyst calls (e.g., Price et al. 2012; Aktas et al. 2016) interviews 
in the Wall Street Transcript provide first-hand information directly and unfiltered from 
the fund managers without being impacted by any investor relations or company 
communication department”12.  
Prior studies using The Wall Street Transcript (e.g., Aktas et al. 2016) analyzed 
interviews of top-level corporate executives. For our analysis, we focus on interviews 
with only one interviewee for assignment purposes, thus, we are able to draw on 744 fund 
manager interviews throughout the period from 2012 until 2018 that are disclosed in a bi-
weekly fashion on the TWST website.  
3.2. Fund data 
We collect information for all mutual funds of fund managers for which we have at least 
one interview in our sample of The Wall Street Transcript. We retrieve a host of fund 
characteristics from Morningstar Direct, among them style deviation, fund size, fund age, 
turnover ratio, (monthly) returns and fund flows. Variables at the share class level are 
converted to fund level aggregates by value-weighting their respective contribution to the 
fund’s total net assets (c.f., e.g., Doshi et al. 2015). Most importantly, we collect (historic) 
                                                          
11 The Wall Street Transcript (www.twst.com) was established in 1963. Nowadays, The Wall Street Transcript has 
approximately 200,000 monthly readers and comprises more than 25,000 interviews. 
12 The Wall Street Transcript’s interviews are verbatim, the interviewee may review the interview before publications, 
but only for factual errors. 
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fund data on fund managers including their respective start and exit dates at the fund 
allowing us to delimit the time period in which a fund manager has been in charge of 
managing the funds. Thus, our sample period starts with the first fund managers’ start 
date on January 1st, 1982 and ends with the last observation in December 31st, 2018. As 
we are interested in examining active decision making of fund managers and due to the 
ease of comparability of key fund characteristics across funds, we limit our sample to 
actively managed mutual funds by restricting the sample to equity funds and eliminating 
index funds13. We are able to match 504 out of 744 fund manager interviews with 
respective data on fund characteristics on actively managed funds. 
3.3. Summary statistics  
Table IV-1 reports summary statistic for the overall sample. Our sample consists of 504 
single manager interviews since 2012 from The Wall Street Transcript with 424 different 
mutual fund managers being interviewed14. Panel A documents the interview 
characteristics: on average an interview is about 2.700 words in length (with large 
deviation to min and max number of words), contains 152 sentences, entails more plural 
(33.6) than singular (21.6) personal pronouns and is given in a positive tone (0.218). Panel 
B describes our sample of fund managers. The average fund manager in our sample has 
a tenure of about 5 years and is male (gender = 0). Panel C provides descriptive statistics 
of the mutual fund characteristics. We aggregate fund information on a fund manager 
level by value weighting the fund characteristics of all funds managed by a respective 
fund manager. In total, we retrieve fund characteristics for 2,110 funds. The average fund 
manager in our sample manages a 10 year old fund with USD 527 million assets under 
management. Moreover, the average fund charges 1.581 percent from its investors, 
thereof 0.876 percent in management fees, is managed by a team, provides a yearly return 
of 0.448 percent, turns over approximately 58 percent of its assets in a year, and is slightly 
                                                          
13 We apply the standard method in mutual fund literature (see e.g., Solomon, Soltes and Sosyura, 2014) and filter fund 
names for words that include ‘‘index’’ ‘‘idx’’ ‘‘S&P’’ and variations of these words in addition to the Morningstar 
Direct filter. 
14 Some fund manager have multiple interviews in the respective period: two interviews (N= 44), three interviews 
(N=12), four, five or six (with N=1 each). 
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less consistent in its declared investment style15,16. Overall, the fund characteristics (in 
particular fund age and expense ratio) in our sample are in line with similar studies 
examining actively managed funds (e.g., Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi 2011)17. 
 
Table IV-1—Summary statistics 
  N Mean Sd Min  25th Median 75th Max 
Panel A: Interviews 
# Words  504 2.685 774.7 341 2.119 2.623 3.114 5.451 
# Sentences  504 151.90 42.39 23 125 147 173 340 
# PS Pronouns  504 21.62 17.92 0.00 9 16 29 124 
# PP Pronouns  504 33.57 18.75 0.00 20 30 44 98 
Tone  504 0.218 0.258 -0.65 0.046 0.229 0.416 0.867 
Panel B: Fund manager characteristics 
Tenure (avg. tenure, in years)  424 4.993 3.007 0.070 2.732 4.741 6.709 15.497 
Gender  424 0.074 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Fund characteristics 
Fund Size (TNA in mio. USD)  415 527.1 1.340 1.242 22.34 80.25 390.4 8.864 
Fund Age (in months)  424 10.03 7.017 0.287 4.907 8.690 13.16 46.56 
Expense Ratio (in %)  312 1.581 0.632 0.316 1.108 1.435 1.920 3.260 
Return (in %)  414 0.448 0.669 -6.498 0.265 0.487 0.785 2.321 
Fund Risk (std. dev. of returns)  372 19.88 7.414 2.234 14.99 19.25 23.52 42.47 
Style Dispersion  377 150.37 19.09 98.82 137.27 149.96 163.66 191.64 
Tracking Error (in %)  375 5.158 2.153 0.682 3.772 4.940 6.353 14.23 
Turnover (in %)  389 58.03 42.41 1.950 28.26 47.44 75.67 226.00 
Mgmt Fee (in %)  363 0.876 0.330 0.060 0.695 0.833 1.000 2.000 
Team Size  424 2.878 2.096 0.000 1.613 2.239 3.429 14.93 
MoSt Rating  359 2.949 0.886 1.000 2.362 3.000 3.420 5.000 
# Stock Holdings  406 129.8 242.9 3.516 39.89 65.24 115.5 2.553 
Segment Flow (in mio. USD)  349 -457 1.350 -5.230 -852.0 -274.0 185.0 3.690 
Fund Family TNA (in bn. USD)  318 68.30 210.0 0.062 0.533 5.470 38.70 1.190 
Max Drawdown  411 -9.626 3.906 -25.10 -12.19 -9.640 -6.909 -1.220 
Kurtosis  411 0.298 0.369 -0.830 0.072 0.286 0.512 1.989 
Skewness  411 -0.228 0.211 -1.160 -0.336 -0.231 -0.130 0.515 
12b-1 Fee (in %)  254 0.328 0.157 0 0.250 0.291 0.427 0.750 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of our sample of N=504 interviews conducted with N=424 fund 
managers, who manage N=2,110 funds. Interview variables reported in Panel A are average values per fund manager 
                                                          
15 Style Dispersion (StyleDis) as noted in Morningstar Direct measures the degree of the overall scatter of the holdings 
in the most recent portfolio along with both the value-growth and size dimensions. Morningstar indicates that low 
dispersion values are below 100, medium values between 100 and 148, whereas high dispersion is above 148. Thus, 
investments with a high score is considered to be less consistent. Prior studies (e.g., Blanchett 2011) and especially 
practitioners refer to this metric. 
16 The fund characteristics (such as size, fund age, expense and turnover ratio) in our sample are comparable other 
studies examining actively managed funds (e.g., Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi 2011). 
17 Even though the average turnover ratio of funds in our sample is with about two thirds of the ratio in the study of 
Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) significantly lower. 
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i, for managers that gave more than one interview. Panel B reports fund manager characteristics and fund characteristics 
in Panel C reflect averages per fund manager over the fund(s) managed by the fund manager. Moreover fund 
characteristics are average values per fund manager throughout the time the interviewed fund manager is actively 
managing the fund(s). Tone is measured by the fraction of negative words by all words that the respective fund manager 
said in an interview according to the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary. Style Dispersion denotes 
Morningstar's measure of the degree of overall scatter of the holdings in the most recent portfolio along both the value-
growth and size dimensions. We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix IV-1. The sample 
includes all actively managed equity funds managed by the interviewed fund manager (starting from the first 
observation in 1982 until 2018). 
4. Methodology and univariate evidence  
4.1. Measuring fund managers narcissism  
Textual information, especially if unscripted, can provide valuable information on 
the authors’ personality (e.g., Ramsay 1968; Hogben 1977). Therefore, we make use of 
the fund manager interviews to learn about their level of narcissism and its potential 
impact on investor relevant fund metrics. Following Raskin and Shaw (1988) we 
construct a textual based measure of fund managers narcissism computed as 
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = ∑
∑ 1𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠




where we average the relative usage of first person singular among all first person 
pronouns18 if fund manager 𝑖 in interview 𝑗 over all interviews given by fund manager 𝑖. 
Thus, by definition 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is distributed between [0, 1]; 1 being the highest 
narcissism score attainable and 0 denotes managers that do not show any narcissistic 
tendencies. Moreover, 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is a time invariant narcissism measure, which is in line 
with the DSM-V criteria stating that narcissism is a fairly stable trait (APA 2013). We 
merge our key independent variables, fund managers narcissism, with the mutual fund 
data by fund manager names.19 To synthesize data on fund manager level, we average 
fund characteristics per manager over all funds managed by this manager. We limit 
observations to a manager’s “active” period in a fund taking account of the time period 
in which a manager was in charge of managing a fund. Further, we exclude turnover 
years, in which a change of the fund manager (team) could bias our results.  
We utilize Raskin and Shaw’s (1988) indicator of narcissistic tendencies, as this is 
                                                          
18 1st person singular pronouns comprise I, Me, My, Myself; 1st person plural pronouns comprise We, Us, Our, 
Ourselves. 
19 We are able to match fund managers with fund characteristics one-to-one by verifying each of the manager’s fund 
management history. Thereby, we mitigate potential “John Smith” issues, as fund managers with common names are 
matched accurately to their corresponding fund characteristics. 
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the only unobtrusive narcissism proxy that has been confirmed by experimental 
psychology research.20 Prior research in finance used this measure in order to detect 
narcissism among CEOs (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Aktas et al. 2016; Capalbo 
et al. 2018; Johnson, Kolasinski and Nordlund 2018). 
In the vein of Raskin and Shaw’s (1988), we believe that the measure captures the 
tendency of the respective manager to express superiority towards others. In that, the 
measure indicates his / her feeling of being the central character of the fund instead of 
pointing out that running a fund is rather a team effort given the amount of people 
involved in managing the fund’s assets21.  
Figure IV-1 depicts the distribution of our primary proxy for fund manager 
narcissism, 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 showing an apparent right-skewed distribution indicating that the 
most fund managers do not exhibit high narcissistic tendencies. Moreover, 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 
shows sufficient heterogeneity and features a mean of 0.373 indicating that 37.3% of the 
first person pronouns used by this manager are in the singular form22. Prior studies on 
CEO narcissism observe slightly lower mean scores (Johnson, Kolasinski and Nordlund 
2018: 0.184; Aktas et al. 2016: 0.215 for the acquirer CEO and 0.185 for the target CEO; 
Capalbo et al. 2018: 0.26 and Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007: 0.21). The elevated average 
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 may suggest that fund managers show on average higher narcissistic 
tendencies compared to CEOs. For interpretation reasons, we standardize the measure in 
our multivariate analysis by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation.  
 
  
                                                          
20 In their experimental study, Raskin and Shaw (1988) show that Raskin and Terry's (1988) Narcissism Personality 
Inventory (NPI) positively correlates with the ratio of first person singular to the sum of first person plural pronouns.  
21 We are aware of the measures’ sensitivity to managers talking in their interviews in the role of managers of single-
managed funds vs. team-managed funds (as a count of first person singular vs. plural pronouns should increase 
respectively). Yet, when examining the distribution of NarScore among team managed vs. single managed funds, the 
variation in NarScore virtually does not deviate from the distribution illustrated in Figure 1. Moreover, in section 6.1, 
we touch further upon the impact of team on fund manager narcissism. NarScore distributions for team-managed as 
well as single-managed funds are available upon request. 
22 NarScorei features the following moments: Std dev.: 0.227; 25
th-percentile: 0.185; 50th-percentile: 0.331; 75th-
percentile: 0.524. 
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Figure IV-1—Distribution of narcissism proxy NarScore 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of our main independent variable, NarScore, computed as  
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = ∑
∑ 1𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠
∑ 1𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠+∑ 1𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠
𝑛
𝐽=1   
where 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the relative usage of first person singular among all first person pronouns of fund manager 𝑖 in 
interview 𝑗 over all interviews given by fund manager 𝑖. The sample comprises N=504 interviews conducted with 
N=424 fund managers. 
 
4.2. Univariate evidence 
To illustrate the relation of fund manager narcissism on the respective main fund 
characteristics of interest, Figure IV-2 provides scatter plots with univariate evidence on 
the differences between narcissistic and non-narcissistic fund managers. 
As hypothesized under H1, we spot an apparent increase in style dispersion with 
increasing values of fund manager narcissism. While we do not observe a relation 
between return and narcissism, we find similar results for fund risk (i.e. logarithmized 
standard deviation of returns23). The slope of the fitted values visibly indicates that risk-
taking appears to be positively correlated with narcissism, as would be in line with our 
hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
                                                          
23 Note that we log-transform volatility, as in log form it is much closer to being normally distributed (Andersen, et al. 
2001). 
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With respect to management fees, the univariate evidence points to narcissistic managers 
charging their investors similar fees when compared to non-narcissistic managers, which 
does not support our hypothesis 3 in the univariate context. As can be inferred from the 
last scatter plot, highly narcissistic fund managers appear to manage significantly greater 
funds than their non-narcissistic counterparts. We will test robustness of our univariate 
findings in the next section. 
 
Figure IV-2—Narcissism scatter plots on style, return, risk, fees and size  
 
Notes: This figure illustrates scatter plots using our main independent variable, NarScore, on the horizontal axis and 
different fund manager level characteristics as variables on the vertical axis. Fitted values are indicated by a line. 
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In sum, the results presented in Figure IV-2 provide preliminary evidence in 
support of the hypotheses that fund manager narcissism has a positive effect on deviating 
from their conventional rules of investment style, greater fund risk and larger assets under 
management. In section 5, we examine whether this relationship persists once we control 
for a battery of independent variables which have been shown to explain the respective 
key fund characteristic of interest. 
5. Results  
5.1. Model  
In order to test our main hypothesis of narcissistic manager tendencies on key fund 
metrics from section 2, we run several linear regressions on (collapsed) cross-sectional 
data from our mutual fund sample on fund manager level outlined in 3.2. The generic 
regressions model takes the form 
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 ; 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 ;  𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝑀𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝐼𝑉𝑖 + 𝑖 
(2) 
where 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 captures the effect of fund manager 𝑖’s narcissism on the respective 
dependent variable. 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 denotes Morningstar’s measure of the degree of overall 
scatter of the holdings along both, the value-growth and size dimensions, providing a 
proxy for how consistent a fund manager invests in terms of investment style of a fund as 
outlined in the fund’s prospectus. For interpretation purposes, we dichotomize 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 
using the proposed methodology by Morningstar assigning 1 to managers that on average 
exhibit values above 148, indicating highly style inconsistent portfolio management and 
0 for rather style consistent fund managers. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 captures the performance outcome 
using abnormal returns in excess of the respective fund benchmark, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 captures 
the overall level of risk measured as the standard deviation of (monthly) returns. 
𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 displays the fund’s fees charged for asset management and 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 
denotes the size of the fund in total net assets (million). 𝑀𝐹𝑖 and 𝐼𝑉𝑖 are vectors controlling 
for fund and interview characteristics, respectively. Fund controls are listed in Table IV-1 
and comprise the full set of fund-level determinants found to affect the respective 
dependent variable. (e.g., Cremers and Petajisto 2009; Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi and 
Ruenzi 2018).  
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In a second step, we analyze the relation of fund manager narcissism on investor 
behavior using net fund flows (Fund Flows) as dependent variable. Based on the approach 
of Jin et al. (2016), we estimate the regression model  
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛼1 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1







𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑃𝑜𝑠 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝,𝑃𝑜𝑠
) + 𝛿′𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
′𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 is an indicator variable of fund manager narcissism in the lowest quintile of 
fund manager 𝑖 in month 𝑡 − 1 24. Analogously, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑝
 denotes narcissism in the top 
quintile. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑁𝑒𝑔
 is an interaction between 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 and thus low narcissism and an 
indicator variable denoting negative past performance in 𝑡 − 1, whereas 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑃𝑜𝑠
 denotes 
positive past performance and fund manager narcissism in the lowest quintile 
simultaneously. For this analysis, we utilize a subset of our sample by limiting it first, to 
single-managed funds (which reduces sample size to 399 funds) and second, fund 
managers that only managed one fund throughout their tenure reducing the sample to a 
total of 383 funds. Consequently, total fund-month observations amount to 10,607 for 
which the fund manager in a single-managed mutual fund has been in charge of actively 
managing the assigned fund.  
5.2. Main results  
Table IV-2 reports the main results of our investigation into the effect of fund manager 
narcissism on key fund metrics for our hypotheses 1-4. Specifications (1) and (2) report 
the effect of fund manager narcissism on investment Style Dispersion. We have 
dichotomized our dependent variable (StyleDis) into management styles that do deviate 
from the conventional investment flexibility along a funds’ value, growth and size 
dimension (StyleDis =1) and those that do not (StyleDis = 0). Accordingly, coefficient 
estimates on NarScore display log-odds of a fund manager to deviate from its respective 
‘target’ investment style. Specification (2) provides evidence that narcissistic fund 
managers are about 41% (=exp(0.341)-1) more likely to deviate from their defined 
investment style as stated in the funds’ prospectus. Clearly, this finding is highly 
significant (statistically and economically) and therefore supports our hypothesis 1. Our 
                                                          
24 Please note that in order to capture a time-varying NarScoreit we refer to the raw NarScoreit on the interview level 
rather than referring to averages by fund manager. We impute missing values in-between interviews by fund manager 
using the last observation carried forward (LOCF) method. 
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finding confirms previous findings in the corporate context, (Chen, 2010; Rijsenbilt and 
Commandeur, 2013) in that narcissistic CEOs care less about conventional rules, at least 
with respect to style conformity in the mutual fund context. 
 
Table IV-2—Style, risk, return, fees, size and narcissism 
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Robust s.e.  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N   377 235 373 206 414 211 363 126 418 312 
R2 (adj.)  0.0126 0.0852 0.000 0.206 0.009 0.247 0.002 0.546 0.013 0.118 
Notes: This table shows the regression results of Style Dispersion (StyleDis), Return, Fund risk (logarithmized), 
Management Fees and Fund size (logarithmized) on the narcissism proxy and various fund characteristics and interview 
control variables. StyleDis denotes Morningstar's measure of the degree of overall scatter of the holdings in the most 
recent portfolio along both the value-growth and size dimensions. We dichotomize 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 using the proposed 
methodology by Morningstar assigning 1 to managers that on average exhibit values above 148, indicating highly style 
inconsistent portfolio management and 0 otherwise. Return is measured as the excess returns of the respective 
benchmark return. Fund risk is measured by the logarithmized standard deviation of returns. Fund specific control 
variables are average values by manager over the time a fund manager actively managed the fund(s). NarScore is 
calculated as: (# of first-person singular pronouns/(# of first-person plural pronouns + # of first-person singular 
pronouns)) following Raskin and Shaw (1988). Return denotes estimated 4-factor alphas (Carhart, 1997). We provide 
a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix IV-1. In (1) and (2) logit regressions are estimated due to 
the dichotomous nature of StyleDis. Interview control variables are average values per manager i, for managers that 
gave more than 1 interview, these variables denote the average scores thereof. Adjusted R-squared is reported in the 
last row except for logit regressions in specification (1) and (2), where the pseudo R-squared is reported. t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Statistical significance, denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, 
corresponds to the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
As hypothesized, specifications (3) and (4) show that fund manager narcissism is not 
associated with a significant outperformance. This effect is neither statistically nor 
economically meaningful and confirms the univariate evidence (see Figure IV-2) in a 
multivariate setting. At the same time we find evidence supporting the second part of 
hypothesis 2 (2b) as risk-taking increases with fund manager narcissism. From 
specification (6) follows that an increase in narcissism of the fund manager by one 
standard deviation increases fund risk, as measured by a fund managers’ average standard 
deviation of monthly returns, by approximately 7%25. This relation is not only statistically 
significant at conventional levels, but also economically meaningful and therefore 
underlines our prior findings in the univariate setting (see Figure IV-2), where we 
observed an increase in fund risk for high narcissistic fund managers. Moreover, this 
finding extends literature on the relationship between financial performance, performance 
volatility and narcissism. Although we do not observe significant out- or 
underperformance of narcissistic managers (as do e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; 
Ham et al. 2017) in the CEO context), we are able to underpin previous findings of 
finance research (e.g., Wales, Patel and Lumpkin 2013; Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007) 
as we are able to establish a clear and significant link between narcissism and 
                                                          
25 Coefficient estimate (NarScore) = 0.068, therefore effect on Fund Risk can be measured as exp(0.068)= 1.074, which 
corresponds to an increase of about 7%. Compared to a fund managers’ average standard deviation in monthly returns 
(19.88), holding all things equal, a fund manager with a one standard deviation higher narcissism score features a 
standard deviation of 21.28. 
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performance volatility. We argue that increased fund risk that does not pay off in terms 
of return to the investor may be detrimental to investors. 
Although we document a positive effect of fund manager narcissism on 
management fees when analyzing the unconditional and conditional effect, in 
specification (7) and (8), respectively, we do not find a significant effect– neither 
statistically nor economically26. Hence, we are not able to verify our hypothesis 2 stating 
that more narcissistic managers charge their investors higher fees for management. We 
argue that fund managers – as much as they would like to – are not able to set management 
fees arbitrarily. In fact, the SEC27 points out that ultimately it is incumbent upon the 
fund’s directors to set an appropriate management fee and that negotiating on contracts 
with the advisers belongs to their most important duties on the fund. Thus, narcissistic 
fund managers themselves do not have authority to set the management fees at their own 
discretion and therefore narcissism does not translate into higher management fees.  
Lastly, we find a significant effect of narcissism on fund size confirming our 
hypothesis 4. Analogously to our finding on fund risk, specification (10) underlines our 
finding from the scatter plot. More narcissistic fund managers indeed manage larger 
funds. An increase by one standard deviation in narcissism translates into 10% higher 
assets under management, which corresponds to an average of USD 54.9 million higher 
net assets. In line with Wallace and Baumeister (2002), we argue that fund managers are 
inclined to seek opportunities to make a name for themselves and simultaneously 
appreciate competition where profiling and approval of others is more likely. On the one 
hand, lager assets under management may function as an accolade for narcissistic fund 
managers with which they can gather appreciation from others. As fund managers 
typically receive a percentage of the total assets under management, their compensation 
hinges on the fund size to a certain extent. Therefore, these fund managers are arguably 
pursuing to increase their fund size. Simultaneously, in their quest for appreciation, fund 
managers may prefer to work for greater funds in the first place. 
In sum, we find that narcissistic fund managers are by far (41%) more prone to 
deviate from conventional rules set out by their expected investment style, more likely to 
                                                          
26 An increase in NarScore by one std. dev. increases fee by 0.094%, which compares very small to an average mgmt. 
fee of 0.88%. 
27 SEC Pub. No. 162 (5/14) (https://www.sec.gov/files/ib_mutualfundfees.pdf) 
Fund manager narcissism 
172 
 
engage in riskier investments while exhibiting no outperformance and appear to manage 
greater funds compared to their non-narcissistic counterparts. While we are able to 
confirm hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, our findings do not support hypothesis 3. Management 
fees remain fairly unresponsive and thus a ‘narcissism effect’ may not be observed. 
6. Further analyses  
6.1. Impact of teams on fund manager narcissism 
Nowadays, most mutual funds are not managed by a single fund manager but rather a 
management team in charge of the daily portfolio tasks (e.g., Patel and Sarkissian 2017). 
In this environment, narcissistic tendencies of fund managers may have a different impact 
on the fund metrics. Hence, it might be worthwhile investigating if teams mediate the 
impact of narcissistic fund managers as proposed by the diversification of opinions 
hypothesis (e.g., Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi 2011), in that extreme investment behaviors are 
averaged out. If narcissism would, however, be aggravated in teams, these findings would 
support the opposing literature strand on the group shift theory (e.g., Moscovici and 
Zavalloni 1969; Kerr 1992). This would imply that narcissistic fund managers are able to 
persuade the other fund manager(s) of their opinion and push through their approach to 
investment decision-making. We estimate the linear regression model  
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖  ; 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖  ;  𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 𝑥 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖
+  𝛿′𝑀𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿
′𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖 
(4) 
where we analyze several fund characteristics as defined in our hypothesis in 2.2. and 
include an indicator variable, 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖, which equals one if a fund is team-managed. The 
interaction term 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 𝑥 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖 captures the mediation effect of teams on the fund 
characteristics of narcissistic fund managers. Specifications (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 
IV-3 report coefficient estimates on this model. 
We do not observe a mediation effect of team-managed funds on any of the fund 
characteristics under investigation (StyleDis (1), Return (3), Fund Risk (5) or Fund Size 
(7)). Yet, our finding on Fund Risk, support the general notion made above with regard 
to the ‘opinion diversification theory’ (e.g.; Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi, 2011). Even though 
the effect is not statistically significant, we observe that the direction of the interaction 
term of NarScore x Team is negative. Fund manager teams achieve less volatile 
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performance outcomes, which might be a consequence of a less risk seeking investment 
style. 
6.2. Impact of gender on fund manager narcissism  
There is ample evidence for females being less risk-seeking than men (e.g., Barber and 
Odean 2001). Female managers are found to have different risk preferences and thus 
engage significantly less in risky decision-making, while average performance is 
indistinguishable from those of male fund managers (e.g.; Brenner 2015; Niessen-Ruenzi 
and Ruenzi 2018), and follow more consistent investment styles (Niessen-Ruenzi and 
Ruenzi, 2018). In addition evidence from upper echelon literature suggests that female 
CEOs have been found to work for relatively smaller firms (Khan and Vieito 2013). Thus 
we believe that it is worthwhile to examine the impact of gender on fund manager 
narcissism, as literature suggests that especially the key fund metrics StyleDis, Fund Risk, 
Return and Fund Size may be affected by gender and thus gender potentially takes a 
moderating role of fund manager narcissism.  
Thus, we estimate the linear regression model  
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖  ; 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖  ;  𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ;  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 𝑥 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛿′𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(5) 
where we include a gender indicator variable, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖, which equals one if fund manager 
𝑖 is female. Thus, the interaction term 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 𝑥 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 captures the mediation 
effect of women on narcissism. Specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table IV-3 report 
coefficient estimates on this model. 
As can be taken from the insignificant coefficient estimates, we cannot document 
an effect of gender on the majority of fund characteristics. Except for performance 
volatility, where we find a highly significant effect indicating that narcissistic female fund 
manager exhibit a less risky investment style resulting in less volatile performance 
outcomes compared to their narcissistic male counterparts. Compared to male managers, 
female managers – even if they exhibit narcissistic tendencies – perform less volatile. Our 
findings support the notion that female fund managers engage less in risk-taking actions. 
This effect remains unchanged, even among narcissistic female fund managers. Next, we 
turn to the investors’ side and analyze how narcissistic tendencies of fund managers 
impact their investing behavior as measured by fund flows. 
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Table IV-3—Team, gender, experience and narcissism 
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  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
Time-fund 
FE 
  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
N     233 235 204 206 204 206  126 126  308 312  
R2 (adj.)    0.106 0.0915 0.277 0.206 0.283 0.291  0.426 0,473  0.115 0.115  
Notes: This table shows the regression results of StyleDis, Return, Fund risk (logarithmized), Management Fees and 
Fund size (logarithmized) on the narcissism proxy and various fund characteristics and interview control variables. 
Experienced denotes an indicator variable being equal to 1 for above median tenure, 0 for below median tenure. Gender 
denotes an indicator variable being equal to 1 for female fund managers and 0 for male fund managers. Team denotes 
an indicator variable being equal to 1 for managers that are on average part of team-managed and 0 for managers that 
are on average part of single-managed funds. Style Dispersion denotes Morningstar's measure of the degree of overall 
scatter of the holdings in the most recent portfolio along both the value-growth and size dimensions. We dichotomize 
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖 using the proposed methodology by Morningstar assigning 1 to managers that on average exhibit values 
above 148, indicating highly style inconsistent portfolio management and 0 otherwise. Return is measured as the excess 
returns of the respective benchmark return. Fund risk is measured by the logarithmized standard deviation of returns. 
Fund specific control variables are average values by manager over the time a fund manager actively managed the 
fund(s). NarScore is a standardized measure calculated as: (# of first-person singular pronouns/(# of first-person plural 
pronouns + # of first-person singular pronouns)) following Raskin and Shaw (1988). Ret denotes estimated 4-factor 
alphas (Carhart, 1997). We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix IV-1. In (1) and (2) 
logit regressions are estimated due to the dichotomous nature of StyleDis. Interview control variables are average values 
per manager i, for managers that gave more than 1 interview, these variables denote the average scores thereof. Adjusted 
R-squared is reported in the last row except for logit regressions in specification (1) and (2), where the pseudo R-
squared is reported. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Statistical significance, 
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6.3. Investor reaction to fund manager narcissism  
In this section, we aim to capture the investor response to fund manager narcissism. In 
that, we run panel-regressions, as outlined in section 5.2. If the investor knows their 
respective fund manager and in particular, the fund managers personality traits (i.e. 
narcissism), then we expect them to react to accordingly. This means that in case of prior 
poor performance, we hypothesize (H5) that narcissistic fund managers are able to 
maintain the investors’ money compared to their non-narcissistic counterparts, due to 
their charismatic and persuasive leadership style (as has been established among others 
by (Galvin, Balthazard and Waldmann 2010). Analogously, we expect investors to target 
and invest in the narcissistic fund manager to a greater extent than non-narcissistic ones, 
and thus hypothesize to observe a greater fund inflow in response to good performance. 
Table IV-4 depicts the estimation coefficients of the panel-regression for a subset 
of fund managers, i.e. fund managers that are attributed to one fund only and are the sole 
managers on the respective fund. Specification (1) shows the results including two 
indicator variables pertaining to a narcissism in the highest and lowest quintile; whereas 
specification (2) addresses the investors’ reaction in response to prior positive or negative 
performance. In contrast to our hypothesized impact, our estimation results do not reveal 
any statistically (nor economically) significant effect of fund manager narcissism on 
subsequent investor fund flows.  
We argue that investors are hardly able to detect narcissism among the fund 
manager they invest in. From a retail investors’ perspective, there is little information 
disclosed on the fund manager 28 and in particular information for assessing his or her 
personality traits. Thus, we attribute the inattention of investors to absent information on 
the fund managers’ personality. On the contrary, this negligence also implies that the 
misconduct of fund managers (i.e. engaging in higher risk-taking and style drift while 
performing comparably) exhibiting narcissistic tendencies arguably harms investors to 
the full extent in that they do not have the possibility to evade investing in these fund 
managers. 
  
                                                          
28 Searching e.g., for Peter Dixon, a former Fidelity fund manager, we find no results on Google Finance and 
Morningstar.com provides only the following information: “Peter Dixon is portfolio manager of Retailing Portfolio, 
which he has managed since April 2010. Prior to joining Fidelity Investments in 2006 as a research analyst, Mr. Dixon 
received his MBA from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University” (Morningstar.com). 
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Table IV-4—Narcissism and investor reaction 
  Dependent variable: Net Fund Flows 































Fund controls  YES YES 
Interview controls  YES YES 
Robust s.e.  YES YES 
N  1.185 1.185 
R-squared (adj.)  0.062 0.063 
Notes: This table shows the regression results of Net Fund Flows on quintiles of NarScore and various controls 
variables. Net Fund Flow is computed as (TNAi,t −TNAi,t−1)/TNAi,t−1 −ri,t. NarScore_low represents the bottom quintile 
of NarScore and NarScore_top represents the top quintile of NarScore. The next four dummy variables are the 
interaction between the top and bottom quintiles of NarScore and the sign of past performance (e.g. 
NarScore_low_negt-1 equals to one if a fund belongs to the bottom quintile of NarScore and has negative past 
performance). Ret denotes estimated 4-factor alphas (Carhart, 1997). Due to endogeneity concerns, we lag all other 
variables by one month except the Expense ratio, Skewness, Kurtosis and Turnover which are lagged one year. The 
sample shows monthly observations for fund managers of only one fund that is single managed. We provide a detailed 
description of the applied variables in Appendix IV-1. All regressions include fund and time fixed effects. t-statistics 
provided in parentheses are based on robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund dimension. Statistical 
significance, denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, corresponds to the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
7. Robustness analyses  
In order to rule out that our findings are confounded by our NarScore proxy, we re-
estimate our model using an alternative specification of narcissism. In particular, we use 
LinesofBio that pertains to the number of lines counted in the biography section of the 
respective fund managers LinkedIn profile as alternative proxy for narcissism. This 
measure has already been utilized in similar studies in the CEO narcissism context (e.g., 
Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013; Buchholz, Lopatta and Maas 2019) and serves as a an 
indicator of the fund managers willingness to disclose information on him or her 
experience, past or present jobs and vita. The measure serves as a comprehensive 
extension of our prior analysis in at least two aspects. First, the fund manager is the only 
decision-maker with respect to publicly disclosed content on LinkedIn, thus there is no 
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other party involved that could distort the measure of narcissism. Second, the inclusion 
of a biography and especially the extent of the biography captures another dimension of 
narcissism, “profiling”. In that, the fund managers seek public exposure as an opportunity 
to take pride in him- or herself. Third, we are able to overcome potential limitations of 
the NarScore as proposed in 4.1, as this measure does not rely on context (as does 
NarScore) and can directly be attributed to the fund manager.  
We are able to access and screen 349 out of 424 fund managers LinkedIn profiles for their 
LinesofBio29 and replicate the regression setup outlined in 5.1.  
 
Table IV-5—Alternative specification of narcissism 










Fund Size (ln) 
(H4) 














YES YES YES YES YES 
Interview controls 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust s.e.  YES YES YES YES YES 
Inv. Category FE  YES YES YES YES YES 
N   199 166 171 81 255 
R2 (adj.)  0.110 0.195 0.227 0.392 0.192 
Notes: This table shows the regression results of our alternative proxy for fund manager level of narcissism, NarScore 
(LinesofBio), using the managers LinkedIn profile, on StyleDis, Fund Risk, Return, Management Fees and Fund size 
(ln). We provide a detailed description of the applied variables in Appendix IV-1. Fund specific control variables are 
average values by fund j across the time a fund manager actively managed the fund. Interview control variables are 
average values per manager i, for managers that gave more than 1 interview, these variables denote the average scores 
thereof. Performance extremity is measured following the approach of Bär et al. (2011) utilizing Fama and French 
(1993) 3-Factor excess returns. NarScore is standardized and measured as outlined in section 4.1. Statistical 
significance, denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, corresponds to the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table IV-5 reports coefficients of the linear regression using LinesofBio as 
alternative specification. Even though the effect of our alternative narcissism proxy on 
StyleDis, using the number of lines in the fund manager’s LinkedIn biography, does not 
hold the same magnitude and significance as in our main analysis (Table IV-2), we still 
                                                          
29 LinesofBioi features the following moments: Mean: 1.917, Std dev.: 4.492; Min.: 0; Max: 35. 
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observe a (weakly) significant effect of narcissism on a fund managers’ tendency to 
deviate from its style benchmark. Specifically, the coefficient in specification (1) 
indicates a 3.2% higher probability of narcissistic managers to deviate from their “target” 
investment style. Again, we do not observe any outperformance of narcissistic fund 
managers. While the sign of the effect has been (marginally) positive in our main analysis, 
it switched negative in specification (2) of Table IV-5, supporting our hypothesis that 
narcissistic managers do not outperform their non-narcissist peers. Supporting our earlier 
finding that narcissists are more willing to take risk, our estimate on NarScore in 
specification (3) remains (weakly) significant. The coefficient of 0.032 can be interpreted 
as the impact of an one standard deviation increase in NarScore (corresponding to 
approximately 4 more lines in his LinkedIn biography) translates into a higher standard 
deviation of almost 3.3%30). Regression results applying management fees as dependent 
variable are similar to those of results of return, except that sign of coefficient remains 
constant – however far from being (statistically and economically) significant. Lastly, the 
effect of fund manager narcissism on fund size is still significant under alternative 
narcissism specification. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in narcissism 
is associated with USD14.43 million higher assets under management. In sum, our results 
outlined in section 5.2. have been found to be robust to an alternative specification of 
narcissism. 
8. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this study, we document that the personality trait, narcissism, does indeed have an 
impact on fund management. First, fund managers are evidently less consistent with their 
defined investment style, as proposed by their fund’s prospectus. The failure to adhere to 
rules as proposed in previous findings in business and finance literature (Chen 2010; 
Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013), manifests itself also in the fund manager context in 
that narcissistic fund managers tend to engage more frequently in a style drift. We find a 
statistically and economically significant effect even when controlling for a number of 
previously identified determinants of style drift. Narcissistic fund managers are 41% more 
likely to deviate from their defined investment style.  
                                                          
30 (=exp(0.032)-1. 
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Second, and more importantly, while we find that narcissistic fund managers’ 
average performance is virtually identical to that of their non-narcissistic counterparts, 
the (average) fund risk is significantly higher. This finding is in line with evidence found 
among narcissistic CEOs (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). Interestingly, we find that 
this effect is mediated by gender. Narcissistic female fund managers are significantly less 
risk prone than their male counterparts.  
Third, turning to the perspective of fund managers’ incentives, we document that 
management fees (and thus partly the fund managers compensation) are not significantly 
different for narcissistic fund managers compared to their non-narcissistic counterparts. 
This effect may be attributed to the fact that fund directors are ultimately in charge of 
determining the appropriate fees. Yet, we find a significant effect of fund manager 
narcissism on fund size. The effect is statistically and economically significant with a one 
standard deviation increase in narcissism translating into 10% higher assets under 
management. Our findings suggest that narcissistic fund managers appear to pursue on 
making their mark by managing greater assets under management which typically are 
closely linked to their compensation. 
Lastly, the above findings also raise the question if investors respond to the 
narcissism-induced mismanagement. Are investors aware of their fund managers’ 
personality? We find that investors do not take a fund manager personality, in this case 
narcissism, into account when allocating their funds. We neither find a significant 
reaction after good nor after poor previous performance. In turn, this means that investors 
do not attempt to evade narcissistic fund managers and thus the effect of rather 
detrimental narcissistic fund management (i.e. lower risk-adjusted returns and higher 
style drift) materializes in full. We believe that investors’ inability to detect narcissism 
among the fund manager lies at the root of this issue. 
As we find lower risk-adjusted returns and lower style consistency associated with 
fund manager narcissism and investors tend not to incorporate information on the funds 
managers’ personality, we believe this has important practitioner implications for 
investors and potentially the fund companies. From the investors’ perspective, thoroughly 
acquainting oneself with not only the funds’ performance or investment style, but also the 
fund managers’ personality may be beneficial. We emphasize – supporting the 
conjectures of prior research on behavioral biases among mutual fund managers – that 
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even though information on the fund manager may at times be scarce, it is worthwhile to 
get an impression of the fund manager’s personality the investors entrusts their money 
with. 
From a mutual fund companies’ perspective, we advise recruiters to get an holistic 
impression on the (potential) fund managers’ personality before delegating portfolio 
management tasks of a fund. As narcissism among fund managers has been shown 
detrimental to shareholders without ‘compensating’ fund companies by higher net inflows 
(as could have been the case through ‘charismatic’ leadership), neglecting this personality 
trait can in the long-term endanger fund companies’ prestige and shareholder base. 
  





Aktas, N., E. De Bodt, H. Bollaert, and R. Roll. 2016. ‘CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From 
Private Initiation to Deal Completion’. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51(1), 113–
137. 
American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th edn) 
(DSM-5). American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Andersen, T. G., T. Bollerslev, F. X. Diebold, and H. Ebens. 2001. ‘The distribution of realized stock 
return volatility’. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(1), 43-76. 
Bär, M., A. Kempf, and S. Ruenzi. 2010. ‘Is a team different from the sum of its parts? Evidence from 
mutual fund managers’. Review of Finance, 15(2), 359-396. 
Barber, B. M. and T. Odean. 2001. ‘Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock 
Investment’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261–292. 
Boardley, I. D., and M. Kavussanu. 2008. ‘The moral disengagement in sport scale–short’. Journal of 
Sports Sciences, 26(14), 1507-1517. 
Braun, S. 2017. Leader Narcissism and Outcomes in Organizations: A Review at Multiple Levels of 
Analysis and Implications for Future Research. Frontiers in psychology, 8, 773. 
Brenner S. 2015. The risk preferences of U.S. executives. Management Science 61(6), 1344-1361. 
Brown, K. C., W. V. Harlow, and H. Zhang. 2009. ‘Staying the course: The role of investment style 
consistency in the performance of mutual funds’. McCombs Research Paper Series, No. FIN-04-09. 
Brunell, A. B., and M. T. Buelow. 2017. ‘Narcissism and performance on behavioral decision‐making 
tasks’. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 30(1), 3-14. 
Brunell, A. B., W. A. Gentry, W. K. Campbell, B. J. Hoffman, K. W. Kuhnert, and K. G. DeMarree. 
2008. ‘Leader emergence: The case of the narcissistic leader’. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34(12), 1663–1676. 
Buchholz, F., K. Lopatta, and K. Maas. 2019. ‘The Deliberate Engagement of Narcissistic CEOs in 
Earnings Management’. Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming, 1-24. 
Blanchett, D. M. 2011. ‘Gaming the System: The Impact of Morningstar Category Changes on Peer 
Rankings’. Journal of Investing, 20(1), 33-42.  
Camgoz, M., B. Karan, and A. Ergeneli. 2011. Relationship between the Big-Five Personality and the 
financial performance of fund managers. Current Topics in Management, 15, 137-152. 
Campbell, W. K., A. Goodie, and J. D. Forster. 2004. ‘Narcissism, Confidence, and Risk Attitude’. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17(4), 297-311. 
Campbell, W. K., and J. D. Foster. 2007. ‘The Narcissistic Self: Background, an extended agency model, 
and ongoing controversies’. Frontiers in Social Psychology: The Self, 115-138. 
Campbell, W. K., B. J. Hoffman, S. M. Campbell, and G. Marchisio. 2011. ‘Narcissism in organizational 
contexts’. Human Resource Management Review, 21(4), 268-284. 
Carpenter, M. A., M. A. Geletkanycz, and W. G. Sanders. 2004. ‘Upper echelons research revisited: 
Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition’. Journal of 
Management, 30(6), 749-778. 
Capalbo, F., A. Frino, M. Y. Lim, V. Mollica, and R. Palumbo. 2018. ‘The Impact of CEO Narcissism on 
Earnings Management’. Abacus, 54(2), 210–226. 
Chatterjee, A., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. ‘It’s All about Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and 
Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(3), 
351–386. 
Chatterjee, A., and T. G. Pollock. 2017. ‘Master of puppets: How narcissistic CEOs construct their 
Fund manager narcissism 
182 
 
professional worlds’. Academy of Management Review, 42(4), 703-725. 
Chen, S. 2010. ‘The role of ethical leadership versus institutional constraints: a simulation study of 
financial misreporting by CEOs’. Journal of Business Ethics 93, 33–52. 
Cremers, M., and A. Petajisto. 2009. ‘How Active Is Your Fund Manager A New Measure That Predicts 
Performance’. Review of Financial Studies, 22(9), 3329–3365. 
Doshi, H., R. Elkamhi, and M. Simutin. 2015. ‘Managerial Activeness and Mutual Fund Performance’. 
Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 5(2), 156–184. 
Ellis, H. 1898. ‘Auto-erotism: A psychological study’. Alienist and Neurologist (1880-1920), 19(2). 
Finkel, E. J., W. K. Campbell, A. B. Brunell, A. N. Dalton, S. J. Scarbeck, and T. L. Chartrand. 2006. 
‘High-maintenance interaction: Inefficient social coordination impairs self-regulation’. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91(3), 456–475. 
Finkelstein, S. and D. Hambrick. 1996. ‘Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on 
Organizations’. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minneapolis. 
Foster, J. D., J. W. Shenesey, and J. S. Goff. 2009. ‘Why do narcissists take more risks? Testing the roles 
of perceived risks and benefits of risky behaviors’. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(8), 
885-889. 
Galvin, B. M., D. A. Waldman, and P. Balthazard. 2010. ‘Visionary communication qualities as 
mediators of the relationship between narcissism and attributions of leader charisma’. Personnel 
Psychology, 63(3), 509-537. 
Grinblatt, M., S. Titman, and R. Wermers. 1995. ‘Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio 
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior’. The American Economic Review, 
85(5), 1088-1105. 
Ham, C., M. Lang, N. Seybert, and S. Wang. 2017. ‘CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality’. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 55(5), 1089–1135. 
Hillert, A., A. Niessen-Ruenzi, and S. Ruenzi. 2018. ‘Mutual Fund Shareholder Letters: Flows, 
Performance, and Managerial Behavior’. Working Paper. 
Hogben, G. L. 1977. ‘Linguistic style and personality’. Language and Style Carbondale Ill, 10(4), 270-
285. 
Investment Company Institute [ICI]. 2019. ‘2019 Investment Company Fact Book’. Investment Company 
Institute. 
Jin, L., A. Eshraghi, R. Taffler, and A. Goyal. 2016. ‘Fund Manager Active Share, Overconfidence and 
Investment Performance’. Working paper. 
Johnson, S. A., A. Kolasinski, and J. Nordlund. 2018. ‘CEO Narcisissm, Human Captital and Firm 
Value’. Working Paper. 
Jones, B. D., T. Woodman, M. Barlow, and R. Roberts. 2017. ‘The Darker Side of Personality: 
Narcissism Predicts Moral Disengagement and Antisocial Behavior in Sport’. The Sport 
Psychologist, 31(2), 109–116. 
Kerr, N. L. 1992. ‘Group decision making at a multialternative task: Extremity, interfaction distance, 
pluralities and issue importance’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 64–
95. 
Kets de Vries, M. K. 2004. ‘Organizations on the Couch: A clinical perspective on organizational 
dynamics’. European Management Journal, 22(2), 183-200. 
Khan, W. A. and J. P. Vieito. 2013. ‘Ceo gender and firm performance’. Journal of Economics and 
Business, 67, 55-66. 
Kim, B. H. 2018. ‘Is narcissism sustainable in CEO leadership of state-owned enterprises?’. 
Sustainability, 10(7), 2425.2438. 
Kumar, S. and N. Goyal. 2015. ‘Behavioural biases in investment decision making – a systematic 
Fund manager narcissism 
183 
 
literature review’, Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 7(1), 88–108. 
Lakey, C., P. Rose,W. K. Campbell, and A. Goodie. 2008. ‘Probing the link between narcissism and 
gambling: The mediating role of judgment and decision-making biases’. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making. 21, 113 - 137. 
Lewellen, K. 2006. ‘Financing decisions when managers are risk averse’. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 82(3), 551-589. 
Li, F. 2010. ‘The information content of forward-looking statements in corporate filings - A Naïve 
Bayesian machine learning approach’. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(5), 1049 - 1102. 
Loughran, T., and B. McDonald. 2011. ‘When is a Liability not a Liability? Textual Analysis, 
Dictionaries, and 10-Ks’. Journal of Finance, 66, 35–65. 
Loughran, T., and B. McDonald. 2016. ‘Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance: A Survey’, Journal 
of Accounting Research, 54(4),  
Lubit, R. (2002). The Long-Term Organizational Impact of Destructively Narcissistic Managers. The 
Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005), 16(1), 127-138. 
Maccoby, M. 2004. ‘Why people follow the leader: the power of transference’. Harvard Business Review, 
82(9), 76-85. 
McCrae, R. R., and O. P. John. 1992. ‘An Introduction to the Five‐Factor Model and Its Applications’. 
Journal of Personality, 60, 175-215. 
Morf, C. C., and F. Rhodewalt. 2001. ‘Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self-regulatory 
processing model’. Psychological Inquiry, 12(4), 177-196. 
Moscovici, S. and M. Zavalloni. 1969. ‘The group as a polarizer of attitudes’. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 12, 125–135. 
Niessen-Ruenzi, A. and S. Ruenzi. 2019. ‘Sex matters: Gender bias in the mutual fund 
industry’. Management Science, 65(7), 3001-3025. 
Patel, S., and S. Sarkissian. 2017. ‘To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual Fund Databases’. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(5), 1989-2021. 
Penney, L. M., and P. E. Spector. 2002. ‘Narcissism and Counterproductive Work Behavior: Do Bigger 
Egos Mean Bigger Problems?’. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 10(1-2), 126–
134. 
Petrenko, O. V., F. Aime, J. Ridge, and A. Hill. 2016. ‘Corporate social responsibility or CEO 
narcissism? CSR motivations and organizational performance’. Strategic Management Journal 37, 
262–279. 
Price, S. M., J. S. Doran, D. R. Peterson, and B. A. Bliss. 2012. ‘Earnings conference calls and stock 
returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone’. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4), 
992-1011. 
Puetz, A., and S. Ruenzi. 2011. ‘Overconfidence among professional investors: Evidence from mutual 
fund managers’. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 38(5‐6), 684-712. 
PWC. 2017. Asset & Wealth Management Revolution: Embracing Exponential Change. 
Ramsay, R. W. 1968. ‘Speech patterns and personality’. Language and Speech, 11(1), 54-63. 
Raskin, R., and C. S. Hall. 1979. ‘A Narcissistic Personality Inventory’, Psychological Reports, 45(2), 
590. 
Raskin, R., and R. Shaw. 1988. ‘Narcissism and the use of personal pronouns’, Journal of Personality, 
56(2), 393–404. 
Raskin, R., and H. Terry. 1988. ‘A Principal-Components Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory and Further Evidence of Its Construct Validity’. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(5), 890–902. 
Fund manager narcissism 
184 
 
Rijsenbilt, A., and H. Commandeur. 2013. ‘Narcissus Enters the Courtroom: CEO Narcissism and Fraud’. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 117(2), 413–429. 
Salton, G. and M. J. McGill. 1983. Introduction to Modern Information Retrieval. McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., New York. 
Solomon, D. H., E. Soltes, and D. Sosyura. 2014. ‘Winners in the spotlight: Media coverage of fund 
holdings as a driver of flows.’ Journal of Financial Economics, 113, 53–72. 
Twenge, J. M., and W. K. Campbell. 2009. ‘The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Eentitlement’. 
Simon and Schuster. 
Uziel, L. 2007. ‘Individual differences in the social facilitation effect: A review and meta-analysis’. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 41(3), 579–601. 
Wales, W. J., P. C. Patel, and G. T. Lumpkin. 2013. ‘In pursuit of greatness: CEO narcissism, 
entrepreneurial orientation, and firm performance variance’. Journal of Management Studies, 50(6), 
1041-1069. 
Wallace, H. M., and R. F. Baumeister. 2002. ‘The performance of narcissists rises and falls with 
perceived opportunity for glory’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(5), 819–834. 
  




 Appendix IV-1—Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description Source 
Interview-related variables  
NarScore Narcissism proxy that denotes the number of first-person singular pronouns/(number 
of first-person plural pronouns + number of first-person singular pronouns) following 
Raskin and Shaw (1988) said by fund manager i in the interview. The variable denotes 




∑ 1𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠




For interpretation purposes, we standardized the measure. 
TWST 
Tone Tone is calculated as (Positive words - Negative words)/(Positive words + Negative 
words) based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary. The variable denotes 





# Words (ln) Natural logarithm of the number of words said by a fund manager during his/her 
interview. The variable denotes the average per fund manager i in case of multiple 
interviews. 
TWST 
# Sentences (ln) Natural logarithm of the number of sentences said by a fund manager during his/her 
interview. The variable denotes the average per fund manager i in case of multiple 
interviews. 
TWST 
# PS Pronouns Number of first-person singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine and myself) said by a fund 
manager during his/her interview. The variable denotes the average per fund manager 
i in case of multiple interviews. 
TWST 
# PP Pronouns Number of first-person plural pronouns (we, our, ours, ourselves) said by a fund 
manager during his/her interview. The variable denotes the average per fund manager 
i in case of multiple interviews 
TWST 
Fund manager – personal characteristics  
Tenure Total tenure of mutual fund manager i. MoSt 
Gender Gender is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if manager i is female and 0 if manager 
i is male. 
MoSt 
LinesofBio Based on Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013) as well as Buchholz et al. (2015) 
LinesOfBioi counts the lines of biography that a manager i published on LinkedIn. 
LinkedIn 
Fund manager – fund characteristics  
Fund Agej (ln) Logarithm of the fund age computed from the date of a fund's inception. The variable 
denotes the average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed. 
MoSt 
StyleDis StyleDis measures the (average) degree of overall scatter of the holdings in the most 
recent portfolio along both the value-growth and size dimensions per fund manager i. 
The metric is calculated from the Value-Growth Dispersion Metric and Size Dispersion 
MoSt 
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Metric according to the Pythagorean theorem: SQRT(Value-Growth Dispersion Metric 
+ Size Dispersion Metric). The variable denotes an average per fund manager i in case 
of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. In our 
regressions, we dichotomize 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖  using the proposed methodology by 
Morningstar assigning 1 to managers that on average exhibit values above 148, 
indicating highly style inconsistent portfolio management and 0 otherwise. 
Fund size (ln) Logarithm of total net assets under management. The variable denotes an average per 
fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
MoSt 
Return Denotes the monthly return in excess of the fund j's respective benchmark. The variable 
denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Turnover A fund’s quarterly turnover ratio in percent reported in Morningstar Direct. The 
variable denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and 
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Fund Risk Standard deviation of monthly returns. The variable denotes an average per fund 
manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
MoSt 
Expense Ratio A fund’s quarterly expense ratio in percent. The variable denotes an average per fund 
manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
MoSt 
TNA Total Net Assets of fund j measured in month t. The variable denotes an average per 
fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
MoSt 
Team  Team is an indicator variable that which is equal to one if the fund is managed by a 
team and zero otherwise for fund j. The variable denotes an average per fund manager 
i in case of multiple funds managed. 
MoSt 
Net Fund Flow (Monthly) net fund flows are the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested 
dividends, computed as  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 (𝐹𝐹)𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes fund i’s total net assets (TNA) in month t and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 denotes fund 
i’s return in month t as reported in MoSt. The variable denotes an average per fund 
manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
MoSt 
Return (4F) Performance alpha estimated using the extension of the Fama and French (1993) model 
by Carhart (1997) including factor returns for the market, HML, SMB and UMD 
factors from the Kenneth French data library. The variable is estimated on a monthly 
basis, denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt, 
KF 
Segment Flow (Monthly) net fund flows of all funds in a Morningstar segment, computed as  
 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
 − 𝑟𝑗,𝑡  
Where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 denotes segment j’s total net assets in month t and 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 denotes segment 
j’s equal weighted return in month t. The variable denotes an average per fund manager 
i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Family TNA Total net assets of fund family (company). Refers to the total net assets reported in 
Morningstar Direct managed by a fund family. The variable denotes an average per 
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fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
# Stock Holdings Total number of (long) equity (stock) holdings in the a fund The variable denotes an 
average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
MoSt Rating  
(1 to 5 stars) 
Morningstar rates mutual funds and ETFs from 1 to 5 stars based on how well they 
have performed (after adjusting for risk and accounting for sales charges) in 
comparison to similar funds and ETFs. Within each Morningstar Category, the top 10% 
of funds and ETFs receive 5 stars and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. The variable 
denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Kurtosis Kurtosis indicates the yearly degree of ‘peakedness’ of the return distribution for fund 
j. The variable denotes an average per fund manager i and is winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Skewness Skewness measures the yearly degree of asymmetry from the normal distribution for 
fund j. The variable denotes an average per fund manager i and is winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Max Drawdown Measures a portfolio’s maximum loss in a peak-to-trough decline before a new peak is 
attained. It is quoted as the percentage between the peak and the trough and measured 
on a yearly basis. The variable denotes an average per fund manager i and is winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
12b-1 Fee Component of total fees that is attributed for marketing and distribution expenditures. 
The variable denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed 
and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
NarScore_low Indicator variabe that is equal to one for values of the bottom quintile of NarScore and 
zero otherwise. 
TWST 





Indicator variable that equals to one if a fund belongs to the bottom quintile of 
NarScore and has negative past performance, and zero otherwise. 
TWST, 
MoSt 
NarScore_top_neg Indicator variable that equals to one if a fund belongs to the top quintile of NarScore 
and has negative past performance, and zero otherwise. 
TWST, 
MoSt 
NarScore_low_pos Indicator variable that equals to one if a fund belongs to the bottom quintile of 
NarScore and has positive past performance, and zero otherwise. 
TWST, 
MoSt 
NarScore_top_pos Indicator variable that equals to one if a fund belongs to the top quintile of NarScore 
and has positive past performance, and zero otherwise. 
TWST, 
MoSt 
Mgmt Fee The management fee is reported as an actual percentage that was deducted from an 
investment's average net assets to pay the investment's management. The variable 
denotes an average per fund manager i in case of multiple funds managed and is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
MoSt 
Notes: This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The data sources are: (i) MoSt: Morningstar 
Direct Database (ii) TWST: The Wall Street Transcripts (iii) LinkedIn: Online profiles on LinkedIn (iv) KF: Kenneth 
French Data Library (v) L&McD (2011) dict: Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary.  
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Appendix IV-2—TWST interview excerpts 
Interview 1: 
"[…] 
TWST: I thought perhaps to get started, maybe you could tell me a little bit about your process and the 
current makeup of your portfolio and maybe about the parameters that you use in terms of sectors and cap 
size. 
 
Mr. Montemaggiore: It’s good to start here because everything comes back to philosophy and process. For 
me, essentially what I am trying to do is buy better-than-average or high-quality businesses when I think 
they are on sale or trading at valuations that are not indicative of their future earnings power. I’m trying to 
find the intersection of quality and price, and that’s across geographies, across sectors, I really don’t 
distinguish, and it’s across market caps as well. So I don’t have a whole lot of limits in terms of the size of 
the company. 
 […] 
TWST: And tell me a little bit about the sectors in your portfolio at present and where you’re overweight 
and where you’re underweight. 
 
Mr. Montemaggiore: From a sector perspective, I am overweight health care, technology and consumer 
discretionary. And then there are these groups of companies that I’m overweight called business services. 
They generally have a lot of the characteristics I look for. It’s hard to categorize, and most of them are 
categorized as industrials. But essentially they are capital-light, they don’t have big manufacturing plants, 
they tend to provide a service for companies, and they tend to lower a company’s cost. So they are an 
outsourcing-type business, whether it’d be call centers, whether it’d be a chemical distributor, there are a 
number of these really interesting niche businesses that fall under business services that have fantastic 
characteristics that I found across the world, and I lump them together in business services. […] 
 
Vincent Montemaggiore - Portfolio Manager at Fidelity Management & Research Company. He co-




Ms. Kessler: We sold the last of our utility holdings recently and now have no exposure to what we perceive 
to be an overvalued sector. That’s illustrative of the process of selling into momentum and stretched 
valuations, and redeploying gains into undervalued issues. We also sold a company that was a beneficiary 
of activist activity as well as merger discussions: Staples (NASDAQ:SPLS). We bought Staples a couple 
of years ago and sold it recently with a nice gain. […] 
 
TWST: You are at over 9%, and the S&P is at 8.25%. How have you been able to perform better than the 
S&P 500? 
 
Ms. Kessler: Our goal is to outperform in strong markets while protecting client assets in down markets. 
We’re now in our seventh year of a bull market, and our portfolio returns have been solid. But just as 
importantly, we want to protect on the downside. That’s where the attention to intrinsic value relative to 
valuation of an individual stock becomes critical to, we hope, build a cushion in challenging markets. […]" 
 
Marian L. Kessler - Portfolio Manager at Becker Capital Management, Inc. She co-manages, among 
others, the Becker Value Equity Fund with Blake Howells, Steve Laveson, Andy Murray, Thomas 
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